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ABSTRACT 
 
Reclaiming Waste, Remaking Communities: Persistence and Change in Delhi's Informal 
Garbage Economy examines the unanticipated impact of expanded municipal garbage collection 
services in Delhi, India in the mid-2000s through public-private partnerships (PPP) that 
included collection trucks and incinerators. Drawing on twenty months of ethnographic research, 
I ask how it is that informal collectors, who rely on pedal-powered tricycle carts and their hands 
to extract recyclables, have survived the expansion of these formal services that threatened their 
livelihoods and the city's only system for recycling. Despite being heavily supported by the 
government, these PPP services were effectively stalled and transformed by the resilience of the 
collector-recyclers’ unofficial enterprise, ensuring the continuation of a recycling network. The 
manuscript addresses the following questions: What do economic relations look like in this 
context, and what kinds of moral economies configure them? How are social relations and status 
distinctions reproduced and transformed through transactions of garbage and money? And how 
does the legacy, experience, and threat of stigmatization—embodied in the idea and object of 
garbage and ranging in scale from individual practice to global reputation maintenance—shape 
transactional possibilities? Revealing how forms of economic life across multiple scales depend 
on caste/community relations, the navigation of caste and (post)colonial stigma, and the 
reproduction of status through transactions, the dissertation brings together literatures from 
economic sociology and anthropology, political ecology, and theories of caste/race in order to 
explain persistent forms of unofficial economic organization.
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Introduction: Transacting in the Informal Garbage Economy 
 
 “But recycling doesn’t exist here like it does in your country.” I heard this not once, but 
three times, on a single day doing garbage rounds door-to-door as part of my two-year 
ethnographic engagement with informal collectors in Delhi. My attempt to convince a resident 
that the collector standing next to me made his living by recycling was met with indignation: 
“But look at his hygiene! 1 What an unsanitary condition. In India, there is no recycling.” To him 
and many other middle-class Delhiites I spoke with, recycling meant shiny plastic bins, 
uniforms, and roaring collection trucks—not laborers in plain clothes outfitted with large sacks, 
worn tricycle carts, and just their bare hands. Yet, with more than half of all plastics recycled in 
India (Nandy et al. 2015), compared to less than 10 percent in the United States (EPA 2015), 
the data tell a different story.  
Reflecting these modernist ideals, Delhi’s government expanded and mechanized the 
city’s garbage collection services through private-public partnerships (PPPs) between 2006 and 
2009, introducing small collection trucks into selected neighborhoods.2 Notably, the system did 
not include recycling, but instead prioritized so-called “waste-to-energy” incineration 
technologies. If Delhi’s middle- and upper-class, and overwhelmingly upper-caste,3 residents 
voiced support for such programs, their actual choices indicated otherwise: a majority continued 
to patronize the very informal collectors that were so widely stigmatized as “dirty.”  
Uncounted, but probably numbering in the hundreds of thousands in Delhi alone, 
Delhi’s informal collectors have been estimated to divert around forty percent of household 
garbage for recycling, saving the local government an estimated US$74 million per year (Hayami 
 
1 I use italics to indicate when English words were used in Hindi sentences.  
2 For similar cases in Egypt, Senegal, and South Africa, see Kuppinger (2014); Fredericks (2013); 
and Samson (2015), respectively. 
3 I use “upper-caste” to refer to Hindus and Jains whose jati (caste community) is savarna, i.e. 
not Dalit or “untouchable.”   
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et al. 2006:63; UN-Habitat 2010), and they are the nation’s only system for recycling. With the 
introduction of PPP-truck services, informal collectors’ territory has diminished, while the 
construction of incinerators and planned closure of existing garbage sheds (kuredan) posed 
longer-term threats to their livelihoods. Many feared that the full-scale dispossession of informal 
garbage collectors and recyclers was imminent (Chaturvedi and Gidwani 2010; Chintan 2007; 
Schindler, Demaria, and Pandit 2012). But, for the time being, they have continued working—
collecting garbage, harvesting scrap, and selling it for cash—all without the authorization of the 
government. What the future holds for them is an open question, but no doubt the threads of an 
answer can be spun out of the processes we are witnessing in the present. And more broadly, 
their trajectory reveals transformations in the socio-economic context of contemporary urban 
India and beyond. 
 The story of expanding garbage services in Delhi, which was part of a larger national 
agenda, and the everyday hybridization that resulted—with garbage trucks running alongside 
informal collectors’ tricycle carts—reveals more than state planning and its failures. In order to 
understand why recycling in Delhi has persisted, we must understand that institution itself: its 
constituent practices, habits, relations, and sources of stigma—along with the social institutions 
that shape it. The story cannot be a neat one. For one, definitions of and delineations between 
“state,” “market,” and “civil society” are far less apparent in a postcolonial context where a 
corporation had governed large swaths of the country in the name of Britain for more than 200 
years. And in this case, the local state created a new market for garbage by funding companies 
directly, while a longstanding but informal system had already existed.  
In this introduction, I survey concepts that help to make sense of the life and 
reproduction of this informal economic institution, beginning with ideas of statehood and 
informality and moving into an approach to economic sociology that centers transactions in 
order to analyze materials and the reproduction of social status. 
 
Genesis of the Project 
This project took shape based on questions of environmental politics and organizational 
forms. I was interested in understanding why corporations were being formed by NGOs to 
provide garbage services in some Indian cities such as Patna, with a broader interest in the 
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“corporatization” of NGOs. I soon learned that these efforts, which were already limited, were 
proving unsuccessful. I began to wonder what their competition—large infrastructure 
companies—portended for the large existing garbage collection and recycling workforces (locally 
called “ragpickers” or “watepickers”) that these NGOs represented. I began fieldwork in Delhi 
because the city had been an early adopter of new solid waste plans, creating a city plan to 
address solid waste, following the Solid Waste Rules of 2000, and abiding by national 
recommendations that garbage services be contracted out to infrastructure companies. I arrived 
in 2013, planning to look at the interaction between those working for these newly deployed 
companies and the existing informal economy collectors who had provided garbage collection 
services to local households for decades. 
 As I planned for a preliminary field visit to neighborhoods in Delhi that had received the 
full suite of door-to-dumpsite garbage collection services, the political economy literature had 
primed me to witness the inevitable destruction of the informal recycling economy. I expected to 
find that a disaggregated economy of garbage collectors and scrap recyclers would be rapidly 
dispossessed of the materials they relied on for a living, the exchange value accumulated and 
extracted by the state and its partnered companies. The situation presented many of the 
hallmarks of a classic case of accumulation by dispossession descried by David Harvey and his 
adherents: the neoliberal PPP form combining state legitimacy with corporate capital, an 
objective of accumulating waste in order to extract value, and centralized capital-intensive tools 
like incinerators that would assist in the task. Like peasants, manual garbage collectors relied on 
dispersed sources of value for their own reproduction—sources that could be accumulated to 
leave them dispossessed. 
 No doubt, this narrative had become dominant because it has been so common: across 
the globe, communities are brutally dispossessed and displaced, as states and corporations—
themselves frequently blurred institutions—have cleared the way for extracting timber, 
constructing dams, commodifying land, or in this case, usurping garbage. And yet, while such  
processes of destruction via accumulation and commodification are widespread, they are not 
inevitable or complete. With the question of why a full-scale dispossession did not occur, this 
project’s impetus became to explain how, in the face of direct threats from more capital-intensive 
and state-endorsed institutions, a large workforce of tricycle-powered garbage collectors and 
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recyclers managed to continue working. Answering this question required going beyond the 
institutions of political economy, incorporating insights from cultural economic sociology and 
anthropology in order to make legible a wider variety of motivations, expectations, sources of 
power, and relations.  
 
Methods 
In many cities across the globe, and especially those of the formerly colonized global 
South, large workforces earn livings by recovering scrap from garbage (e.g. Medina 2007; 
Vergara and Tchobanoglous 2012). Although the most well-known example of waste collectors 
in these “megacities” are those working on colossal garbage dumps, less discussed are the millions 
of people—referred to here as collectors—who provide daily household garbage services with the 
goal of harvesting the re-sellable, recyclable material it contains. Recognizing the larger 
implications of this project, which include not only garbage collectors but urban life at the 
intersections of the economic and environmental more generally, my approach came to reflect 
that of an earlier tradition defined by Max Gluckman (1959) as the “extended case method,” 
which was later adapted by Michael Burawoy (1998). This form of ethnography guided mid-
twentieth-century British anthropology, which was similarly concerned with how large-scale 
political-economic forces—and particularly the introduction of money and law through colonial 
institutions—were reflected in particular ethnographic encounters. This lens, along with the light 
historical comparison it invokes, usefully brings into focus larger historical influences that shape 
power relations in practice and requires attending to processes of social change using a relational 
approach to ethnographic practice (Desmond 2014).  
The data presented here are drawn from ethnographic fieldwork in Delhi that included 
participant observation, 97 interviews, and document collection, the bulk of which was 
conducted between 2013 and 2015. I spent nearly two years documenting the informal 
organization of garbage collection and recycling in Delhi—working alongside collectors, helping 
to sort and sell their scrap, and following plastics and papers up the commodity chain to the 
factories where they were eventually recycled—also contextualizing this process vis-à-vis formal 
policies. Working primarily in Hindi, I completed 54 interviews with informal garbage 
collectors, 20 interviews with recyclable buyers and business owners who purchased their scrap, 
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and 23 interviews with public officials such as policymakers, bureaucrats, private company 
managers, and civil society advocates.  
Combining breadth with depth, my fieldwork included visiting several work sites and 
interviewing a range of actors across the metropolis, concentrating on three particular sites in the 
northwest, northeast, and south of the city. This strategy allowed me to access detailed evidence 
while also understanding how it mapped onto more general trends. I initially gained access to my 
field sites through a community organizer who traveled to waste collector settlements to talk 
with them about organizing for rights, but he had varying levels of ongoing involvement in those 
areas. He did not have regular relations with people in the site that I spent the most time in 
(which was also where the trucks were operating regularly), in northwest Delhi, where Almaas4 
was the local scrap buyer and had hundreds of collectors selling their recyclables to her.  
I started there and in northeast Delhi by conducting interviews with informal recyclers, 
often hanging out after they ended, drinking tea and talking with workers about their lives or 
helping them to sort and sell their scrap. After a few months, I was able to convince some of 
them to take me out with them on their collection routes, which I did for around 6 months in 
northwest Delhi. In one neighborhood, I knocked on the doors of 19 households and asked 
them why they chose to use the trucks or the informal collection system. I spent an average of 
three days each week over the course of 20 months at my primary field site, watching collectors 
return from their routes, sort their materials, and engage in various transactions. On occasion, 
this also meant accompanying someone to the hospital, or more often, joining Almaas as she met 
with buyers and other associates in the course of conducting business. Eventually, and only after 
many months of fieldwork, collectors were willing to share their accounting books with me that 
documented loans and payments for scrap. I was able to document the books of five collectors 
who narrated their financial history.  
When I joined six different informal collectors on their garbage collection routes between 
November 2013 and March 2014, I would wake up at five or six o’clock in the morning and meet 
them on the street (to take advantage of a ride in the back of their still empty tricycle cart). In the 
 
4 A female boss is rare. I never encountered another one during my time in the field, and when I 
told people who worked in this sector for decades about a female buyer, they were always very 
surprised. Our shared gender was a significant factor in me getting entrée to this site. 
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case of Meenu, who I joined more regularly, I tended to meet him in the neighborhood where he 
worked because it was close and I got to know it well. Throughout the morning, and sometimes 
into the early afternoon, we would walk through the neighborhood’s lanes—pushing the tricycle 
cart by its handles, collecting buckets of trash, and doing a first sort by hand to separate garbage 
from recyclables in the cart. Typically, I helped to sort the garbage, but I also collected the pails 
and talked to local residents and other workers we encountered along the way. In the evenings, I 
spent time with collectors in their nearby home settlements, where I would continue my 
interviews or hang around while women oiled their hair, men drank tea and played cards or 
gambled, recyclables were sold, and accounts were calculated. These periods of observation were 
necessary for building rapport that interviews alone could not have afforded. For example, I later 
realized that in a few early interviews, recyclers told me that they worked door-to-door when 
they actually collected from the street. Others exaggerated how well residents treated them, 
presumably in order to counter the intense stigmatization they were often subjected to. When I 
had trouble understanding the social context of their villages of origin, I took 2 trips to villages in 
West Bengal—nearly a 20 hour trip each way by train—observing and interviewing local 
residents. 
The 24 interviews I conducted with city leaders and officials included solid waste 
managers, local and national bureaucrats, and advocates and activists. During interviews, I asked 
about their professional and personal backgrounds, their role in planning or implementing 
garbage programmes, and their assessment of the changes that have been introduced in recent 
years. In addition to interviews, I also went on site visits with bureaucrats and private company 
managers that included collection and transfer processes, as well as disposal sites such as landfills 
and incinerator complexes. The 20 interviews conducted with recyclable scrap buyers and 
business owners asked about their backgrounds, how they run their business on a daily basis, how 
their business had changed over the years, financial ties up and down the chain, their relationship 
to legal structures like registration and taxes, and their ambitions for the future. 
All interviews were conducted by me in Hindi or English, except in the case of seven 
collectors who preferred to speak in their first language of Bangla during a brief period when I 
worked with a research assistant in 2015. Although standard Hindi was not the first language of 
many collectors, most had been living in Delhi long enough to know it well. Hindi was the 
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language used on neighborhood collection routes because it was the common language between 
me, the collectors, and the other neighborhood actors (residents, informal contractors, municipal 
workers, etc.). The interviews were transcribed by native Hindi speakers in Delhi to ensure that I 
would not misunderstand anything that was said. Once they were transcribed, I used Atlas.ti to 
organize the data into themes from which I could draw in order to elaborate key parts of social 
and material processes or illustrate theoretical points, using an iterative process (Decoteau 2016). 
 
Informality and “the State” 
The sociological canon took the European transition to modernity as the primary process 
to be explained. Tonnies’ Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, Maine’s status to contract, Weber’s 
traditional to legal authority, Durkheim’s mechanical to organic solidarity, and Marx’s feudalism 
to capitalism (and then communism): all were seen as steps towards, if not immediate then 
eventual, improvement. As state influence grows, the logic goes, official forms of political and 
economic organization would decimate unlicensed activities—if not because they are more 
efficient or preferable, then because state regulations and enforcement prove formidable. From 
the margins (the workers, the colonized), however, these projects were of course seen differently, 
and even for many of these thinkers, the transition was seen as never being fully complete. 
Informality has been a crucial term indicating residual life beyond modern categories. 
The concept of an “informal economy”5 was itself first introduced in the 1970s to make legible a 
vast array of actually existing economic activities for development economists (Godfrey 2011), 
with the progenitor of the term later explaining, “The informal sector allowed academics and 
bureaucrats to incorporate the teeming street life of exotic cities into their abstract models 
without having to confront the specificity of what people were really up to” (Hart 2006: 28). 
Anthropologists such as Hart, as well as Clifford Geertz, had allied themselves with economists 
in the project of national development, focusing their studies on normative desires to promote 
what they considered to be more efficient and rational organizations in order to spur economic 
growth. The informal economy concept allowed large sections of national populations to come 
into the view and under the purview of policymakers—especially development and labor 
 
5 See Castells and Portes 1989 and Feige 1990 for two of the most commonly cited definitions. 
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economists who sought to improve conditions through various interventions. Such a category is 
useful in that it allows us to say, for example, that informal economies provide livelihoods to 
around sixty percent of workers across Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Vanek et al. 2014). 
Yet, the concept also entails a problematic modernist teleology positing postcolonial 
contexts as atavisms, and it has been forcefully and rightfully criticized (e.g. Elyachar 2003; 
Millar 2018; Roitman 2005). Meanwhile, ideas of state-society dualism have been challenged by 
accounts suggesting that “informal” spaces are in fact deeply entangled with, if not themselves 
produced by, state power (Roitman 2005; Roy 2005). And yet, despite these vital criticisms, the 
concept of informality remains descriptively (if not theoretically) useful for indicating spaces 
where the state—and especially its laws and regulations—do not predominate. To dispense with 
the term would, I believe, impoverish our ability to analyze the extent and limits of state 
authority, even while the need to reformulate the concept is imperative.  
However, while naming the “informal” makes a set of activities and relations legible in 
order for organizations to intervene, it is an inadequate organizing concept for explaining the 
practices that comprise these diverse forms of economic life. But just as there are an enormous 
variety of issues collected beneath the umbrella of the formal economy, so too are extra-legal 
economies rich and diverse terrains of social interaction and organization. Lumping these 
activities into a single category has served to efface the practices that constitute these forms of 
economic life, which have becoming increasingly blurred by transformations that include the so-
called “gig economy” and the rise of temporary, part-time, and contracted work even in the 
formal economy. As Barbara Harriss-White aptly describes, these spaces “are persistently 
embedded in social institutions such as the state, language, caste, ethnicity, religion, gender, life 
cycle, space/locality, and … the needs of the local agro-ecology” (2009:172).  
In order to contend with the contents of Delhi’s informal garbage economies from a 
decolonized perspective that avoids epistemological assumptions (cf. Savransky 2017), I had to 
realize that my own perspective had been colonized by a particular idea of the state itself—that 
power which is so pervasive, and so often obscured, that it can appear inevitable (Foucault 1991; 
Mitchell 1999). By thinking of nonstate economic spaces as “informal,” I had inadvertently 
consented to their relegation as deviant, unless I accepted a postcolonialist claim that, here too, 
the state was paramount (Chatterjee 2004; Roy 2005). Institutionalist development perspectives, 
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meanwhile, framed the persistence of informality as a failure of state capacity or authority due to 
a lack of institutional independence (e.g. Evans 1995), an ineffective bureaucracy (e.g. Chibber 
2002), or an inability to “see” everyday life (Scott 1998). Yet, such narratives are themselves 
dependent on particular ideals, born in the West, of what states “should be,” rather than the 
reality that actually is (Li 2005; Roy 2009; Scott 1998). To take the state and its categories for 
granted is to ignore variations in how states cultivate authority, and how state forms vary by 
cultural context (cf. Steinmetz 1999). Once state formation is conceptualized as an ongoing and 
uneven process, it becomes clear that the form and extent of state influence over social life varies 
considerably (e.g. Bourdieu 2014; Mayrl and Quinn 2016), and especially so in formerly 
colonized nations (e.g. Gupta 2015; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Migdal 2004; Soifer 2008). 
Theorizing how authority is consolidated—and frustrated or resisted—in practice is therefore a 
crucial task (Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Painter 2006; Trouillot 2001).  
Considering why unofficial practices like recycling persist does not address processes of 
state formation from the perspective of the state, but rather from the margins (cf. Das and Poole 
2004; Fassin 2015; Roitman 2004), for “[t]he extent to which states are successful in establishing 
their claims to encompass the local is […] not preordained, but is a contingent outcome of 
specific sociopolitical processes” (Ferguson and Gupta 2005:114). Following the foundational 
studies of James Scott and others, other writers have shown how practices such as unlicensed 
vendors claiming street space are by their very nature “insurgent” because they limit state 
authority by encroaching on territory (Bayat 2000). In this sense, actors rely on the “weapons of 
the weak” (Scott 1985), but they do not have a pre-determined effect (Benjamin 2008). In the 
context of India, as Shatkin and Vidhyarthi (2013) have argued, there is a need to better 
understand the particular vicissitudes of urban statehood because the literature has tended to 
either posit it either as totally unique, or as an unqualified manifestation of global neoliberalism. 
Useful here is Jonathan Anjaria’s (2011) idea of “ordinary states,” which posits urban state-
making as a negotiated, everyday process. Instead of starting with a particular idea of the state 
and then analyzing its actions and effects, Anjaria’s framing allows for a consideration of how 
state-society relations are co-produced through everyday interactions in what he calls “ordinary 
spaces of negotiation.” I demonstrate that it is on this level of everyday practice that both state 
authority and its limits become both visible and real to ordinary actors. For, even while processes 
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of accumulation, the ideas that promote them, and the state actors who facilitate them have 
become globally dominant, they are grafted onto existing patterns of social life—coopting, 
displacing, purging, or perhaps reinforcing existing relations and institutions in the process.  
 
An Economic Sociology of Transactions 
Continuing its focus on everyday forms of practice that takes relations as primary objects 
of analysis, this dissertation contributes to what Viviana Zelizer (2012) has called “relational 
economic sociology,” featuring an understudied facet of global economic life in order to 
understand the culture of its economy (cf. Wherry 2012). As Zelizer describes, this approach 
“posits that in all areas of economic life people are creating, maintaining, symbolizing, and 
transforming meaningful social relations” (Zelizer 2012:149). Relational economic sociology 
might be seen, in part, as a response to the fact that while foundational texts in economic 
sociology considered many forms of economic life, the “new economic sociology” has tended to 
focus on organizations like corporations, nation-states, and financial firms that enjoy higher 
levels of global legitimacy and legibility to majority white, western academics. In other words, 
“economic sociology constituted itself as that part of sociology that deals with the objects of 
economics, rather than economic objects broadly conceived” (Fourcade 2007: 1017; see also Zelizer 
2006, 2008). This can be traced further to the subfield’s implicit tendency to divide the world in 
two, which is made explicit in Granovetter’s landmark 1985 article where he distinguishes 
traditional from modern economies in order to explain that he is concerned only with “modern 
capitalist society” (70). Demonstrating both a modernizing perspective that assumes 
organizational forms to be moving towards formalization, based on the experience of the U.S. 
and the “First World” (Pletsch 1981; see also Steinmetz 2005), the durable effect has been to 
limit the forms of economic life considered to be worth studying.  
While the informal economy as a conceptual domain emerged only in the 1970s, studies 
of economic life had long included people and processes beyond the reaches of bureaucratic and 
legal control, especially in the field of anthropology. Reimagining economic life beyond “the 
market” or “capitalism” means considering these studies in order to move towards the broader 
objective of decolonizing economic sociology. As E.P. Thompson aptly observed:  
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We know all about the delicate tissue of social norms and reciprocities which 
regulates the life of Trobriand islanders, and the psychic energies involved in the 
cargo cults of Melanesia; but at some point this infinitely-complex social creature, 
Melanesian man, becomes (in our histories) the eighteenth-century English 
collier [coal miner] who claps his hand spasmodically upon his stomach, and 
responds to elementary economic stimuli. (1971:78) 
The capitalist relations that disturbed Marx, Polanyi, and so many other critical theorists have 
swept the globe in successive waves of colonization and imperialist “globalization.” And yet, even 
where capitalist relations become deeply normative, other logics remain. These hybrid logics are 
especially apparent in places such as the informal economies of Delhi, where markets are 
configured through relations and institutions that often confound those molded in service of 
speed, anonymity, and particular ideas of efficiency. As the Thompson passage suggests, the line 
drawn between so-called “traditional” and “modern” economies—whether explicitly or 
implicitly—problematically reinforces western capitalist assumptions of how economic life, and 
social institutions more generally, should work. 
In order to supplant this problematic binary, we must bring the discipline historically 
tasked with understanding the so-called “third world” together with that which has been tasked 
with the first, suturing the historic division in which anthropologists studied “gift” and 
sociologists analyzed “market” societies (Douglas 1990). Karl Polanyi is a key lynchpin between 
anthropology and sociology, urging for grounded institutional analyses that spanned multiple 
forms of economic life (Polanyi 1957). According to him: “the market cannot be superseded as a 
general frame of reference unless the social sciences succeed in developing a wider frame of 
reference to which the market itself is referable” (Polanyi 1957:270; see also Krippner 2001). 
This is especially true in former colonies, where institutionally plural contexts were engendered 
through processes of encounter, conquest, and rupture. 
 
Bringing in Economic Anthropology 
Instead of examining the “market,” then, we consider transactions. Transactions bring 
into focus the everyday practice of participating in economic life, while also making apparent the 
contingency and potential for transformation that those practices entail. Turning to economic 
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anthropology, we begin, of course, with Mauss. It would be difficult to say much that is new 
about Mauss’ essay Essai sur le don, which was published in French in 1925. But it is important 
to lay out his central arguments here because the text is not widely engaged with in economic 
sociology. Mauss aimed to develop a theory of the gift that contributed to an understanding of 
“total social systems,” as, following Durkheim, he was in search of sources of social solidarity that 
bound people together. He recognized that modes of provisioning were integral to community 
structures and relationships, rather than cleaving them off as a separate “economic” sphere. 
Mauss took on a number of questions in his panoramic essay. At its heart, The Gift is concerned 
with explaining social contracts and exchange through the specific question of why the gift is 
“obligatorily reciprocated,” effectively completing a cycle (3). Mauss describes what he calls a 
“general theory of obligation” (12), defining three distinct moments of the process: the obligation 
to give, the obligation to receive, and the obligation to reciprocate. Through acts that initiate, 
acknowledge, and continue the process of gift exchange, social systems were said to establish 
moral and spiritual practices while providing for those who participated.  
 To be perfectly clear, Mauss posits these actions as obligations, not as the voluntary or 
altruistic acts that the concept “gift” signifies in everyday conversation or in some analyses. The 
obligation to give implies the existence of a social obligation to be generous. Yet to be generous 
here has a double meaning: on the one hand, it is to freely share what is available, and on the 
other, it gives the impression that one is a generous person. In service of the latter, the former 
obligation must be adhered to, but actors navigate this mandate according to their own positions 
and dispositions. To be generous, actors must engage in acts of invitation, for as Mauss 
describes: “To refuse to give, to fail to invite, just as to refuse to accept, is tantamount to 
declaring war; it is to reject the bond of alliance and commonality” (13).  
If the mandate to give seems logical enough, the mandate to receive or accept is more 
counterintuitive. It is important to remember that Mauss’ ambition is to demonstrate larger, or 
even “total,” systems of exchange by breaking them down into component actions. On the 
obligation to accept during the potlatch, for example, Mauss cites Boas, explaining that to accept 
in a redistributive system is to recognize another—in other words, to acknowledge and accept 
their social position relative to one’s own (40). To refuse to acknowledge, to refuse to accept, is 
to present a challenge to one’s own position in relation to the position of the giver (41)—for 
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example, for a leader to assert dominance over a competitor, or for a subordinate to refuse to be 
held in another’s debt. To decline an offer is also to deny responsibility or refuse to engage in a 
relationship of mutuality.  
 Finally, reciprocation completes the cycle. If a gift is accepted “with a burden attached,” 
as Mauss tells us citing Boas (41), forcing the recipient to “take on weight” (117 f.n.161), it is 
much like a conversation that begins with a question demonstrating interest in a longer 
exchange. After an initial response, another question might be posed or an initial statement 
elaborated, implicitly signaling interest in engaging in conversation. Similarly, the obligation to 
reciprocate a gift confirms the importance of the relationship. Reciprocation may happen 
immediately, or it may be extended over a longer period of time, with delays concealing that the 
action is indeed reciprocal. Instead, the countergift is offered as a gift in its own right (Bourdieu 
1996). Alternatively, the obligation of reciprocation may take the form of credit/debt—a social 
obligation that binds actors together in dependent relationships between dominants and 
subordinates, which continues until the debt is repaid. Two features are important here: the form 
of the relationship between the two actors, and the kind of object being given, received, and 
reciprocated. For Mauss, these cohered in the object of the gift. The gift, he maintained, 
contained something of its giver, creating a moral obligation to return it.  
 Published a few years before Mauss’ essay but in English, Malinowski’s Argonauts of the 
Western Pacific (1922) offers the empirical depth that Mauss’ short essay cannot. Drawing on 
fieldwork carried out during a stay in Melanesia that was delayed by the outbreak of World War 
I, this first of many detailed monographs laid out the Kula, which he described as “an extremely 
big and complex institution, both in its geographical extent, and in the manifoldness of its 
component pursuits” (Malinowski 1984:83). Malinowski traced a process of exchange that 
entailed an opening gift, followed by subsequent sets of exchanges. The Kula ring, Malinowski 
explained, was constituted by bonds created through initial gifts and continued with objects 
known as vaygu’a that circulated between islands: large mwali shell-bands worn on the arm in 
one direction, and soulava necklaces crafted from the red spondylus shell in the other. Once this 
link was established, trade partners were connected and able to make requests of one another—
for example, for food and a place to stay when they visited the island as part of an expedition (see 
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also Gluckman 1965:174). Exchange, then, became a reason to share other fundamental aspects 
of human life: the potentially pacifying effects of trade.  
  Yet these analyses tend to focus on times before European imperial conquest and the 
spread of statist, capitalist forms of governance. To find the culture in the Kula ring of the 
Trobriand Islands or the potlaches of the Kwakiutl was easy: since the ethnographer was outside 
of the system, its features could more readily be integrated into a theory of culture, while one’s 
own culture became the standard for comparison. Yet the timing of these studies meant that the 
societies under ethnographers’ lenses were themselves undergoing rapid transitions due to the 
imposition of colonial institutions. There is a deep irony in the fact that ethnographers were busy 
documenting internally referencing cultures from a structuralist perspective at the very moment 
that the world was being rapidly connected through colonial technologies. Yet if we read these 
texts as implicitly comparative, they become amenable to a wider range of meanings and relations 
than might be readily visible in contemporary capitalist settings. For, as another anthropologist 
more recently observed, “the main ideal-typical distinction between gifts and standard market 
forms of credit/debt may be [that]…the gift ‘contract’ is silent and invisible (or ‘misrecognized’), 
whereas the commodity contract is enunciated and visible” (Peebles 2010:229).  
 
Spheres of Exchange 
As Mauss describes, whether and how people and communities are obligated to return a 
“gift”6 depends on their relationships and the particular expectations associated with them. 
Indeed, transactions are so important because they create social bonds between individuals, 
groups, and institutions—bonds that may be individual, temporary, and fleeting, but which more 
 
6 Indicating the range of meanings not only in different contexts, but even between the French 
and English versions of his essay, Mauss uses four French words with slightly different meanings 
in the original text—don, cadeau, présent, and prestation—all of which are translated into English 
as “gift.” Guyer (2016) carefully charts the etymology of each words in her introduction to the 
new translation of Mauss’ work, noting in particular how prestation implies notions of status 
differentiation, rendered in Mauss’ conclusion as “total prestation,” which is used to describe all 
aspects of a given society. 
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commonly indicate relations of longer-term patterns of social reproduction. The ability to form 
and maintain bonds in Trobriand society were a central aspect of status; those who were able to 
participate in kula exchange—not every person (or even every man)—gained higher status on 
account of being involved. Some islands, however, were represented by their leader, a king, who 
would undertake the process of exchange on their behalf.  
 When Zelizer was beginning her work in the 1980s in sociology, anthropologists were 
engaging in a parallel set of debates over the role of gifts and how they created what were 
described as “spheres of exchange.” (e.g. Bohannan 1955; Guyer 2004; Sillitoe 2006), or groups 
that designate which things can be treated as ontologically analogous for the purposes of 
exchange, such as yams and corn, and which things should not, such as corn and cows. The idea 
of spheres of exchange was an important conceptual tool for schematizing how differentiated 
social ties could be bundled according to particular kinds of materials and values without an 
assumption of a capitalist market. Notably, all kinds of goods and social relations were included, 
with nothing considered too sacred. In his foundational piece, Paul Bohannan identified three 
spheres that demarcated subsistence, prestige, and kinship forms of exchange amongst the Tiv 
community he studied, for example, each of which contained different objects and had their own 
moral associations: yams in one; brass rods, cows, cloth, and slaves in another; and women for 
marriage in the third. Trading within each sphere was called a “conveyance,” and these were 
relatively insignificant features of everyday social life, according to Bohannan.  
Exchanges between spheres, however, were more significant. Labeled “conversions,” 
these were the thresholds across which social status could be cultivated, offering the possibility of 
a successful marriage. However, since only some people had access to higher status goods, Tiv 
leaders could create a monopoly over cultural capital,  preventing others from acquiring the 
things that would allow them to claim rival status. The introduction of capitalism through 
colonial rule, Bohannan expounded, complicated these analytically neat “spheres” by creating a 
quasi-fourth sphere that consisted of currency. This was forced onto the Tiv through taxes that 
had to be paid in money instead of agricultural yields and by enforcing laws that banned marriage 
exchanges, in which women were traded between families as wives, allowing a brideprice to be 
paid in cash.  
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The production of these kinds of long-term relationships raises central questions of social 
reproduction: How were intimate partnerships and communities formed via transactional 
relations? How did ethnic groups coalesce? How were status positions generated? Considering 
the connections between short-term transactions and long-term social reproduction allowed for 
not only conceptualizing the enactment of such social categories and boundaries, but their very 
production. These become clearer with anthropologist Jane Guyer’s concept of “transactional 
pathways,” which breaks down “spheres of exchange” in order to trace “the historical constitution 
of conversions and wealth creation, under turbulent conditions” (Guyer 2004:30). These 
pathways are dynamic and multi-institutional, allowing for what Bourdieu (1977:195) refers to as 
“social alchemy,” or the “endless reconversion of economic capital into symbolic capital” (Guyer 
2004:30).  
Especially due to imperial rule, the introduction of western capitalism created new 
transactional possibilities, with money holding out the promise of traveling between them, as 
Bohannan described. In other words, “[t]he alchemy of money, with its power of 
commensuration, lies in its ability to dissolve distinctions between value schemes or measuring 
rods, and to create the fiction that a flattened, comparable world exists. We make and live both 
realms continuously” (Gudeman 2001:15). To say this is not to claim that money’s significances 
are predetermined, but rather to acknowledge that it has an inherent possibility, if not 
inevitability, for commensuration (Espeland and Stevens 1998). 
The boundaries between these realms, importantly, also define distinct moral economies 
(cf. Fourcade 2017), with the distinction between short- and long-term forms of exchange 
depending on who constructs the boundary, what it consists of, and what its character means for 
the relationship between institutions on either side (cf. Lamont and Molnar 2002). While state-
organized capitalism tends to posit a bright moral boundary that makes some objects, and 
especially human life, profane in the market, even these boundaries vary by context in both their 
location and transparency/opacity. Consider, for example, the concept of dowry or brideprice. 
Such practices are not only widely stigmatized in contemporary western contexts, they are said to 
pollute the ideal of individual choice in the institution of marriage. However, if we view the 
giving of expensive engagement rings as a mandated expense, the two customs can appear to 
similarly constitute a significant investment that solidifies an agreement to marry; while one is 
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explicit, the other is disguised. The construction of a moral boundary between “market” and 
“nonmarket” practices for these kinds of disguised transactions reinforces the idea that explicitly 
financial transactions are polluting to intimate relationships. In Zelizerian terms, this constitutes 
a “hostile worlds” perspective (e.g. Zelizer 2000), holding that market transactions and intimate 
relations are like oil and water: the two should not mix. Zelizer instead practices a hybridized 
model—what she calls “differentiated ties”—in order to understand how actors themselves define 
relevant relations and institutions through their economic practices. By deciding which kinds of 
payments are gifts, entitlements, or compensation, she elaborates, “people incessantly match 
different forms of payment to their various intimate relations” (Zelizer 2000:826). The “market,” 
then—that ambiguous if utopic site of anonymized, carefully indexed transactions that tend to 
accrue profits to large corporate firms—becomes just one, albeit extremely powerful, realm 
amongst several.  
To return to Guyer, transactional pathways help to bring these multiple kinds of relations 
into perspective on a flatter terrain. In other words, if we accept that ties are differentiated 
according to transactional patterns, then those tendencies might cohere, if not into spheres, then 
perhaps into something more akin to fields or institutions in which particular values and stakes 
structure social differences (Bourdieu 1977, 1993). Structuralist accounts might then be 
leveraged but then unhinged, their basic insights providing a scaffold for theorizing forms of 
capitalist development that are rooted in context-specific meanings and transformative processes. 
Transactional obligations remain central—not because of the “total” system that Mauss 
described, but rather out of a sense of responsibility and desire for moral goodness. As a result, 
“[t]he life course, in all its puzzling and uncontainable mutuality and indeterminate time 
horizons, reinstates itself again” (Guyer 2012:500). Both social stability and change become 
apparent, as these responsibilities break down, are interrupted by more powerful institutions, or 
shift according to actors’ own cultural reference points and strategies for action. 
 
Why Materials Matter 
Central to any sociology of transactions are the materials through which they are 
conducted. These objects and the interpretations they afford are not a distinct realm formed a 
priori, but rather influences that shape the social process itself. For example, in contrast to the 
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garbage that Delhi collectors sort through by hand to harvest recyclable scrap, which has 
polluting and stigmatizing effects, I demonstrate that the money exchanged during moments of 
account-keeping signals pure and redemptive possibilities. Central to this process is making the 
polluting substances of garbage and garbage-laden scrap more neutral or even positive in the 
quest for money, paid out in cash, which can used to gain a slightly higher social status. Yet this 
conversion of garbage for money violates existing transactional orders by commensurating the 
pure and the sacred with the polluted through processes of exchange. Such pathways imply a 
temporal dimension in which objects come to take on different meanings and values, which may 
be more or less commodified (cf. Kopytoff 1986). As fuel for incinerators, for example, garbage 
becomes a singular commodity, in contrast to its multiple forms when sold as recyclable scrap or 
recuperated for repair and re-use (Corwin 2017; Isenhour and Reno 2019). 
For Mauss, it was the animation of objects themselves that compelled the obligation to 
return a countergift. If the meanings that inhere in money are determined by social practice, 
rather than by abstracted ideas of “the market” or prefigured relations of capital (e.g. Gilbert 
2005; Hart 1986; Keane 2010; Maurer 2006; Parry and Bloch 1989; Zelizer 1989), then the 
conditions of its exchange reveal how institutional, relational, and cultural contexts configure 
processes of status (re-)production—much like cows, pigs, iron rods, and grain, or, for that 
matter, good taste. As debt and credit, money becomes abstracted: an obligation to return 
something that has not yet been fulfilled, resulting in an ongoing relationship (Gluckman 1965; 
Graeber 2011; Peebles 2010). Cash, in contrast, tends to reflect a form of money that is oriented 
into the future, allowing for the fulfillment of moral commitments and obligations (Keane 
2008:32), and affording imaginings of life yet to come. This holds out potential sources for social 
redemption, as objects afford conversions between social institutions and geographies (i.e. work 
and marriage; village and city). It soon becomes clear that “at issue in indigenous critiques of 
money is often not so much its alienating and corrosive effects per se as its unequal distribution” 
(Keane 2008:29). I find here, too, that it is not money (or by extension, capitalist markets) that is 
seen to be profane per se; rather it is how it can compel certain groups to engage in stigmatizing 
and devalued work in order to acquire it. 
Exchanges, then, involve not only quid pro quo trades of scrap for cash, but the transfer 
and transfiguration of stigma. Tracing these becomes a central task in this manuscript, which 
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shows how exchanges of garbage and money occur in practice with multiple partners and 
institutions who frame, use, and value materials in different ways. Incinerators require amassed 
plastics and cardboards and are run by large companies with few workers, while informal 
collectors sort those materials into multiple subcategories. Meanwhile, door-to-door collectors 
sell stale bread that they harvest from household garbage to local dairy farmers, or they might 
simply exchange it for milk. Plastics tend to be recycled in Delhi by small informal factories, 
while cardboard is sold through smaller dealers before making its way to large registered 
recycling plants, providing a living to multiple small business operators and laborers along the 
way. Not only are goods differently circulated within the informal economy; so too do payment 
systems vary. Some transactions involve negotiated amounts for scrap sold by weight, which are 
paid upon receipt, while others entail longer-term debt and account-keeping practices in which 
payments are delayed over time, rates are variable, and money is paid out both in the form of  
advances for longer-term reproductive needs and short-term cash payments for daily expenses. 
 
Regulation via Status 
What matters, then, is not only that actors relate via transactions, but that those 
transactions are actually productive of relations themselves, along with the institutions they 
engender. Elsewhere I have theorized this as a kind of jurisdiction, extending Abbott’s (1988) 
concept to include the territorial, in order to consider how informal jurisdiction can be secured 
over a profession, service, or territory (Kornberg 2020). I introduced the idea of practical 
legitimation in order to describe the process through which groups obtain recognition from actors 
endowed with capital and status to obtain legitimacy (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008; Johnson, 
Ridgeway, and Dowd 2006:69–71), affording them the institutional authority to challenge 
formal laws (e.g. Bayat 2000; Scott 1985), and ultimately, persist over time (cf. Suchman 
1995:574-575). I call this outcome status-based regulation, or the process through which roles, 
relations, and expectations based on status (here, class and community/caste) come to structure 
institutions via everyday transactions. These sources of regulation are enacted in practice as actors 
are bound together through their transactional ties and the meanings and moralities they 
engender.  
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As such, this project contributes to the urgent need for work analyzing how the 
institution of “caste” is being reproduced in contemporary India, especially in urban settings. 
While caste in India has been overdetermined both as the Weberian concept of a rigidly defined 
hierarchy and the Brahminical concept of four rigid varnas, caste (a Portuguese word that was 
introduced under British colonization) is also very much a folk concept when rendered as jati in 
Hindi, connoting something more like “community” or “ethnicity.”7 My approach contributes to 
theories of caste formation grounded in practice, which acknowledge both the rigidity of 
structure and the potential for transformation (e.g. Bentley 1987; Wimmer 2008). This moves 
away from modernist ideas of caste as a traditional relic (cf. Jodhka 2015:5) while also eschewing 
exceptionalist ideas of caste as particular to India.   
The relationship of social and ritual pollution to occupational and economic position has 
long been at the heart of the recognized sources of social difference across South Asia. Like race, 
caste is deeply intertwined with economic possibilities, with one of its defining features being 
that it is a system of status formation based on ideas of purity and pollution derived from 
Brahminical norms. Pollution avoidance has long been recognized, in particular, as a mechanism 
for this (e.g. Marriott and Inden 1977:233), and while it has also been overstated as the 
generator of a cohesive “caste system,” it remains an important mechanism for delineating social 
differences. In other words, if not a closed or clearly defined “system,” caste “continues to be 
significant as a source of cultural capital that enters into the reproduction of class differences” 
(Harriss 2012:2). Indeed, the recent experiential and comparative turn in studies of caste reveals 
dynamic sets of practices, for example around the promotion “merit” in higher education, that 
structure processes of status-making and domination, and which can simultaneously provide 
support for upper-caste claims of living in a caste-blind society (Subramanian 2019). When seen 
as a system of “ascriptive hierarchies” (Jodhka 2015), caste groups can be seen as relating within 
dynamic social fields, in which some groups wield power in its multiple forms that allows them 
to attain and ascribe status. Such ascriptions may occur through practices of pollution and 
humiliation (Geetha 2009; Guru 2009), servility (Ray and Qayum 2009), employment 
 
7 See Guha 2013, Chapter 1 for a comprehensive discussion of the etymology of the word “caste” 
in the Indian context. 
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discrimination (Deshpande and Newman 2007), and residence in particular neighborhoods 
(Vithayathil and Singh 2012). 
To develop how social distinctions marked by caste and ideas of ritual pollution—key 
sources of cultural capital that engender social and economic power—I reach back to the work of 
McKim Marriott,8 who documented complex systems of substance transfers with the ambition of 
creating a more general formula for determining social status. Marriott (1968) detailed the flow 
of food transactions (i.e. staples, cooked meals, food waste) in a village, with the goal of 
determining which caste groups were able to give which kinds of food to whom. According to 
Marriott: 
An occupation is a kind of behavior rendered as a service by one caste for another 
caste. The servant gives away honor or purification, (thus raising his master's 
caste’s rank); he takes on pollution or otherwise demonstrates his inferiority by the 
service, thus lowering his own caste’s rank.... Pollution in an interactional 
hierarchy is not innate, but always social, always a matter of giving and taking, of 
adding and subtracting. (1959:98) 
Instead of reifying these relations into a rigidly mapped hierarchy, however, I take them to 
indicate vital processes that link material flows with the generation of status via transactions, 
which help to account for how roles and positions change over time. In the context of this case, 
for example, I find that collectors look to a future when they have converted waste into money, 
and then capital, in order to build homes in their villages of origin where they will never have to 
sort through garbage again. And, even when they are not low-caste per se, collectors develop 
dispositions, or habituses, through their rural experiences of being landless laborers, doing 
manual work (dirt sticks under the nails much like garbage does), and being subordinated to the 
whims of land-owning groups. Perhaps, the logic goes, transacting with scrap today in Delhi will 
bring a more comfortable and respectful life in the village someday.  
 
*   *   * 
On my first visit to my primary field site in northwest Delhi, where Almaas is the 
 
8 I am grateful to Lee Schlesinger and John Matthias for introducing me to Marriott’s work. 
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primary buyer and boss of the collectors, I was on the back of Arif’s motorcycle from the nearby 
metro station. Turning left from the main road, which was wide and freshly paved if still 
constantly jammed, we rode down a smaller street lined with shops on one side and tall 
apartments under construction on the other. Suddenly, when the road veered off to the right, we 
continued straight onto the unpaved and bumpy trail riddled with muddy brown potholes. Off to 
the left and laid out in front of us were more shacks, or jhuggis, than I could count—all made of 
discarded plastic placards, rice sacks, and tarps tightly secured onto bamboo poles. Getting off 
the motorcycle, we walked to our right to enter one of the huts.9 A woman stood waiting to greet 
us, and I turned to say “salaam alekum,” which she for some reason found to be hilarious. Inside 
sat two Muslim leaders (wearing white caps and flowing attire) on the side of the space, while 
Almaas was at a table in the front of the room. She commanded some of us sitting in chairs as an 
audience, while treating bystanders waiting for her as people with whom she did not need to 
show any interest. I noticed that she had teeth so straight and clean it seemed as if someone had 
held a ruler to them to keep them in line, and there was not a speck of dirt under her fingernails. 
Her skin was smooth and creamy, and her hands looked like she had just finished trimming her 
nails and applying lotion. She was wearing a bright salwar kameez, including a fluorescent yellow 
and green dupatta that she kept over her head, creating a ballooning drape that appeared almost 
regal in contrast to the scene surrounding her. Her speech was precise; her tongue whipped her 
teeth in just the right places to pronounce the dental and retroflex staccatos of the Hindi she 
spoke with only a slight Bangla accent. On the table, a large two-liter bottle of Limca soda had 
been placed along with small plastic glasses for us.  
When I began my fieldwork, I expected to be surrounded with garbage. I knew that there 
were various categories of scrap that were sorted and had seen lists compiled by others who had 
documented their local names (e.g. “guddi,” “HM”). What took me by surprise, however, was the 
constant exchange of cash—often in large amounts—which was far more important to my 
respondents than the trash-harvested materials that surrounded them. Meanwhile, buyers like 
 
9 This hut would go through multiple iterations over the course of my fieldwork, starting out 
kaccha, or made of bamboo and plastic, and then becoming a brick structure that would 
eventually be plastered and have CCTV monitors inside. I mention the site again at the start of 
Chapter 5. 
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Almaas made it clear that, despite working directly with collectors, they were not collectors 
themselves. Contrary to others who have commented on scrap collectors’ and buyers’ pride in 
their knowledge of the various materials, I saw this only rarely, instead finding that collectors and 
buyers tended to regard the recyclable scrap with indifference, if not disdain: they were the 
transient objects that had to be contended with in order to obtain money. In contrast to the 
ontological status of waste material, which was in flux both geographically and categorically, 
money was seen as more stable and dependable, if always inadequate. And, despite being 
physically tainted—smudged, worn, and manipulated (written on, folded)—by the many hands 
and substances it came into contact with, currency endured as a relatively pure object. It was, for 
example, kept close to the body. Almaas, like many women, kept hers tucked into the top part of 
her bra, so that it was held against her skin. 
*   *   * 
With this in mind, the manuscript addresses the following questions: 
• What do economic relations look like in this context, and what kinds of moral economies 
configure them?  
• How are social relations and status distinctions reproduced and transformed through 
transactions of garbage and money?  
• And how does the legacy, experience, and threat of stigmatization—embodied in the idea 
and object of garbage and ranging in scale from individual practice to global reputation 
maintenance—shape transactional possibilities?  
These questions are intended to address the larger issues of the (re-)production of inequality in 
cities more generally, along with promising to bring deeper insight to processes of economic life 
and environmental governance at the intersections of race/ethnicity/caste.  
I begin the manuscript by analyzing the production of a hybridized system of garbage 
collection, demonstrating some of the historical-geographical roots of contemporary urban 
inequalities. I then detail, from an everyday perspective, how neoliberal forms of environmental 
governance became entangled with informal recycling systems in practice, with informal 
collectors newly navigating the PPP trucks. I survey the particular relations—between newer and 
older groups of informal collectors, informal collectors and middle-class residents, and scrap 
buyers—that create transactional webs structuring informal recycling systems and form a 
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substantive challenge to government-supported programs. Across these, I show how the 
motivation to maintain or improve social status engenders durable bonds.  
Chapter 1 takes up the question of  why Delhi expanded formal garbage collection 
services in the early 2000s. The chapter includes a historical and geographical overview of the 
city and uses the moment of the Commonwealth Games in 2010 as a focal point for shifting 
forms of urban environmental policymaking, and especially new garbage programs that were 
rolled out in Delhi in 2009. Chapter 2 compares the formal programs introduced in the previous 
chapter to the informal recycling system, with a focus on the garbage materials themselves. In 
contrast to formal programs, which have emphasized incineration, I demonstrate how informal 
recyclers rely on categorical distinctions made between different kinds of materials, which are 
apprehended through multiple senses, unlike predominantly upper-caste bureaucrats and 
engineers who attempt to create a singular category of fuel, invoking a kind of alchemy that 
creates pure substances from diverse materials. I examine neighborhood-level decisions in 
Chapter 3, asking why residents choose to give their garbage to either informal recyclers or the 
government trucks. I demonstrate that informal collectors had an advantage over the trucks 
because they allow middle-class residents to avoid the stigma of being seen touching garbage in 
public, affirming their higher status.  
I pursue the resident-collector dynamic further in Chapter 4, asking why informal 
recyclers have been willing to take on the stigma of garbage collection, as Muslims not 
historically engaged in dirty work. Building on my analysis of status transformations in Chapter 
2, I take up the question of stigma, following informal recyclers between the city and village to 
examine their relation to waste and capital across geographies, showing that the positive and 
potentially redemptive power of money enables collectors to regard dirty work as an opportunity 
for rural social mobility, while their Balmiki employers realize some benefits in the city. In 
Chapter 5, I ask how long-term economic relationships are rendered durable between informal 
collectors and the buyers to whom they sell their scrap. Getting paid, I show, is a highly 
personalized event that reinforced long-term bonds between buyers and collectors. I show how 
these structural features are created through cycles of payment for scrap that are not immediate, 
but rather entail long-term debts and reciprocity that include non-monetary provisions like 
housing and medical care, which includes The stability of this relationship built on tensions of 
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exploitation and care provides another source of social structure that regulates the recycling 
economy. I conclude the manuscript with a discussion of how these processes become relevant 
for considerations of urban governance, economy, and sustainability. 
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CHAPTER I 
Making Delhi “Clean”10 
 
Why did the city of Delhi expand formal garbage collection services in the early 2000s? 
This chapter addresses this question, offering a historical and geographical overview of the city 
and using the 2010 Commonwealth Games as a critical moment to reveal forms of 
environmental meaning and action. Analyzing post-2000 attempts to overhaul solid waste 
systems, I also provide a critical overview of national legislation and focus on how this mandate 
was taken up in Delhi. I then discuss the new, expanded garbage programs that were rolled out 
in Delhi in 2009, contrasting them with the existing cluster of waste collection actors who had 
long been operating informally and sustained large-scale recycling.  
 
Environmental Politics as Class Politics 
The modern domain of the “environment,” and particularly sanitation, has been a key site 
for propagating forms of social stigma that reinforce class and caste differences across Indian 
cities. Contemporary urban scholars have documented the widespread tendency of urban 
authorities to use environmental claims in order to remove groups and activities that violate 
official notions of public order—including slum removal, the eviction of street vendors, removal 
of industries, and displacement of workers (e.g. Anjaria 2009; Baviskar 2003; Bhan 2009; 
DuPont 2011; Ghertner 2011a). While the needs of the poor are readily denied by recourse to 
claims of environmental damage, elite conceptions of a “clean” environment are, in contrast, 
deemed worthy of municipal and legal support. For example, street vendors have been evicted for 
their “dirty” practices, while cars were declared clean (Anjaria 2006:395). What is especially 
 
10 Sections of this chapter and Chapter 2 have been adapted from a published article. See: 
Kornberg, Dana. 2019. “Garbage as Fuel: Pursuing Incineration to Counter Stigma in 
Postcolonial Urban India.” Local Environment 24(1): 1–17. 
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problematic about these elite environmental concerns, of course, is that it is the poor who are 
likely to be environmental because they tend to lack the petroleum-powered resources that 
exacerbate destruction and their livelihoods tend to depend on practices of re-use and repair (e.g. 
Isenhour and Reno 2019; Martínez-Alier 2003). 
Awadhendra Sharan has used evidence from Delhi to argue that for a sociological 
conception of the urban environment that situates it historically and culturally, suggesting five 
broad constellations of environmental practice: public health, infrastructure, noxious trades, 
zoning, pollution, and legal rights (Sharan 2006: 4905). Such a historical approach to framing 
environmental problems suggests that governing regimes are linked with particular 
conceptualizations of urban environmental problems, and further, that these domains lead to 
different ideas of what comprises a “sanitary” city itself (McFarlane 2008). D. Asher Ghertner 
has focused on the particular legal category of “nuisance,”11 showing how colonial-era 
justifications for demolishing informal settlements in Delhi was invoked in the early 2000s in 
order to provide legal support for slum demolitions (Ghertner 2008, 2011b). Unlike in earlier 
decades, when nuisance law was leveraged to call for the construction of toilets or sewers,12 in the 
2000s slums and the poor residents who called them home were themselves declared the nuisance 
in need of remediation (Ghertner 2008). The power of “nuisance” lies in its subjectivity: Delhi’s 
middle-class citizens13 are able to effectively maneuver around the untidy facts that 90% of the 
housing that should have been built for the poor was not—while many middle-class residential 
areas are themselves illegal—and instead call for the removal of slums based on their deficient 
cleanliness and projection of order. According to Ghertner, “if a slum appears to be polluting or 
 
11 Nuisance is defined as “any act, omission, injury, damage, annoyance or offence to the sense of 
sight, smell, hearing or which is or may be dangerous to life or injurious to health or property” 
(59). Contemporary nuisance law, as codified in the Indian Penal Code, derives from the original 
colonial laws as implemented in 1862.  
12 For example the judge in the Supreme Court Case Ratlam Municipal Council vs. Vardichan 
opined: “[T]he grievous failure of local authorities to provide the basic amenity of public 
conveniences drives the miserable slum-dwellers to ease in the streets, on the sly for a time, and 
openly thereafter, because under Nature’s pressure, bashfulness becomes a luxury and dignity a 
difficult art…. [P]roviding drainage systems… cannot be evaded if the municipality is to justify 
its existence”  (Ghertner 2008). 
13 In the sense of Chakrabarty (2004), which marks a distinction between rights-bearing citizens 
and governed denizens of political society.  
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filthy, based on a judge’s subjective view of acceptable, ‘clean’ conduct, then the slum is deemed 
polluting, a nuisance, and therefore illegal” (Ghertner, 2008: 65). Thus, the ability to define and 
invoke particular kinds of “nuisance” became a way for Delhi’s dominant classes to protect their 
property by making environmental claims (Ghertner 2011a, 2011b).  
Such claims, made in the name of the environment to protect the interests of the city’s 
middle classes and elites, constitute part of what Amita Baviskar has called “bourgeois 
environmentalism” (Baviskar, 2002, 2003). Baviskar claims that the urban context creates 
different kinds of natures: nature as leisure and beauty and nature as resource. The divide is  
predicated on stark differences in class and access to resources. For instance, Delhi relied on the 
labor of poor denizens to build roads, flyovers, and buildings, yet simultaneously denied their 
right to the city by failing to provide legal housing and livelihoods—accusing those very people 
of violating the Master Plan by “trespassing” on public land despite the lack of planned public 
housing (Ramanathan, 2006: 3194). It is this unfortunate irony that Baviskar’s work calls to our 
attention: while the needs of the poor are frequently denied, elite conceptions of a “clean” 
environment are deemed worthy of municipal and legal action.  
 
Colonial Legacies, Contemporary Divides 
These contemporary desires to evict the poor in order to create aesthetically “modern” 
cities for the Indian elite must be situated in relation to colonial and postcolonial histories that 
have long created a territorial stigma of Indian cities as dirty and dangerous. These histories, it 
should be noted, potentially fuel self-fulfilling prophecies through which resources and 
expectations are curtailed(Kornberg 2016)—first by colonial administrators and then by the 
Indian government—reinforcing staggering socioeconomic divides (Kornberg 2016). In 
gesturing towards these historical lineages, I ground wider political-economic processes in local 
histories (Go 2013; McFarlane 2008; Robinson and Roy 2015; Sharan 2006), following the 
earlier example of mid-century British anthropologists (Gluckman 1959; van Velsen 1967), as 
discussed in the Introduction. 
It is important to situate more recent environmental politics in relation to longer-
standing spatial divisions that rest not only on class, but also caste and coloniality. Delhi’s 
colonial history not only shaped the city’s jagged bureaucratic structure, but also its spatial layout, 
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distribution of sanitary services, and cultural politics of cleanliness. Originating in British 
colonization, and extending through independence and global urbanization, the city has long 
contended with characterizations as dirty, diseased, dangerous. With these labels cultivated by 
global rulers and rivals in an international context, this form of territorial stigma is not confined 
to those who are marginalized within urban contexts (cf. Wacquant 2007), but rather creates 
another scale of stigma formation at the global level, which sits in tension with it. At the global 
level, it is not only poor Muslim and low-caste areas that are deemed contaminated and 
dangerous, but rather it is the city itself—and the postcolonial nation it represents—that 
threatens to stigmatize all who reside within its territory. Efforts to counter such labels have 
nevertheless engendered a taste for the modern and orderly, with the widespread popularity of 
Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf  providing an especially disconcerting example (Gupta 2012).  
In response to this stigmatization, Indian leaders have worked to make cities more 
“developed.” While such efforts might choose to focus on urgent environmental and public 
health needs, such as access to clean water, air, and soil, they have instead tended to foreground 
aesthetic concerns, prioritizing sterile feeling spaces like malls and large apartment complexes. 
These choices, I argue, are embedded in longer histories through which inadequate services have 
been justified with stereotypes of the “natives” under the British—and now poor, low-caste, and 
Muslim Indians—as dirty.  
While Delhi’s contemporary footprint is significantly larger than its smaller iteration 
under British rule, the colonial experience left stark bureaucratic and cultural imprints on the 
city’s form and governance structures. Moreover, it was through British imperialism that ideas of 
modernity were themselves propagated, setting standards that would later be diffused by 
international organizations, media, and other conveyors of global aspiration. The city of New 
Delhi, now just a small section of Delhi’s sprawling urban expanse, was initially a colonial 
venture commissioned by the British to replace their capital of Calcutta. It was completed in 
1931 after more than twenty years of construction. The site lies to the immediate southwest of 
the walled city of Shahjahanabad, now better known as Old Delhi, from where the Mughal 
Empire had ruled over much of the subcontinent since 1648. In marked contrast to the winding 
streets of Old Delhi, where housing mixed readily with industry and shops, New Delhi was 
planned to be a spectacular imperial showcase for the British Empire (Legg 2007). Spaces of the 
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old city were characterized by colonial administrators as congested, traditional, and organic, 
while the new city was intended to be a place where open spaces would include greenery, the 
plentiful circulation of air, and the cultivation of order (Chatterjee and Kenny 1999). In his 1912 
address to the colonial Delhi Municipal Committee, Viceroy Hardinge laid out expectations for 
the new capital city: “you must make your town a model of municipal administration; your 
institutions, your public buildings, your sanitation, must be an example to the rest of India” 
(cited in Legg, 2007: 152). Such a mandate must be understood in contrast to India’s under-
resourced “native” urban neighborhoods, which were characterized as diseased and filthy.  
In particular, the cholera pandemic, which brought the disease from India to the heart of 
London, was important for propagating ideas of India as a dangerous source of disease and 
contamination for the newly sanitizing metropole. During the second global outbreak of cholera 
in 1829-1851, around 55,000 people died in England, creating ideas of a tropical India filled 
with pathogens capable of harming not only traders and rulers who traveled to the region, but 
also ordinary residents at home. As successive epidemics killed millions of people across the 
world, cholera was known as “Asiatic cholera” or the “filth disease” (Harrison 1999; Singh 2005), 
and its “natural home” was said to be India, linking the territory directly with the pathogen (cited 
in Prashad 1994: 254). 
In the city of Delhi, these threats were invoked to justify divides that were not only 
ideational, but reified in physical boundaries that segregated British and Indian residents through 
a cordon sanitaire that reinforced differences by labeling Indian neighborhoods as “diseased” and 
British areas as “healthy,” funneling resources into the latter in order to facilitate adequate 
sanitation. These divides effectively projected conceptual binaries of pure/impure and 
modern/traditional onto city space (Beverley 2011; Chaplin 2011b; Legg 2007; McFarlane 2008; 
Prashad 2001). This logic of purity and pollution was invoked by state administrators especially 
when epidemics were being attributed to problems like overcrowding in cities, and the 
“ignorance and uncleanly habits of Indians” were blamed as a key reason for the city's 
contamination (Harrison 1999: 153). Employing a logic that has been called “excremental 
colonialism” (Anderson 1995, 2010), European bodies were separated from Indian ones based on 
fears of disease and the desire for a sense of purity constructed around race (or here, 
caste/community), with this politics of excrement representing white bodies as contained and 
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self-regulating, while brown bodies were portrayed as unpredictable and in need of strict 
management in order to protect colonial administrators from typhoid, cholera, and dysentery 
(Anderson, 1995: 641). In other words, this logic of rule invokes a disciplinary approach to 
public health that entails state-enforced social segregation, rather than providing access to 
resources. In British neighborhoods—the cantonment, civil lines, and station areas—sprawling 
homes and greenery dominated. Indian areas, meanwhile, were more densely packed with 
narrower streets and choked passageways, creating a reflexive pathway that reinforced stereotypes 
via structural institutional inequalities.  
Indeed, if Indian areas were dirtier and more prone to disease, their inadequate water and 
sanitation services combined with crowded housing and inferior health services ensured that 
these realities were borne out. In other words, racist colonial stereotypes were materialized 
through the unequal provision of services by the state, which in turn served to reinforce those 
stereotypes. For example, local Urdu newspapers in the late-nineteenth century blamed the Delhi 
Municipal Corporation for providing expensive drainage for the “White Town” while doing 
nothing to meet the needs of the more densely populated neighborhoods in the walled city where 
most Indians lived (Prashad 2001: 124). Unlike in London, where citywide waterworks and 
drainage systems were built, the fiscally conservative British builders of New Delhi were “guided 
not by what is the best system of sanitation, but by what is the best system which the Municipal 
funds can afford” (Prashad 2001: 117; See also Arnold 1993). Invoking a logic that bears an 
uncanny resemblance to more recent forms of austerity urbanism (Peck 2012), colonial financial 
priorities like the British military and payments to London left meant that there was little left for 
Indian municipalities. Services were given to British parts of the city first, and the logic of 
excremental colonialism meant that even the two populations’ sewage was segregated for fear of 
contamination (Mann, 2007).14 This separation allowed colonial planners to use comparisons 
 
14 During his fieldwork in 2006, Ghertner encountered a similar politics of shit. A middle-class 
Delhi man described how his wife was once scared by a scorpion that came up through the 
kitchen drain. Confused as to how this related to their conversation about the city’s slums, 
Ghertner asked the man to elaborate. “All these sewers are connected,” he explained: “Our waste 
flows into them, and the slum waste flows into them before ours. It is all mixed. This scorpion 
just climbed through the sewer and came into our house.” Ghertner posits that the scorpion here 
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with Europe as a standard of how the city “should” be and create limited areas that mimicked it, 
further solidifying positive associations with the European parts of town (McFarlane 2008). The 
contemporary city mirrors this construction, with colonial institutions like the nationwide 
Gymkhana social clubs and Cantonment areas continuing to be places where quiet, greenery, and 
recreation are enjoyed by urban elites across the country.  
 
The 2010 Commonwealth Games 
Contemporary ambitions to become, clean, green, and “world class” bear the imprint of 
these colonial divides. Indian officials have frequently promoted plans and technologies that have 
more to do with global reputation-building than serving India’s majority—a tendency that 
resembles 19th-century Indian leaders who sought to counter the stigma of “backwardness” by 
promoting technologies that were not successful on their own terms, but rather suited the tastes 
of powerful colonial actors in pursuit of “civilizational recognition” (Gowda 2010). Infrastructure 
projects have been a key site for this, as they cultivate and reinforce power, in part, by affording 
claims to development and modernization (Graham and Marvin 2001; Molnár 2016; Mukerji 
2003, 2010). For example, Gabrielle Hecht has shown that French post-war nuclear programs 
were promoted by ideas of “salvation” and “redemption,” promoting ideas of a radiant national 
future (Hecht 1998:7). Similarly, India’s 2010 Commonwealth Games, hosted in Delhi, 
provided an opportunity for the capital city—a synecdoche for the nation—to invest in large-
scale infrastructural technologies in an attempt to remedy global stigma. These cultural pursuits 
are typically centered in the promotion of such international events, since even larger games such 
as the Word Cup and Olympics are not profitable (Black and Peacock 2011).  
Indian officials therefore welcomed the 2010 Commonwealth Games as an event that 
would improve the city of Delhi’s reputation, perhaps even preparing it to join the big leagues 
one day by hosting the Olympics. Delhi was only the second city in Asia to host them, having 
outbid Hamilton, Ontario for the honor in 2003. The event provided a sense of urgency for 
realizing urban development programs for around five years—resulting in funding for flyovers, 
 
acts a metaphor for the danger of the slums, indicating the danger in integrating even their 
excrement (Ghertner 2011b). 
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metro lines, and garbage services—all boosted with the rationale of making the city presentable 
for international athletes and visitors. An efficient citywide metro system was inaugurated along 
with a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system, a new international airport, and additional electric 
capacity. To clean up the city for these new amenities, household garbage collection was 
expanded and privatized, and responsibility for services was transferred from municipal agencies 
and informal sector workers to infrastructure companies in half of the city’s districts.  
The Games therefore created a mandate for significant urban investment and 
infrastructure financing (Majumdar and Mehta 2010). Initially estimated to cost around US$350 
million (Indian Olympic Association 2003), over $13 billion were ultimately spent on new 
infrastructure, stadiums, and venues when all was said and done (Baviskar 2011:147).15 Amita 
Baviskar’s commentary captured the tenor of these changes well: “Say ‘world-class’ and you 
conjure up a gleaming cityscape of skyscrapers, fast-flowing traffic, and neon-lit branded shops 
and restaurants, with unlimited power and water. The Games offer an opportunity to fast 
forward into this future” (Baviskar 2007: 16). Indeed, if the Games were never planned to be 
profitable themselves, they allowed for the leveraging of capital and enforcing of rules that would 
make the city look, feel, and smell like a global city.  
International consultants projected that tourism during the Games would contribute 
significantly to employment and the country’s GDP, describing the event as an opportunity for 
“showcasing the depth of talent, creativity and skill of Indian business to the rest of the world” 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2008:6). Official documents and newspaper accounts routinely 
focused on how the city would appear to foreign visitors, whose depiction characterizes them as 
discerning judges of the city’s global reputation. City and games officials frequently invoked the 
thousands of foreign tourists that would be arriving in the city for the event, saying that at least 
10,000 hotel rooms must be available for them. These calls came in spite of the city’s experience 
during the 1982 Asian Games, when instead of 1,000 expected tourists from Europe and the 
 
15 How government contracts came to benefit local leaders would only be revealed in the years 
following, with widespread reports of vastly inflated contracts eventually culminating in the 
arrest and jailing of Games Organizing Committee Chairman Suresh Kalmadi. Kalmadi was 
convicted for inflating a contract by 95 crore rupees, or over US$14 million. “Top 10 Facts about 
Kalmadi’s Commonwealth Games Scandal.” NDTV, January 19, 2012. 
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United States, around 200 visitors arrived from Hong Kong, Japan, and Saudi Arabia—much to 
organizers’ disappointment (“Turnout for Games Lags” 1982). In fact, in the 2003 bid document 
for the Commonwealth Games, “The Tourist” (with both letters capitalized) is invoked as a 
more mythical than actual figure, with the creation of all things pleasing—like a range of hotel 
rooms “[a]waiting him”—offered as evidence of success (Indian Olympic Association 2003: 32). 
The anticipated presence of international tourists suggests that, more than the sights and sounds 
that viewers could access on television, other spectators would be able to sense the city firsthand. 
India’s Tourism Minister explained his Ministry’s segregated approach plainly: “We are not 
claiming to clean up the entire city or town which have these destinations. We will begin with 
the approach roads leading from the airports, railway stations and bus stations to the destinations 
and areas around the sites” (“Campaign Clean India: A Holistic Approach to Cleaning” 2012). 
Campaigns were launched in order to “clean up” these spaces for thousands of imagined 
foreigners, who were implicitly coded as predominantly white and wealthy. Officials ordered, for 
example, the rounding up of “beggars” during city drives, invoking a 1959 act criminalizing 
begging, and setting up mobile courts across the city where they would be “tried.” Delhi's state 
Social Welfare Minister Mangat Ram explained: “We Indians are used to beggars. Westerners 
are not. So, we must make the city free of them” (Mahaprashasta 2010). To hide the city's poor, 
bamboo was shipped in from the country's northeast, with Delhi's Chief Secretary elaborating: 
“We want to present a good face of Delhi during the Games next year, but it is not possible to 
remove all the slums. Therefore, we have decided to use bamboo screens instead to simply 
conceal the sights.”16 Sanitation was also invoked as a disciplinary site, with India’s Rural 
Development Minister writing to Delhi officials “urging them to declare the entire national 
capital a 'no open defecation zone'…to avoid [a] national embarrassment during the Games.”17 
Popular political commentator Kiran Bedi told a local newspaper: “garbage is strewn around, 
people have bad parking habits, we spit on roads…. Since Commonwealth Games are to be held 
here and the city is going to be watched by people coming from abroad, there is a need to do 
 
16 “Bamboo Screens to Hide Delhi Slums.” Hindustan Times, August 16, 2009. 
17 Naqshbandi, Aurangzeb. “Minister Wants All to Take ‘Pot’ Shots.” Hindustan Times, January 
16, 2009. 
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better and change for the better.”18 The idea of a foreign gaze—white and well-resourced—was 
invoked to justify the city’s drastic, punitive measures against the working poor in the name of 
cleanliness.19  
Meanwhile, to socialize Delhi residents into civic manners, cartoon characters named “Su 
Su Kumar” (peeing Kumar; Kumar being a common and unusually caste-neutral last name) and 
“Thu Thu Kumar” (spitting Kumar) were created, and after they were deemed a failure, cricket 
stars replaced them (“Cricket stars to push for MCD’s clean Delhi plan” 2010). Kiran Bedi 
substantiated these ideas in her etiquette pamphlet Broom and Groom—the nouns referring to 
hygiene and manners, respectively—which she co-wrote in 2010 to express “anguish over the 
inadequate civic sense in our society” (Bedi & Choudary 2010: Introduction). Linking behavior 
with national transformation, the illustrated booklet’s dedication reads “The Right to Civility” 
and includes an endorsement from former Indian President APJ Abdul Kalam. Offering 
“globally acceptable manners and etiquette,” the 167-page small hardcover features a hairy Bert 
(from Sesame Street) on the cover and includes Victorian-inspired tips ranging from elevator 
etiquette to road manners, interacting with foreigners, personal hygiene, bathroom hygiene, and 
the proper treatment of “the help” (Bedi & Choudary 2010: Disclaimer; See Figure 1). Notably, 
each of the situations include markers of middle-class status—tables for eating, cars for driving, 
laptops in classrooms—as well as a preference for Western culture, i.e., using disposable toilet 
paper and tissues, advising women not to wear “Indian ethnic clothes” in business settings, and 
eating with utensils instead of one’s hands (Bedi & Choudary 2010: 141). A crucial part of 
 
18 “Learn Manners, Behave Better.” Hindustan Times, September 23, 2009. 
19 The paradoxical effects of changes to the city’s garbage programs were also evident in other 
environmental domains across the city. Although organizers promoted the Games as an 
opportunity for environmental reform, several sites of contention fomented as a result of what 
activists recognized to be instances of ecological damage. For example, one of the event's core 
building projects was the construction of an athlete’s village, which the organizing committee 
described would be constructed on “100 acres of land naturally endowed with greenery.”19 The 
project, however, was situated on the banks of Delhi's Yamuna River, which is a floodplain 
required for absorbing swollen monsoon waters and feeding the city's sinking water tables 
(Baviskar 2011). At least 150,000 people were evicted from their homes, justified with claims 
that they polluted the river, in order to clear land for the concrete construction (Bhan 2009). 
Thus, while officials highlighted the clean and pleasurable aesthetics of the new construction, the 
elided the ecological damage they were causing, as well as the negative effects on the poor.  
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creating a sanitary city—at least for some influential national voices—meant the civic disciplining 
of the middle-class population, akin to those which “civilized” Europeans into modern national 
citizens (Elias 1978). 
 
 
Figure 1  Illustrations from Broom & Groom by Kiran Bedi and Pavan Choudary (2010) 
 
Converging with these moralizing sanitary discourses were claims to contemporary 
environmentalism—adding another source of meaning for the environment to the historical list 
that Sharan so usefully details. Forging a partnership with the United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP), the Commonwealth Games were dubbed the “Green Games,” signaling the 
growing significance of modern environmentalism for urban reputation building. “The 
environment is increasingly becoming an important criteria for gauging the success of sport 
events,”20 Games officials noted, with Delhi’s then-Mayor A. R. Verma articulating: “The 
Commonwealth Games are scheduled for 2010 and there is a need to present a clean and green 
Delhi to the participants and the visitors of the mega-event.”21 
Yet, rather than the Bollywood-inspired opening ceremony that had been planned to 
send India glittering onto the global stage, the lead international story was instead of a dirty 
athlete’s village where a snake had been found in the living quarters, dog prints stained beds, and 
 
20 Organizing Committee CWG. 2010. Post Games Sustainability Report Card. Delhi. Pp. 6. 
21 “Power from Garbage and How.” Hindustan Times, December 7, 2004. 
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water and electric systems were not functioning. An article on the front page of The New York 
Times included a half-page photo of a lone laborer standing beside a towering scaffold, knee-
deep in a moat of murky brown water around one of the city’s new stadiums (see Figure 2). 
Despite Indian officials’ efforts, the stigma of contamination had proved sticky and enduring. 
Originating in colonial domination, this territorial stigma became a kind of self-fulfilling 
prophecy (Kornberg 2016). Responding to charges that the apartments were dusty and 
“uninhabitable,” games official Lalit Bhanot brushed them off, explaining—or perhaps 
capitulating—that Western visitors “want certain standards in hygiene and cleanliness which 
may differ from our perception” (Yardley 2010). 
 
Figure 2  Front-page story about the Commonwealth Games in Delhi22 
 
Official Approaches to Solid Waste Collection in Delhi  
Delhi’s garbage services, too, were overhauled at this time, with officials explaining that 
this was “the only way to make the city clean for the Commonwealth Games.”23 Before the early 
2000s, Delhi’s local government had collected garbage from neighborhood collection points 
called dhalaos or kuredans: three-sided covered dumpsters from which garbage often spilled out 
into the street, where people hunted for recyclables, and cows grazed on kitchen scraps. 
 
22 Source: Jim Yardley, “Games Official Angers India with Hygiene Comment.” New York Times. 
September 24, 2010. 
23 “MCD Clears Plan to Privatise Garbage Removal.” Hindustan Times, October 7, 2004.  
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Municipal trucks picked up the remaining waste from them daily, hauling it out to open 
dumpsites. Beginning in 2004, Delhi’s largest city government24 the Municipal Corporation of 
Delhi (MCD) began to introduce new solid waste systems that included private companies and 
mechanized processes, ushering in systems and technologies that had been designed in the global 
North. As municipal officials and private company managers boasted in interviews, Delhi was 
one of the first cities in India to implement these changes by replacing municipal trash collection 
services from neighborhood dumpsters with PPPs in nearly half of the city’s zones. After two 
years of delays caused by opposition from unionized municipal sweepers, MCD announced these 
privatized garbage collection services in 2006. In addition to this workforce, it should be noted, a 
much larger one of around 40,000 people swept the city’s streets daily, using bureaucratic and 
technological approaches that had changed little from their colonial foundation (Jaoul 2011; 
Prashad 2000).   
These programs implemented the central government’s attempts to introduce national 
regulations and guidelines for household garbage collection for the very first time, beginning 
with the Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) Rules of 2000. The MSW Rules of 2000 were 
subsequently updated in 2016, and they provided a mandate for expanding garbage services to 
individual households while also transitioning away from open burning and dumpsites to 
managed landfills, composting, and incinerators. While sanitation had comprised a significant 
portion of the Delhi municipal government’s attention and annual budget since its colonial 
founding, the organization of services had hardly changed until a Supreme Court case25 led to 
 
24 Although MCD was split into three discrete bodies in 2012, it remained one unit for most of 
the period examined here. It covered most of the city: eight out of nine districts.  
25 Ramanathan (2006) suggests that government priorities on “cleaning up” the city began with 
the Almitra Patel case, a public interest litigation case that led to the development of the 
Municipal Solid Waste Rules of 2000, the country’s first major statement on how garbage should 
be managed nationally. The Patel case references the experience of Surat in western India, where 
there was an outbreak of the plague in 1994, which has been recognized as providing the impetus 
for calls to clean up India’s cities (Chaplin, 2011: 64; see also Inderjit, 1994). The judicial 
opinion declares that while Surat was “one of the dirtiest cities in the country …  the effort of 
one man, namely, the Municipal Commissioner, … resulted in not only eradicating the plague 
and cleaning up Surat but gave the city of Surat the distinction of being the second most clean 
city in the whole of India.” This example demonstrates how the fear of unusual disease—as 
opposed to regularly occurring ones like malaria and gastrointestinal diseases that become 
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this restructuring in the mid 2000s. The municipal government had long been responsible for 
garbage services, deriving its legal authority from the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act of 1957, 
adopted ten years after independence, which assigned the municipality with removing all 
“offensive matter”—i.e. human, animal, and food waste—from public places and declared 
rubbish to be the property of the municipal body. Although the 74th amendment encouraged 
greater local control, the strange governance structure of Delhi as the National Capital Territory 
(NCT), combined with the increase in funding for infrastructure projects because of the Games, 
meant that the Delhi state government was also involved in crafting city policies. 
The MSW Rules were a policy of their time. Focused on creating a “world class” city, 
they urged local governments to exert greater control over basic services through public-private 
partnerships, as had already been done in the electricity sector. International organizations like 
the World Bank and Clinton Foundation promoted these corporate partnerships, reasoning that 
they would help to gain control through access to capital and greater managerial accountability 
(Cointreau-Levine and Coad 2000:74–75; Zhu et al. 2008).  
Bringing these policies to the local level, Delhi's City Development Plan (CDP)—issued 
in 2006 as a blueprint for accessing funding through the country's JNNURM urban renewal 
program—focused on the processes and specifications for setting up bins and discussed the types 
of machines to be used for garbage collection, stressing aesthetic and technocratic concerns. It 
justified overhauling garbage services with the following statement: “Appropriate solid waste 
management of a city is crucial for public health and aesthetic surroundings. It is essential for a 
clean look.”26 The presence and potential contributions of the informal garbage collection and 
recycling workforce were considered briefly but summarily dismissed with the following 
statement: “However, these activities, carried out in [an] un-hygienic and unscientific manner, 
have unfavourable environmental, occupational health and community health implications.”27 
Here, public health concerns are held together with aesthetic ones, equating them in a 
 
normalized—raise perceptions of hazards that can otherwise go unnoticed (Auyero & Swistun, 
2008, 2009).  
26 Department of Urban Development (Delhi) and IL&FS Ecosmart Limited. 2006. City 
Development Plan: Delhi. Pp. 12-1. 
27 Ibid: 12-8. 
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formulation that exemplifies, following Ghertner, how aesthetic logics have become central to 
policymaking across the administrative spectrum.   
The introduction of the Swacch Bharat Abhiyan (Clean Indian Campaign) in 2014 with 
the election of Narendra Modi put toilets and garbage at the center of India’s national policy. 
Images of political leaders (Modi included) wielding brooms and smiling for cameras enjoyed 
mass circulation, suggesting that these men were bravely engaging in such work for the 
betterment of the nation. Of course, once the cameras went away, the city’s low-caste or Dalit 
sweepers presumably picked up where they left off, doing the work without fanfare (and for low 
pay, facing multiple forms of stigmatization and discrimination, and facing dangerous work 
conditions). The Swacch Bharat Abhiyan campaign’s signature logo—Gandhi’s circle-framed 
glasses—was printed on the new currency issued in the wake of Modi’s catastrophic 2016 
demonetization policy, affirming the centrality of asserting a “Clean India” in service of 
economic development. The choice of depicting this alongside the Mars space probe 
Mangalyaan, which brought India global recognition for its technological capacities, connects the 
national focus on cleanliness and sanitation with wider modernist ideas of international 
competition and development. 
By 2006, MCD formed public-private partnerships with three infrastructure companies, 
turning half of the city’s twelve zones over to them. These newly created PPPs initially replaced 
the municipality’s existing services, which were limited to transporting garbage from local 
neighborhood dumpsters, or dhalaos, out to dumpsites. In 2009, MCD introduced a more 
extensive program, contracting with a subsidiary of the Indian infrastructure company Ramky to 
begin collecting garbage from individual households in three parts of the city: Rohini, Civil 
Lines, and Dwarka-Vasant Kunj. Household collection was said to be an essential part of the 
“gold standard” of the nascent Indian solid waste industry because it was the first step in ensuring 
that the waste was entirely under municipal control. 
The contract signed in 2009 for expanded door-to-door garbage services included a 
tipping fee of 1494 rupees (US$22) per ton of garbage, to be paid to the company, for an 
estimated total of around US$25 million per year (MCD and Delhi MSW Solutions 2009:238). 
The program was thus well-funded and endowed with legitimacy from both the state—widely 
understood as the rightful provider of basic services—and its authorized corporate firms, 
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considered to be purveyors of economic development in contemporary India. This program 
aimed to improve services through three key strategies. First, official door-to-door collection was 
brought to households for the first time through the introduction of small hydraulic “tipper” 
trucks that made daily rounds through neighborhood lanes, announcing their arrival with a “bell 
or hooter” (MCD and Delhi MSW Solutions 2009:13). Second, the program aimed to make 
Delhi a “Dhalao/dust bin-free city” by connecting the small collection trucks directly with large 
compactors, rather than storing the garbage at neighborhood dhalaos (MCD and Delhi MSW 
Solutions 2009:15). And finally, the new program included the construction of processing and 
disposal sites, which included an incinerator, along with a sanitary landfill and composting pit. 
While the trucks effectively extended into informal collectors’ neighborhood territories, closing 
the dhalaos also threatened informal collectors because they rely on the spaces to sort recyclables 
and dump their waste (Gidwani and Chaturvedi 2011). The rise of incineration plants, 
meanwhile—three operating to various degrees, with two more planned across Delhi28—posed 
another threat, since they require the same plastic and paper materials for combustion that 
collectors depend on for recycling (Author 2019; Demaria and Schindler 2016). 
Since their introduction in 2009, the collection trucks have become a routine presence in 
the neighborhoods they serve; their distinctive tinny jingle can be heard down the street, alerting 
residents or domestic staff to bring out the garbage. As drivers guide the trucks down 
neighborhood lanes, attendants walk alongside, taking bins from residents’ hands or the street 
and dumping it all into the truck’s rear compartments. As a result, informal collectors and PPP-
truck operators contend for residents’ support. In response to my question of what informal 
collectors should do for work if they are put out of a livelihood, a municipal Chief Engineer in 
the sanitation department articulated a desire that seemed to be held more widely: that these 
“ragpickers” find other work like construction labor, rather than competing with the trucks.29 
 
28 Singh, Paras and Jasjeev Gandhiok. “4 More Waste-to-Energy Plants in Delhi.” Times of India 
30 January 2019.    
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/corpns-coming-up-with-four-more-say-city-of-
2cr-people-has-no-option/articleshow/67763704.cms. 
29 Interview, 8/6/12. 
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Yet, the trucks have been, to officials, disappointingly ineffective. Instead, most residents 
have continued to use the informal collection and recycling system, which I discuss in the next 
section. Figure 3 depicts the neighborhood division of labor that emerged, with each household 
facing the decision of whether to give their daily waste to the PPP trucks or to informal workers 
collecting garbage with their tricycles, while Figure 4 shows a collection truck and a tricycle at 
the neighborhood dumpster. 
During a meeting with a senior bureaucrat in MCD’s sanitary landfill department, a 
Muslim man who had worked there since 1975, in an old school building near the railway tracks 
in Old Delhi, I sat across from him at his desk as he explained why programs introduced for 
household garbage segregation tended to fail. He relied on a favored official trope, blaming the 
public, but then elaborated why he thought residents hadn’t participated: “They think that ‘we 
will be called bhangis, we’ll become lower caste (neechi jati ki).’ It’s because there’s lots of caste 
discrimination (jativad) in India, you know.” He went on to tell me that he had explained to 
them that everyone is equal, created by God. But, he complained, they had the money to pay for 
someone else—an informal collector—to do the segregation work, so they really didn’t have to 
do it themselves.  
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Figure 3  Depiction of the household-level decision between the formal truck and the informal 
collector (illustration by Shebani Rao) 
 
 
Figure 4  A truck and a tricycle at a neighborhood dumpster (kuredan or dhalao), with informal 
recyclers picking through the waste inside 
 
Unofficial Approaches to Solid Waste Collection in Delhi  
Beyond the idealized visions of policymakers that have Delhi garbage being seamlessly 
transferred between government- and corporate-controlled machines, household garbage in 
Delhi actually circulates along multiple circuitous pathways. Although most Delhi 
neighborhoods do not have municipal door-to-door garbage collection trucks (and none did 
before 2009), a clutch of waste collectors and recyclers earn a living by collecting the materials 
being discarded at increasingly high rates, as Delhi residents can increasingly afford the rising 
production of disposable products and packaging.  
In addition to official services, then, informal collectors have worked for decades across 
Delhi middle-class neighborhoods and elite colonies, picking up garbage daily from each 
household and bringing it out to the dhalaos. Before dumping it, however, they harvest materials 
for recycling—metals, plastics, and papers to be sold by the kilogram in order to earn a living. 
Households in turn pay a monthly fee for the service, which goes to an overseer called a 
“jamadar”: someone typically from the Balmiki community who inherited the rights to collect 
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garbage from a particular neighborhood territory. The collective efforts of these informal workers 
have contributed to the base of an extensive Indian recycling industry (Chaturvedi and Gidwani 
2010; Gidwani 2013; Gill 2010; Schindler, Demaria, and Pandit 2012). Uncounted, but 
probably numbering in the hundreds of thousands in Delhi alone, they divert around forty 
percent of household garbage and have been estimated to save the local government US$74 
million per year (Hayami et al. 2006:63; UN-Habitat 2010). Yet, despite these contributions to 
material reuse and recovery, their manual work is highly stigmatized and has long been 
characterized as unscientific and unhygienic in official documents (e.g. Department of Urban 
Development and IL&FS Ecosmart Limited 2006:12-1). 
At the top of this neighborhood scrap chain are itinerant scrap buyers, or kabadi wale – 
who are well known throughout urban India for their regular rounds accompanied by loud calls 
announcing their arrival. These itinerant buyers pay residents for pre-sorted metals, newspapers, 
and glass bottles, which households (and often their domestic laborers) store until they can be 
sold in bulk. Over the last 20 years or so, they have grown significantly in number and can be 
found in nearly any city neighborhood. Less common but still notable are actors like the women 
with shiny new pots on their heads accept used clothing in exchange for cookware in some 
neighborhoods, along with cow service (gay seva) carts equipped with distinct brass bells 
summon residents to deposit their bread and vegetable scraps in others. These pose as charities 
(“seva”), but are actually businesses: the haul sold to nearby dairy farmers.  
The actors that I focus on in this manuscript are the people who collect household garbage 
door-to-door in a range of middle-class and elite neighborhoods: the waste left over after 
residents may have pulled out things like newspapers and glass bottles to sell separately. 
Although waste collection was historically done by the “untouchable” Balmikis who came from 
Delhi’s neighboring villages (Prashad 2000), recent decades have seen a flood of migrants—many 
of them Muslim—from the states of West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and neighboring 
Bangladesh, who have begun to informally subcontract from the Balmikis. Collectors have been 
aptly described as “self-employed proletariats” (Birkbeck 1978), a term that captures their ability 
to determine their days and hours while acknowledging their dependence as workers on the scrap 
recycling sector, which depends on and indirectly controls their labor. 
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Picking up buckets and bags of mixed household waste each morning, their activities 
provide a service to middle-class city residents while also salvaging and selling the recyclable 
scrap material it contains to earn a living. Waste collectors in Delhi are nearly all boys and men 
roughly between the ages of 14 and 50, who live in clusters distributed mostly on the far outskirts 
of the city in cramped informal settlements made either of brick or plastic sheeting and bamboo 
rods that double as storage facilities for collected scrap. They tend to be first or second 
generation migrants to the city, and most have their families, immediate and/or extended, along 
with them—though some of the men come alone and keep their families in the village so that 
they will not, in the words of a newly married nineteen-year-old boy, become “spoiled.” While 
the men (and sometimes boys) of the family tend to be the ones going out to collect garbage 
from middle-class neighborhoods, female family members tend to stay near the home and sort 
the scrap that is hauled home. Collectors tend to live together in settlements where their home 
spaces double as work spaces, where scrap is initially sorted, stored, and sold.  
In the settlements where collectors live and store the recyclable scrap they process, they 
tend to join other families and workers who are from the same regions, if not the very same 
village. Even when collectors do not have extended family in the city, they tend to form kinship 
relationships (that entail both positive/caring and contentious relationships) with people from 
similar regions who speak the same dialect. For example, my primary field site in Northwest 
Delhi had Muslim families from across West Bengal, but most were concentrated within a few 
districts, and nearly all of them had the last name Sheikh, indicating a similar community. It was 
these bonds that led one after another to come to Delhi, often connected to a particular “boss,” 
or a recyclable buyer who might help pay for the trip and provide them with housing and a 
guaranteed market for their scrap.  
Yet other places in the city revealed different forms of social organization. In one area of 
south Delhi that I visited, for example, all of the collectors were from a low-caste (Balmiki) 
community in a northwestern district of Uttar Pradesh. The same area also housed migrants 
from the state of Assam, who had come to Delhi fleeing violence against Muslims. While scrap 
work provides an essential source of livelihood for these rural-to-urban migrants—mostly low-
caste and Muslim—it is typically treated with disdain and resentment in the neighborhoods they 
serve, further reifying their need to remain in tightly bound, ghettoized communities. 
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Workers’ social marginality was at times manifest when they were accused of stealing 
things from the neighborhood (I saw a simple wooden board become the source of great 
contention). They are easy scapegoats because they are usually illiterate in Hindi or English, have 
tenuous claims to the city, and lack strong social networks. In some areas—especially the 
wealthier parts of south Delhi, for example—they were picked up by police in order to close a 
case, leaving the actual perpetrator still at large. More mundanely, collectors regularly faced scorn 
from residents, who would tell them to move away their garbage carts because they smell (I 
discuss this further in Chapters 3 and 4). Even when they are shown kindness by the local 
residents they serve, this tends to be framed as an act of charity or pity instead of egalitarian 
kindness or fairly valued labor. 
 
Conclusion 
Needless to say, although Delhi’s recyclers benefit the city in multiple ways—by 
providing a service to middle-class and elite residents, offering the only recycling service, and 
diverting massive quantities of waste from already overflowing landfills—they have been framed 
by those in power as menial and threatening to visions of the city’s global, modern future. How 
cleanliness, sanitation, and the environment are defined, then, have remained remarkably stable 
over time, affecting not only the shape of these crucial services, but also marking the organization 
of city space. In the next chapter, I further specify these clashing visions by focusing on the waste 
materials themselves. 
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CHAPTER II 
Alchemizing Garbage 
 
I was finishing a morning visit to a landfill in East Delhi when the government official 
taking me around asked if I wanted to see the waste-to-energy30 plant under construction on the 
site. I eagerly said yes, realizing the significance of incinerators being rapidly built across the 
country. Following an office assistant into an nearby conference room, I could see the exhaust 
stacks under-construction rising up into the air. The room’s walls were lined with framed photos 
of European consulting teams—mostly middle-aged men, but also a couple of women, with light 
complexions and blondish or graying hair—who had advised on the local project. I stood over a 
model of the plant at the back of the room that included several structures and a convoluted 
series of conveyer belts, impressively detailed with imitation garbage (see Figure 5). Finding me 
busy trying to figure out what the different objects were, the plant manager walked in, eagerly 
picked up one of the large glass beakers sitting next to the model, and gave a shake to its 
contents, which looked like dark-brown compost marked with lighter protrusions of plastic bag 
pieces. It hardly budged. He explained: “This is heavy and dense and not good for burning. This 
is Indian garbage.” He then swirled the contents of the second flask, which had plenty of dry 
plastics, rubber, and papers. This one had a way of rising up as it circulated the beaker, which, he 
told me, was because it was European waste. “Even your garbage is much better!” he concluded, 
associating me, an American, with the generically “European” trash.  
The national construction of incinerators nationally can be understood as the culmination 
of longer-standing aims to mechanize garbage services; yet Delhi’s garbage politics include not 
only policies and institutions, but material attempts to control and benefit from the waste flow 
 
30 Waste-to-energy is the industry term for a suite of technologies that produce energy sources 
from household garbage. In India, the term refers more specifically to various forms of 
combustion, or incineration, which are used to produce electricity. 
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itself. Access to city space has been central to these politics (Kudva 2009), with advocates calling 
for waste workers’ rights to the city in order to continue accessing and processing recyclables 
(Chaturvedi and Gidwani 2010; Demaria and Schindler 2016; Gidwani 2013; Schindler et al. 
2012), while neighborhood door-to-door collectors maintain access to recyclable waste through 
longstanding, if informal, territorial claims (Kornberg 2019a). At the center of the story, then, 
are the garbage materials themselves. An index of human life (and death), garbage reveals daily 
habits: the foods we eat, the goods we use, the “disposable” plastic containers that envelop 
everything, but also less ordinary events like a 50th birthday party, a move, or an injury. In the 
aggregate, garbage provides an archaeological record of social life, containing artifacts that will 
likely outlast humans. The volume, character, and method of disposing garbage is therefore not 
only a technical question to be handled by engineers like the one described above, but—as he so 
vividly illustrated by contrasting “worlds” based on their trash—also a cultural indicator of what a 
given society is comprised of and how people relate to their environment. What is in the garbage 
and where it ends up, then, are questions of environmental and ethical practice. This chapter 
asks: What kinds of social relations are indicated by such practices? Through what categories are 
these relations framed and made legible?  
 
Figure 5  Plan for the East Delhi incineration plant (from 2013 IL&FS brochure) 
Figure 1: Plan for the East Delhi incineration plant (from IL&FS brochure, 2013) 
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These material politics were couched within a larger set of debates framing rising levels of 
garbage in Indian cities as a “crisis” or “tsunami.” Suggestions for what to do ranged from the 
mundane to the bizarre, including compounding and storing waste in bales, building 
underground garbage bins or “bins-cum-flower pots” to “camouflage the filth,” and spraying 
landfills with tons of air freshener.31 With urban populations climbing and disposables 
consumption increasing, cities like Delhi were faced with a dilemma: land was scarce and 
difficult to acquire, and existing dumpsites were dangerous and overflowing. Relatively new 
participants in urban governance at the time, solid waste infrastructure companies promised cities 
the ability to expand and mechanize garbage collection, offering modern services that would 
streamline the collection of garbage, beginning with the household and ending with a scientific 
landfill or “waste-to-energy” incinerator: a solution that has been promoted as “environmental” 
by company managers, government bureaucrats, and the UNFCCC alike. By 2015, the Indian 
government had sanctioned 48 incineration projects across 12 states in India32 (Central Pollution 
Control Board 2015), with plans to build more across 100 cities by 2019 (NITI Aayog 2017:58). 
In this chapter, I show how city leaders sought to supplant low-caste and Muslim 
garbage workers—whose publicly visible manual sorting labor was seen to negatively affect the 
city’s reputation (as discussed in Chapter 1)—while introducing high-caste engineers and 
businesspeople, who became willing to work with stigmatizing waste for the first time. I argue 
that seeking to exert control through processes of mechanization allowed these managers and 
engineers to remove garbage’s stigmatizing properties while generating a single commodity: fuel. 
In attempting to create a socially benign, uniform object of fuel that could be burned in waste-
to-energy incinerators—a process akin to alchemy that resonates with Brahminical ritual—the 
idea was to transfigure Delhi’s trash in order to run incinerators that are locally referred to as 
“power plants.” This effort is motivated not only by garbage containing “dirty” contents, but also 
 
31 There are parallels in the colonial era, when there were fantastic suggestions that garbage 
stations be located underground, or even more, that the Health Office develop a medicine for 
citizens to take so that they could be freed from their sense of smell (Prashad 2001: 133). 
32 This number includes all projects listed as “power plants” and “refuse derived fuel” in the report 
because they depend on undifferentiated masses of garbage. It excludes biogas plants, which are 
concentrated only in the state of Kerala, because they rely only on organic content. 
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because of its characteristic instability and inscrutability (Reno 2015, 2016), which has the 
potential to threaten the status quo of a “world-class” (i.e. upper-caste), “green” (i.e. upper-class) 
Delhi. 
Attempts by India’s new class of solid waste managers and bureaucrats to equate unruly 
piles of garbage with petroleum-derived fuel, which is ritually uncontaminating and physically 
translucent, suggests an ability to socially and spiritually “clean” Indian garbage—transforming 
not only its material characteristics, but also rendering social and environmental questions into 
countable, standardized units of energy that produce electricity by the megawatt. This, I show, 
was a significantly different process and ethical relation to materials than those embodied and 
enacted by Delhi’s recyclers, who rely on categories of distinction that are not only much more 
complex, but based on a sensory relationship with waste materials that depends on sight, touch, 
sound, and of course, smell, in order to identify and distinguish materials. It is only through 
these practices of segregation that materials become valuable, re-usable, and recyclable. 
These contrasting orientations, I show, are borne out in the materials—with garbage 
treated by informal recyclers as a source of valuable scrap or maal, while city leaders attempting 
to transform garbage into fuel. A process of alchemy,33 material transformations accompany 
social ones: chaotic and polluted materials are synthesized into a singular category, to be cleaned 
through the promise of fire. Similarly, status is cultivated, as city leaders and company managers 
gain capital from the dispossession of low-caste and Muslim workers. Like alchemy, which 
sought to create pure substances from diverse materials, the conversion of garbage into fuel 
transforms hundreds of separate recyclable materials, which provided for thousands of families, 
into a singular abstract commodity, cleansed through burning, which promises to deliver (or 
divert) profits. 
 
 
33 Ironically, there was one incident when I encountered mercury—a central material of Indian 
alchemic practice—in the garbage. We found some in medium-sized sealed bag, which was 
actually just a container for a number of smaller bags inside, each filled with mercury. The 
woman I was with had worked with recycling for at least the last few decades, but she had no 
idea what to with the stuff. She decided to throw it in the municipal dumpster to be brought out 
to the landfill after I informed her that it was toxic (but who knows what might have happened 
to it next).  
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The Material Affordances of Fuel versus Recyclables 
More than just a domain or space, the environment is also comprised of human 
relationships to materials: where toxic waste is dumped, but also access to goods like cars, “fast 
fashion,” and one-time-use plastics. Our relationship to materials thus affords particular status 
positions and ethical stances, and especially so with waste, which for too long had been glossed as 
a passive object without socially meaningful properties (Gille 2010; Gregson and Crang 2010). 
The toxic waste dumped on the riverbank near a poor community in the United States, for 
example, may be nothing more than a line item to the accountant overseeing a company’s 
finances, but to the mother living in an adjacent neighborhood, the pile consists of its ability to 
be carried by wind into her yard and tendency to contain lead that threatens the health of her 
children. The same material, then, can be apprehended—and thus related to—in markedly 
different ways (cf. Bennett 2004; Hawkins 2009; Keane 2003).     
Comparing Delhi’s new solid waste managers with the city’s marginalized recyclers 
evidences a difference in not only how these materials are understood and valued, but also how 
these determinations are arrived at by way of (or through the active cultivation of distance from) 
one’s senses. Recent work in environmental geography and anthropology considers how an ethic 
of care emerges from practices of re-use and repair, demonstrating how such practices hold out 
the possibility of stewarding material resources in a way that extends their lifespans. 
Nevertheless, practices of repair and re-use, whether borne out of material limitations or 
ideological commitments, require that people engage with materials in ways that temporarily de-
commodifies them in order to reinstate them as commodities (Corwin & Gidwani draft; 
Kopytoff 1986). This temporary confrontation or reckoning could last for a matter of months, in 
the case of rehabbing a house, or for only a split second, as a recyclable scrap of paper is 
identifying and categorized. In both cases, the object must be apprehended as distinct before it is 
subsequently launched back into the world of commodities for sale, its components experienced 
via the senses and categorized according to particular representational economies (Keane 2003). 
Put differently, waste paper must be sorted into different commodities (i.e. glossy, white, 
colored, etc.), but in the process of rummaging through a pile by hand, a person is forced to 
contend not only with these pre-determined categories, but the words on the paper, the purpose 
it might have served, and the wear it now sustains—having been crumbled, torn, or saturated. At 
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times, an object’s category may be elusive, requiring the sorter to employ their senses—looking, 
touching, listening—in order to identify it. Such engagement is necessitated by the object’s 
indeterminacy, as well as the existence of multiple categories. Recycling is not re-use exactly, but 
to do it well similarly requires attending, via knowledge and the senses, to an object’s constituent 
parts. This isn’t just a matter of consuming less and reducing waste, but also confronting the 
contents of “garbage” in a way that considers the individuality of objects and the relevance of 
object categories. 
Yet, as Isenhour and Reno (2019) have rightly pointed out, these practices are not 
distributed in ways that are socially even, with social contexts based on race/ethnicity/caste, class, 
and gender shaping who can, or indeed must, engage in practices of re-use and repair. Across 
India, the unequally differentiated relationships of humans to materials and space, particularly 
through occupation and neighborhood (or muhalla), have long been central to practices of caste 
or jati, which have produced categories organized around ideas of purity and pollution (e.g. 
Jodhka 2015; Marriott 1968; Rawat and Satyanarayana 2017; Sarukkai 2009; Vaid 2014). 
Dominated groups of Dalits or “untouchables” have historically been relegated to small village 
hamlets (jati muhallas), denied access to water wells, and been prohibited from selling their goods 
into wider markets. These practices uphold a logic of segregation that does not even pretend to 
espouse equality. One of the most comprehensive recent studies to document caste 
discrimination recorded, for example, the incidence of Dalits being barred from using umbrellas, 
smoking, or wearing new/bright clothing, and having to remove their shoes on public roads 
(Shah et al. 2006:82). Along with these punitive upper-caste sanctions, researchers found that 
other segregation practices were prevalent, including the separation of upper-caste and Dalit 
students in school, differential access to healthcare facilities and common grazing or fishing 
areas, and limitations on the sale of agricultural goods in markets and the sale of milk to local 
cooperatives (Shah et al. 2006:104–5). Perhaps the most glaring indicators of these spatially and 
materially enforced differences are the fact that in 70 percent of 435 villages surveyed Dalits were 
not able to eat alongside upper-caste (savarna) individuals; in 73 percent of 430 villages Dalits 
were not able to enter into the house of a an upper caste/savarna person; and in 48 percent of 
527 villages Dalits were barred from accessing local water facilities (Shah et al. 2006:102). With 
similar surveys lacking in urban contexts, these data offer a sense of how caste practices have been 
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historically mediated in rural India, where anonymity is nonexistent and economic life depends 
on forms of agricultural and craft labor. In the city, these particular practices are surely less 
prevalent, if not in some cases altogether abolished, yet practices of segregation forcefully endure. 
Neighborhoods and schools reflect jati divisions, while households continue practices of keeping 
separate utensils for “the help” (Ray and Qayum 2009; Vithayathil and Singh 2012).  
Yet, if such punitive practices of suppression and avoidance continue to proliferate in 
order to mark some particular communities as subjugated, it follows that upper-casteness (and 
particularly Brahmin identity) is itself marked by practices that indicate the goodness and 
rightness of their socially superior positions. Central to such claims has long been the ability to 
claim a status of “purity” (pavitra) in contrast to those who are deemed “polluted” and therefore 
“untouchable.” The continued salience of these politics have been reflected at the national level 
and actively promoted by recent campaigns to ban cow killing, for example. The idea of 
alchemization connects with these practices, as it indicates a process of accumulation—or the 
agglomeration of diverse materials, and purification, which is often achieved in Brahminic ritual 
through fire. These cultural references, I argue, help to explain why solid waste administrators 
saw incineration as desirable. 
In order to show how these changes have unfolded, I find useful concepts that were 
originally formulated in the 1950s in order to describe social mobility in India’s villages. M. N. 
Srinivas introduced the idea of sanskritization: a process through which lower-ranked caste or jati 
groups could improve their status over a generation or two by adopting upper-caste, and 
especially Brahminical, practices: 
[P]racticing an occupation like butchery, tanning, herding swine, or handling 
toddy, puts a caste in a low position. Eating pork or beef is more degrading than 
eating fish or mutton. Castes which offer blood-sacrifices to deities are lower than 
castes making only offerings of fruit and flowers. The entire way of life of the top 
castes seeps down the hierarchy. And as mentioned earlier, the language, cooking, 
clothing, jewelry, and way of life of the Brahmans spreads eventually to the entire 
society. (Srinivas 1956:483)  
What is clear here is the centrality of work, materials, and diet—in other words, materials and 
sensory relations—in demarcating status within a wider system of caste distinction. The 
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resoundingly Hindu markers of status are clear here, related to not only a (non-)vegetarian34 diet 
and animal sacrifice, but also language and clothing—all of which mark the supposedly inherent 
inferiority of low-caste and Dalit groups. On top of this, however, Srinivas usefully notes that 
British colonization has generated a second plane of distinction, which is more directly 
determinative of economic capital (for the high status of Brahminism had been largely defined in 
by its professed detachment from economic concerns). He writes: 
The Indian leaders were thus caught in a dilemma. They found that certain 
customs and habits which until then they had looked down upon obtained also 
among their masters. The British who ate beef and pork and drank liquor, 
possessed political and economic power, a new technology, scientific knowledge, 
and a great literature. Hence the westernized upper castes began acquiring 
customs and habits which were not dissimilar from those they had looked down 
upon. (Srinivas 1956:487) 
Thus, a second field is identified, in which several of the markers of high status stand in direct 
conflict to those valued in Brahminical, upper-caste culture. Srinivas continues: “The net result 
of the westernization of the Brahmans was that they interposed themselves between the British 
and the rest of the native population. … The Brahmans looked up to the British, and the rest of 
the people looked up to both the Brahmans and the British” (Srinivas 1956:488).  
The case of contemporary garbage work lies at the crossroads of these competing 
valuation systems. On the one hand, working with garbage—other people’s discards—has long 
indicated “untouchable” status, placing those who work with trash or sewage (i.e. human shit) in 
socially marginalized positions. Yet, solid waste also became seen as a modern industry during 
this time, creating a pathway for higher-caste workers (and Brahman engineers) to begin 
working with waste in order to pursue high salaries and profits. If Srinivas was concerned with 
marginalized groups gaining status, his categories can be re-deployed in order to understand why 
and how high status groups have become willing to work with trash. 
 
 
34 In India, meat eating (including eggs) is indicated by the term “non-vegetarian”—a label that 
affirms the positive normative status of vegetarianism. 
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Sanskritizing and Westernizing Garbage 
Srinivas’ categories of Sanskritization and Westernization help to reveal how the turn to 
incineration was facilitated by processes of upper-caste leaders cultivating distance from waste 
materials—a kind of Sanskritization—in order to benefit from them economically—a goal in the 
service of mobility as Westernization. While these two are practically conjoined in the 
contemporary Indian context, making them explicit here I think helps to tease apart their distinct 
origins. 
At the center of India’s garbage reforms has been the need to find alternative disposal 
methods. With land for dumping increasingly scarce in rapidly growing urban regions, cities like 
Delhi have found themselves in a bind where dumpsites are growing to the point of toppling 
over, prone to spontaneous combustion, and yet new land is not available. Before garbage 
programs were reformulated, Delhi's municipal system included three active dumpsites, each 
filled beyond capacity and lacking protective measures like plastic liners, diversion channels, or 
methane flares. In response, local governments began contracting with infrastructure companies 
that purchased garbage collection trucks and built incinerators, particularly refuse-derived fuel 
(RDF) and combustion technology plants. Dubbed “waste-to-energy,” the garbage incineration 
industry has grown rapidly, supported by central government support and funding from the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In 2013, the Indian 
Express reported, “[t]he new mantra for solid waste management (SWM) in urban India is 
waste-to-energy plants,” and the Asian Development Bank supported several early projects.35 
Between 2003 and 2010, three garbage incinerators were sanctioned for Delhi, which has been at 
the forefront of a national trend: a Jindal project in Okhla, an IL&FS plant in Ghazipur, and a 
Ramky compound in Narela-Bawana. However, these lack adequate regulation and enforcement 
to prevent the emission of polluting and toxic exhaust (Demaria and Schindler 2016; Shah 
2011). Further complicating matters, the country’s few previous attempts to build solid waste 
incinerators had failed unequivocally—sometimes being shut down in just a couple of weeks 
(Annepu 2012).  
 
35 Bapat, Jyotsna. “Making Waste Disposal Work Better.” The Financial Express, October 17, 
2013. 
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Technologies like incineration promise to reduce the geographic footprint of garbage 
disposal, allowing authorities to sidestep the thorny issue of acquiring land. Such technologies 
require centralized contracts that afford systems of patronage, which are nearly impossible to 
track, yet commonly benefit local bureaucrats and politicians. In contrast to large dispersed 
workforces, centralized mechanical systems like incineration require smaller labor forces that are 
subject to more direct control. Important also seems to be the presentation of the workforce. 
Unlike informal recyclers, who are able to wear whatever they want and work according to their 
own practices, workers in the corporate system are expected to at least perform the role of 
employees with basic workplace regulations, even if those may be more ceremonial than 
protective. For example, when I was at the landfill, I was offered a mask and was driven past 
other workers who were similarly wearing masks, even though there were informal pickers clearly 
(if distantly) visible on top of the lopsided mountain of trash who not only lacked protective gear, 
but were at risk of being buried under fresh piles of garbage, becoming victims to a landslide or a 
simple misstep, or being burned by spontaneous fires. The divide between the new “scientific” 
landfill was clear (see Figure 6), but the juxtaposition was jarring. How could these two realities 
be held together in such close geographic proximity?   
If  incineration also depends on cultivating a notable amount of psychic distance, one aspect of 
this is the need to dispense with the well-known fact that the technology depends on petroleum-
derived plastics and fibrous papers to fuel their combustion, which Indian waste is notably bereft 
of. Indian waste tends to be more heavily organic—with relatively few one-time-use plastics and 
papers, and more of the remnants of fruits and vegetables that are processed within the house, 
producing peels (from mangos, cucumbers, potatoes), stems (from spinach, cilantro), and shells 
(from peas) that comprise a relatively proportion of household waste. Apart from this is the 
important fact that household garbage in Delhi goes through multiple rounds of stripping from 
various recycling actors. In addition to the garbage collectors considered here, scrap buyers 
regularly circulate across Delhi’s middle-class neighborhoods, shouting “kabadi!” (scrap). Within 
households, items like newspapers, glass bottles, and now sometimes also milk bags never make 
it into the garbage bin. Instead, they are set aside by residents or their domestic laborers to be 
sold for cash. What remains after these are sold is stripped—often multiple times—by informal 
recyclers tends to be wet and, yes, “not good for burning,” as the engineer above described.  
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Figure 6  Uniformed men on top of the new scientifically engineered landfill, with the old dump 
towering above, human figures barely visible 
 
In fact, India's first modern waste-to-energy incinerator was established in Delhi back in 
1987 by the Danish company Volund Miljotecknik. The plant ran for just three weeks before 
being shut down. This modern failure recapitulated much earlier colonial-era experiments, such 
as when a Delhi official observed in 1928 that “refuse destructors had been tried and proved to be 
costly failures” (Prashad 2000:63) or when Mysore’s leaders developed unprofitable industries in 
order to impress their British overlords (Gowda 2010). A municipal officer who worked on 
India’s first incinerator in Delhi detailed during an interview that the European-designed plant 
had been completed in 1989 after three years of construction, but it required a level of energy (or 
combustibility, as measured in kilocalories) in the garbage that does not even exist today. When 
an 84 crore rupee ($12.6 million) plant built in the city of Lucknow with support from the 
World Bank and Indian government ran for just three months in 2005 after being declared a 
failure, a Supreme Court order banned the construction of incineration plants in 2005, a couple 
of years after which it allowed the construction of no more than five pilot projects (Krishna 
2006). Government officials are thus well aware of the fact that Indian garbage is not well-suited 
for combustion. An MCD Sanitation Chief explained plainly: “For power generation, the fuel 
should have a minimum calorific value of 2,500-3,000 per kilocalorie. However, Delhi garbage 
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has a value of 550-600 per kilocalorie, which is not sufficient.”36 This calorific value is likely to be 
reduced even further when recycling activities are taken into account. Still, the first recent 
project, constructed at Okhla in Delhi in the 2010s, was bolstered by company claims that the 
waste would have a kilocalorific value of 1200. A member of the committee evaluating the claims 
for the pollution control board described this as “quite impossible,” however, and concerning 
because if the garbage did not burn, diesel fuel would likely be added.  
Interviews with company managers and government bureaucrats revealed that they 
nevertheless saw the reasons for the policy overhaul to revolve around the benefits of 
mechanization, which were explained as a remedy for aesthetics and management issues, 
emphasizing how machines would replace manual (and implicitly low-caste or Muslim) workers. 
For example, a municipal engineer in the sanitation department explained that the programs 
aimed to “mechanize things previously done by hand,” while a solid waste company manager 
added that bringing new equipment and relying on privately contracted, instead of unionized, 
labor were intended to address the problems that “trucks were not in good working order, [and] 
people weren’t efficient in doing their work.” This new class of managers was frequently upper 
caste, or Brahman like the engineer introduced in the chapter’s opening vignette.37 They saw 
“solid waste management” as an exciting and well-paying industry on the business frontier. Yet, it 
was striking that working with the very waste that stigmatizes Delhi’s recyclers in this context 
afforded claims to business innovation and environmental stewardship—perhaps a kind of 
frontier-like danger that, for these actors, bolstered existing forms of cultural capital. While 
upper-caste engineers have successfully converted their inherited privileges into merit through 
engineering institutions like the IITs (Subramanian 2015, 2019), the country’s solid waste 
engineers and managers have transformed those materials from a source of diminished status into 
a more socially neutral object that affords cultural and economic capital. 
In addition to their moral or religious connotations, machines of course also have the 
effect of reducing the number of employees, which appealed to administrators because laborers 
were described as a source of trouble because of their tendency to unionize and contest working 
 
36 “Power from Garbage and How.” Hindustan Times, December 7, 2004. 
37 Determined by his surname, which was written on the visiting card he gave me. 
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conditions. Where one mechanized plant opened in the south Indian city of Madurai, just forty 
or fifty workers were reportedly hired, according to a waste company manager who I met during 
a field visit to a Delhi garbage processing and disposal site. A site in north Delhi that was to 
receive at least one-quarter of Delhi’s trash was planning to hire only eighty-four workers. Hence 
there was a direct conflict with the thousands of informal collector-recyclers who rely on the 
same materials for their livelihoods, despite claims made by companies in their public documents 
that they would employ workers. To monitor staff more closely, many planned to install 
biometric fingerprint readers to track the attendance of truck drivers and GPS technologies to 
follow the routes of the trucks. Indeed, the company’s approach has been one of keeping 
distance, or marking a distinction, between manager purity and worker pollution. When I asked 
what would happen to the existing informal workforce with the introduction of formal collection 
and incineration, a field manager responded with unintended maliciousness: “We have the 
contract for the next 20 to 30 years, and we can't hire everybody. It's our livelihood now.”  
Equating garbage with capital, a company manager readily described how these projects 
“monetize” waste through the collection of a municipal disposal fee and incineration to produce 
electricity, which is sold to the power supplier. For example, the first plant to be completed in 
Delhi, in Okhla, reported spending Rs 285 crore (US$43 million) in 2013.38 The project had 
three sources of revenue: a tipping fee per ton of garbage from the municipality, the UNFCCC’s 
carbon credits program, and revenue from selling electricity. These “market” projects are thus 
highly dependent on state resources, including land, environmental clearances, a regular supply 
of garbage, and direct financial subsidies. The director of a state-owned Norwegian company, 
which actively promotes incineration technologies in India, stated during his presentation at an 
industry conference on waste-to-energy that government subsidies are “essential to be 
economically viable.” Government assertions that these are “green” technologies have 
furthermore received financial support from the UNFCCC's Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). Plants receive funding for offsetting methane emissions and replacing a portion of 
carbon-fueled power plant activities—including the ones in Okhla and Ghazipur. In fact, the 
 
38 Somasekhar, M. “Waste Management, the Jindal Way.” The Hindu BusinessLine, November 
25, 2013. 
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Okhla plant’s application to the UNFCCC is explicit: “these kind of projects are not sustainable 
without CDM benefit.”39 
Incineration has been popular amongst both of India’s major national parties. Delhi's 
former Chief Minister Sheila Dikshit laid the foundation stone for the city's first incinerator 
project at Okhla. Just a few years later, the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) adopted 
waste incineration as a core part of its platform during the 2012 municipal elections, and during 
his Budget Speech in 2014, Finance Minister P. Chidambaram announced the introduction of 
new funding sources for waste-to-energy. By sanctioning and even celebrating incineration 
technologies, politicians at the highest levels have promoted the mechanization of garbage 
systems—using images of trucks and machines to signal their support for modernist ideas of 
national development. With the introduction of the national Smart Cities Mission in 2015, 
incineration received a significant boost of support across India. The national government’s 
planning body described it as “the best option” for large cities, explaining that “Singapore and 
other countries have waste incinerators” (NITI Aayog 2017:58). The more recent introduction of 
the Swacch Bharat Abhiyan, or Clean India Campaign, under Prime Minister Modi introduces 
even more robust forms of support. 
When I talked to the head engineer for the municipality, he added another layer to this 
vision of a progressive west and a catching-up, backward-planning India: in the “western part of 
the globe,” he said, the “population is low and the city is not littered;” there, people have a “civic 
sense” and a “responsibility to clean the city.” Here, in contrast, he described, “most people are 
uneducated,” which leads to a garbage problem. This engineer, and several others like him, were 
quick to praise the segregation and recycling practices of “developed” nations like the US (usually 
focused on because of my presence). In contrast to the mess, dirt, and disorder that they 
associated with Indian garbage systems, western nations were commonly described as civilized 
and orderly—their practices facilitating the creation of discrete objects through segregation that 
could be appropriately handled. Barring this—seen an impossibility because of the frequently 
noted deficient “civic sense” and low levels of education (also a marker of status and frequently a 
 
39 UNFCCC. 2007. CDM Project Design Form for the Timarpur-Okhla Waste Management 
Company Pvt Ltd’s Integrated Waste to Energy Project at Delhi. Pp. 25. 
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proxy for caste), lumping all the material together and burning it becomes a desirable solution, 
minimizing as it does the number of people involved while offering the prospect of control and 
order for a particular class. 
Along with western recognition and promises of global recognition, incineration also held 
out the promise of improved status through caste-based forms of progress. The industry's 
preferred terminology, “waste-to-energy,” indicates that electricity is produced as a result of the 
process, but also insinuates a linear flow where garbage fuels an equal output of energy. In 
practice, however, not only can toxic gases be produced in the process if polychlorinated plastics 
are not segregated and expensive abatement technologies not included, but the amount of energy 
produced for electricity is prohibitively low if the heat is not harnessed for heating buildings in 
cold climates (Stantec 2011:vi). The logic behind “waste-to-energy” thus seems remarkably 
similar to the “refuse destructors” that were championed in late-nineteenth century England 
because they both entail a desire to make garbage disappear (Clark 2007:260).  
The introduction of these new mechanized programs are thus notable for creating a new 
class of garbage, or “solid waste” managers. Despite the longstanding caste-based stigma of 
garbage work in India, those I spoke with tended to see solid waste management simply as a “new 
and growing sector,” akin to any other corporate setting. For example, a young manager who 
volunteered that we was an upper-caste Rajput, had switched careers from finance to waste 
management, explaining that he enjoyed being in a growing sector, liked the freedom of riding 
around on his motorcycle to monitor workers, and unlike the “ragpickers”—pointing to the 
dumpster we were standing next to, where informal collectors were hunched over sorting through 
garbage with their bare hands—he and his colleague “don’t become smelly.” He continued, 
pointing out that the mechanized vehicles added to the “aesthetics of the area,” in contrast to the 
informal garbage workers. Perhaps the most explicit testament to machines’ avowed purity was on 
display in a solid waste company’s office where I had conducted an interview. As I was leaving, I 
noticed that on top of one of the large grey laminated cabinets a shrine had been assembled from 
images of a light-skinned Jesus and framed images of garbage collection trucks. Side by side, 
garbage trucks took on a venerated status that positioned them, in contrast to the garbage itself, 
as pure and redemptive objects, with images of Jesus suggesting a potential nod towards 
Westernization (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7  A shrine with garbage trucks 
 
The Sensory Logic of Informal Recycling 
These utopic visions of centralized control over garbage through multi-million-dollar 
incinerators pose a sharp contrast to the large, dispersed network of informal waste collectors and 
recyclers, who continue to be essential to garbage systems in Indian cities. Attempts to assert 
garbage as fuel through the lens of engineering elides and erodes this workforce, which is 
primarily lower-caste and Muslim. Instead of the logic of segregation and categorization required 
to recycle plastics through the vastly networked informal economy (cf. Gidwani & Chaturvedi, 
2011; Gill, 2010), upper-caste male ideals claim dominion by constructing multi-million dollar 
incinerators that transform garbage into an object—fuel—that powers them. In contrast to the 
undifferentiated mass that fuels incineration plants, recycling involves a multi-stage, 
disaggregated process that eventually creates hundreds of distinct materials from garbage that are 
re-used and recycled. Underway, then, is not only a contest over who gets to claim these 
materials, but which actors get to assemble them into which kinds of objects. 
For India’s vast network of recyclers—nearly all of whom work without formal 
documents—garbage is treated as a source of value, its contents signifying eventual payment. 
The individuals, households, and businesses from which the garbage originates may characterize 
their actions as throwing things away, but “away” is a euphemism that elides complicated 
geographies, labors, and organizational forms. What starts as undifferentiated household garbage 
is initially distinguished by collectors as objects that are waste (e.g. organic content, mylar bags) 
Figure 2:  A shrine with garbage trucks (author’s own photo) 
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and things that can be sold: primarily recyclable scrap (in Hindi: maal) like plastics, papers, 
metals, and glass, but also bread and rice that is sold to local farmers for cows and buffalo. After 
it is segregated, collectors haul the scrap back home, where they sort it further into ten to twenty 
different categories—things like guddi (mixed hard plastic), paani ki botal (PET bottles), panni 
(plastic bags), sheesha (broken glass), and silver (aluminum). Some of these will be further 
differentiated as they move up the commodity chain. For example, a collector might sell guddi 
(mixed plastic) to an initial buyer who then has it sorted into more than 20 subcategories for 
resale and processing. The logic, then, is one of differentiated recovery via sorting. At every 
stage, individual objects must be assessed (i.e. seen, felt, manipulated), identified, and 
categorized. 
Delhi’s door-to-door collectors describe the garbage they pick up in simple terms: 
“everything comes in it” (usmein sab kuch aata hai), they’ll say. This is, on the one hand, 
obvious—garbage is where most things eventually end up, one way or another. But there is also 
something else that revealed by this statement, something that would not have occurred to me 
before contrasting their recycling labor with incineration: there is a recognition that garbage is 
more than a singular object; it is comprised of many, uncountable different things. What’s more, 
beneath this acknowledgement lies an awareness of the contents that indicates not only 
intellectual or abstract forms of knowledge, but rather knowledge gained through lived practical 
experience, or habituation. In other words, collectors not only observe that everything is in the 
garbage, but in fact have learned to identify and distinguish the multiple objects it contains by 
employing their senses. For them, garbage is not an abstracted mass seen from a comfortable 
distance, but a slew of familiar—if often uncanny—materials with their own textures, hefts, 
flexibilities, porosities, tendencies for decomposition, and, indeed, smells.  
Collectors begin with an undifferentiated mass of garbage, which they then sort into two 
primary categories—garbage (kooda), which is not recycled, and scrap or maal, which is. In the 
process of creating two discrete categories, however, individual objects are touched, sometimes 
considered or roughly cleaned with a shake or whack, and categorized. In contrast, from the 
vantage point of a landfill or incinerator, garbage contains just a singular object—its contents 
distinguished not by readily apprehendable qualities, but rather by their chemical capacity for 
pollution (i.e. PVC in incineration, organic waste in landfills), weight (for transportation), or 
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capacity for producing energy (i.e. plastics and papers have high calorific content). I described 
the process of doing an initial sort between garbage and scrap during one of my first rounds with 
neighborhood collector Naseem:  
We’re about halfway done when we … begin sorting by hand. I notice how the 
most apparent stuff in the trash, covering everything, is chai ki patti [tea grounds]. 
They are dumped into clear plastic bags, hidden inside dudh ki taili [milk bags], 
and lightly dusting nearly everything in the waste. The fruit and veg[etable] peels 
are large enough that they stay in place and fall to the bottom, but the chai ki patti 
are small and wet and mixed in with the remnants of the sweet milky tea that they 
helped to produce. Most of the pannis [plastic bags] with dudh ki tailis [milk bags] 
and vegetable peels, etc. are tied only loosely, but some are bound tightly into a 
knot, as if the thrower were either unaware of the temporariness of the bundle, or 
maybe just hoped that the bag would stay tightly sealed forever instead of having 
another’s hands rummage through his own waste. Nearly everything that is not 
organic is recycled. The [biggest] exception are mylar packets. There are tons of 
these in the waste, and they are just tossed. The other thing is blister packs for 
pills. The ones that are pure metal (you can fold them and they stay in place, as 
Naseem explains) can be recycled, but the ones that are plastic with a layer of 
metal cannot. Naseem explains that roti sells for Rs4/kg for cows as he puts some 
slices of bread into the bag hanging from the handlebars. (fieldnotes, 11/22/13) 
Though some items—like the milk-laden tea grounds—have a tendency to infiltrate material 
boundaries, coating or soaking other items with abandon, most of the recyclable material was 
easily recognized and quickly segregated. Sealed bags are torn open, their contents dumped, and 
plastics, glass jars, papers, metals, bread, and the odd-but-valuable strands of hair were pulled out 
and put in their rightful place. 
All of this is done inside or around the collector’s cart—a tricycle constructed from a 
heavy-duty steel bicycle in front with a single wheel and a wagon-like wooden cart with two 
thick wooden wheels in back (see Figure 8). A setup typically included three two-to-three-foot-
high boards erected on three sides of the cart’s interior to make it taller for accommodating more 
waste. Two long flat pieces of wood, placed diagonally on the cart’s floor, can form a triangle a 
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couple of feet outside the cart to holds another board (like a discarded karamboard game) for 
additional capacity. Here, the sack of scrap—in an old white woven plastic bag (bora)—is usually 
held, its sides rolled down nearly to the bottom at first, and then rolled up gradually to 
accommodate the growing pile of scrap. Plastic bags are used for any bread (roti) or hair that is 
found, their handles hung from the bicycle’s own handlebars.  
 
Figure 8  A collector’s setup, with white sacks for recyclables, the main cart for non-recyclable 
“wet” waste, and a bucket in front for scraps of bread, or roti 
 
Returning to Naseem, once we had segregated out the garbage inside his cart, he dumped 
it out at a municipal dumpster on the way back home, from where a truck would eventually 
collect it and carry it out to the dumpsite. I went back separately, meeting Naseem at his house 
and sat down with him and his wife to sort through our haul. Along with the milk bags, various 
papers, plastics, and cardboard that we rifled through quickly, and which his wife tossed my way 
to put in nearby piles, there were more personal things that had to be dealt with individually. 
That day, for example, we found colorful shaadi (wedding) cards—many with “best wishes” 
jotted inside and containing business cards that were presumably the givers’. These needed to be 
checked to make sure that no money had been left inside. I went through dozens of them but 
 66 
found only a single one-rupee coin. Along with these, we had also recovered at least eight nail 
polishes from the waste. I decided to take a mauve-colored one after someone else said it was too 
light for her, opting instead for bright orange. Then, in a stroke of beginner’s luck (as this never 
happened again), I emptied the contents of a discarded handbag to find that it contained not 
only a five-rupee coin, but also a small gold mango-shaped nose ring. “Twenty-three karat!” 
Naseem announced, passing it around for all to inspect, especially his mom. They told me that 
this happens from time to time, and that someone who lived nearby had found 50,000 rupees in 
cash once (field notes, 11/22/13).  
Most of the objects blurred together—cardboard tea and biscuit boxes, schoolchildren’s 
notebook paper, plastic soda bottles—all identified, touched, and tossed into its kindred pile. 
Others, however, stood out—like a small greyish jug with a rainbow sticker labeled “ganga jal” 
(Ganges water), shiny glass bangles gilded with rhinestone and metal details, or the individual 
ceramic models of full sets of teeth gotten from a local dentist.  
If these had the potential for recovery (if only by me, who, as both newbie and foreigner, 
was fascinated by the variety of things to be found), other objects had to be handled individually 
for their potential danger. For example, I watched Shahbur snap the needles of a few dozen 
syringes recovered from the dentist’s office off, using just one hand and the wooden board that 
formed the side of his cart. He held one hand up to his phone, which was partially tucked 
beneath a loose turban around his head to protect him in the searing sun, and chatted away in 
Bangla, snapping the plastic noses off from each syringe one-by-one, letting the needles drop 
into the garbage that he would later dump on his way home. Other more mundane items that 
had to be treated carefully include diapers (for both babies and adults, as at least one collector 
made sure to remind me), sanitary pads, condoms, and broken glass. As one collector described:  
So many things come, they give it [all] to the garbageman, you know? There are 
so many really dirty things that come in it. … But we don’t have to take that. 
That goes away in the garbage, in this garbage. It has no use. It - it isn’t sold. It’s 
the paper, the panni, the plastic - all that kind of stuff - that we sort out and take. 
(Interview, 1/24/14) 
While there was an NGO campaign to put sanitary pads into specially marked colored bags to 
make their contents known, I never saw one, and everything tended to be mixed in with the rest 
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of the trash. Spotting these items, then, became an important skill. Nevertheless, the collector 
here makes it clear that they too are able to cultivate distance from waste that is considered to be 
more severely polluting, positing that that stuff is not ours to deal with. 
 While most items were readily recognized by sight, some required that we engage other 
senses. For example, when I was sorting through piles of scrap one day, a recyclable buyer who I 
called Aunty gave me a test that she often enjoyed administering. Picking up two pieces of what 
looked like clear plastic wrap, she asked me what made them different. Having been through this 
exercise before, I responded that it had to do with the sound, but I couldn’t remember which 
sound meant which kind of plastic! Right, she said, and I tried to elaborate that one makes a 
louder sound because it’s harder, and another makes less sound because it’s soft. She tells me the 
hard one goes into the hanging mosquito net behind me (along with other things that are 
“bekaar” or useless, such as rice packets because they’re worth too little), while the soft stuff goes 
into the bag that needs to be re-sorted through later, along with metals and electronics, any hard 
plastics except for bottle, and hair (field notes, 1/23/14). 
The contents of the garbage also varied by season. In the summer, for example, I noted: 
“there are loads of mango peels, cucumber rinds, and the hay from the coolers” (field notes, 
5/22/13). In the powerful summer sun, a resident on a higher floor tossed down some garbage: 
“Plop. Two badminton rackets, fluorescent yellow and hot pink with thin nylon strings, land flat 
in the middle of the wet waste, sending a few mango peelings into the air” (field notes, 5/22/13). 
Around six months later, with the heat subsiding, the Hindu Diwali holiday brought what could 
be an overwhelming number of boxes from biscuits, sweets, chocolate, and even Kurkure. Joining 
these were the containers for new household goods and the remnants of firecrackers—known in 
India simply as crackers, perhaps indicating the affection people have for them—with their stems, 
blasted shells, and boxes. A couple months later, during Delhi’s relatively short but bleak winter, 
the garbage would noticeably shrink. Shorter days and the Delhi chill brought fewer outdoor 
activities or time for meals, but some indoor favorites were evident nevertheless. I noted: “while 
I’ve seen maybe one condom in the past, today I spot at least 3 used ones along with their 
wrappers. There are a handful of whiskey bottles, 2 of them broken, and lots of packets of instant 
soup. I imagine everyone holed up in their flats, trying to stay warm with booze, sex, and soup—
supplemented with the occasional cigarette” (field notes, 1/9/14). The shifts not only affected the 
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types of materials that were found in the garbage. Somewhat like farming, the amounts of 
recyclable scrap waxed and waned according to what could be harvested seasonally from the 
trash. 
As also described above, once the scrap is hauled home, another process of work begins. 
With the garbage dumped, the recovered maal has to be sorted further in order to be sold. An 
interview with a collector details the multiple categories. The need for regular clarification 
indicates how these categories vary by locale. 
 So what exactly gets sold here? Can you explain, who do you sell to? 
Glass is sold on its own. … Panni (plastic bags) is separate. … Paper is separate. … 
  So this all, these all go to madam, ok, can you tell me all of the things you sell 
to madam? 
So it’s like this - there are 10 items (types) of maal (goods) that we sell here. We 
give 10 items of maal to her. There are three paper items. One is the intact kind, 
one is the torn kind, and another is the white kind. There are three for paper, one 
for glass. One for tin, one for iron, and one for plastic bags, one for plastic. 
 You mean for bottles? 
There are also bottles, water bottles. 
 And plastic is separate? 
Yes, it’s separate. … Plastic is separate. 
 What is “plastic”? The soft kind? 
Not the soft kind 
 It’s hard? 
Yes 
 Like dabba (plastic containers)? 
Yes, dabba 
 Ok, I see 
We call dabba plastic 
 Ok 
That goes separately. Milk bags go separately. 
  You give those separately? I see, you don’t sell them with panni (plastic bags)? 
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Right. We don’t sell them with the plastic bags, panni is sold separately. So all of 
these make 10 items of maal that are sold, then those items … 
  Ok, and what else is sold apart from this? For example, what if you get some 
copper? 
Yes, copper is sold on its own, if we need to sell copper then, 
 [You give it] to madam [the local buyer]? 
Yes. And along with that there’s also some lightweight silver, a kind of aluminum 
(“silver”) that it goes in with 
 So this all goes together with tina (tin cans)? 
Huh? 
 That all goes with the tina, no? 
Yes, it does, it does. (Interview WW36, 1/24/14) 
This conversation reveals how both knowledge and relationships inform the number and type of 
categories that recyclables were sorted into. For example, while some buyers wanted all plastic 
bags mixed together, others separated out different kinds of plastic films depending on their 
thickness, material (determined from the sounds they make when crumbled), and color so that 
the white bags that atta flour and potatoes come in, and the clear bags (oddly named “rangeen” or 
colorful) that held bread, would go separately. I watched on as Rupa made roti from the old atta 
flour she had found, which she would sell the next time the buyer came around (Figure 9), and as 
wires were burned for their copper, creating an eerie scene in the dark of night (Figure 10). 
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Figure 9  Making roti from old atta flour recovered from the garbage 
 
Figure 10  Burning a heap of wires to recover the copper inside  
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 In order to create these divisions, scrap was most commonly sorted in or near the home, 
bringing together multiple members of the family. Notably, this is one part of the process that 
collector’s female family members—usually wives and older children women—commonly take 
responsibility for. Some sort through their scrap daily, while others might wait for a day or two’s 
haul. In some areas, where there is not space for storage, buyers have it sorted in the larger area 
of their shops, paying local women as laborers to get the job done (see Figure 11). In one of these 
areas in northeast Delhi, I observed: 
Being underneath those white tarps strung up by twine to bamboo poles is like 
entering another cosmos. That might be extreme, but the smell is intense in the 
rising summer heat: the leftover yogurt on containers, globs of hair stuck to plastic 
bags, the occasional razor, and collections of medical goods conspire to make the 
place the true antithesis of everyday consumptive life—with everyday objects 
becoming downright ghoulish in some cases. (field notes, 4/30/13) 
Yet, if the objects could be strange or disgusting, the teasing camaraderie (and sometimes 
disputes) amongst women and other family members provided a welcome distraction.  
 
Figure 11  Paid female laborers sort through about a week’s work of scrap    
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 In such areas, which were densely settled with brick (i.e. pakka) houses, because 
there was no space to store the scrap, it was weighed out and sold each day—the amount 
of each item noted down in the buyer’s accounting notebook, but not usually paid out on 
the spot (I discuss this detailed process in Chapter 4). In places where houses were self-
constructed from plastic sheeting and bamboo, space would be made to store the scrap 
just outside, or on top of, the home (see Figure 12). There it could be kept for a week or 
two until it was time to weigh it out, bora by bora or sack by sack, in order to record the 
earnings by item.  
 
Figure 12  A collector’s family stores scrap in front of the entrance to their home 
 
 The process of recycling is a product of manual labor, dependent on families and 
communities. Contact with garbage is personal—it is not an object seen from a distance, but 
rather the aggregate of legions of materials that have their own feels, sounds, smells—and 
ultimately, economic values. In order to realize these values, individual materials must be 
identified and culled from the mass, using knowledge that is localized depending on the kinds of 
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things that can be sold within particular categories. This poses a stark contrast to the logic of 
incineration that Delhi’s leaders have promoted. 
 
Conclusion 
In a subsection titled “the force of things,” Marcel Mauss writes: “The large abalone 
shells, the shields that are covered with these shells, the belts and blankets that are decorated with 
them, the blankets themselves that also bear emblems, covered with faces on them—all are living 
beings” (Mauss 1990:44). Mauss continues to describe how these objects decorate houses, which 
are home not only to people, but also their gods and ancestors who are contained and invoked 
within. For Mauss, the spirit of the gift was what compelled the recipient to reciprocate. Things, 
then, are distinct, recognizable, significant. Here too, I have shown that the recognition of 
materials as distinct constitutes a central feature of Delhi’s recycling economy. Indeed, it is the 
attempt to de-personify these items, to transform them into a singular alchemized material, that 
endeavors to expel practices and people who relate to wasted items as individual things—as 
shaadi cards with notes and maybe also cash inside, rather than colored paper. 
These practices reflect the valorization of modern machines, overseen by upper-caste men 
and especially engineers, over lower-caste and Muslim stigmatized working bodies. Instead of the 
detailed knowledge and highly-coordinated process that recyclers employ to recycle plastics in 
the city, incineration relies on a logic of mass destruction. By introducing these new solid waste 
technologies under the aegis of environmental policy, Indian leaders prioritized a kind of 
aesthetic sanitation concerned with the city’s reputation that sought to redeem garbage as a sign 
of modernity instead of a source of national contamination. Machines afford the possibility of 
capital accumulation for elite actors, while also improving the city (and national) image by 
centralizing and transforming materials construed as disorderly and contaminating into fuel for 
electricity, a ritually pure substance that has the capacity to obliterate social pollution, or stigma, 
through combustion. While the introduction of these technologies has been multiply challenged 
in practice, as middle-class residents and informal waste workers contest their introduction 
(Demaria and Schindler 2016), the logic of governance that incineration exemplifies remains a 
powerful influence for urban environmental trajectories. Despite incineration’s severely limited 
applicability as a technology in India—a situation that closely parallels Gowda’s (2010) historical 
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case of industrial development in Mysore—there is an ongoing struggle to reconfigure the 
materials themselves: from irregular and multiply classified discards that require stigmatized 
labor to realize value in the informal recycling sector, which allows a class of engineers, 
government officials, and businesspeople to realize personal benefits while promoting the 
progress of the nation in the international system.  
Mechanization, then, allows for practices of both Sanskritization and Westernization, as 
garbage becomes a material to be exploited without stigma—burned just like coal or gas—in the 
service of growing new corporate enterprises and stimulating profits. This reflects a postcolonial, 
developmentalist desire to be rid of both garbage and the low-caste and Muslim people who 
handle it, alchemizing it all in the bowels of an incinerator. Rather than encouraging practices of 
repair, reuse, and recycling, incineration has the ability to encourage a taste for dry waste, as 
expressed by the engineer in the opening vignette: the material artifacts of a throwaway culture.   
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CHAPTER III 
Serving the Middle Classes40 
 
I was walking through a middle-class neighborhood in Northwest Delhi’s Rohini area 
during one of my first rounds with an informal garbage collector named Meenu on a cool 
November morning. Working at a regular pace, we navigated the wide lanes, collecting garbage 
pails left outside or handed over after ringing a doorbell, putting the waste into the back of the 
sturdy tricycle cart. As we sorted out recyclables from the wet kitchen waste—plastic bottles, 
milk bags, and notebook paper, but also stale bread for cow feed—I heard Meenu’s boss abruptly 
calling out: “Get over here now!” It was only 7:30, but we had already covered around 80 of the 
120 houses from which we had to collect. A jingle began to ring out, announcing the municipal 
garbage collection truck, followed by a recording that instructed residents to deposit their trash 
in order to keep Delhi clean. I joined Meenu, picking up garbage pails from the road as quickly 
as we could and throwing everything haphazardly into the back of his cart. As we headed back 
home, he offered a reply to my earlier surprise that he started work at 5:30 each morning: “See,” 
he said, “This happens every day. That’s why I have to get here so early.”41  
As already discussed, informal collectors had long bridged the gap between individual 
households and municipal neighborhood-level dumpsters, charging a small monthly fee42 and 
earning a living by selling harvested materials into the only existing recycling system (Chaturvedi 
and Gidwani 2010; Gidwani 2013; Gill 2010; Schindler, Demaria, and Pandit 2012). The PPP 
program had significant resources and was operating regularly, offering an alternative that did 
 
40 This chapter has been adapted from: Kornberg, Dana. 2020. “Competing for Jurisdiction: 
Practical Legitimation and the Persistence of Informal Recycling in Urban India.” Social Forces: 
1–23. 
41 Field notes, 11/24/13. 
42 This was paid monthly and ranged between 30 and 100 rupees (US$.25 to US$1.50) While 
low, it is another expense in a context where middle-class homemakers are expected to manage 
budgets frugally. 
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not require an additional payment from residents and was seen as an important effort to 
modernize city services. Although these formal services did not include recycling, Delhi residents 
did not see the informal collectors as being part of a recycling system, and were therefore not 
motivated to use them for environmental reasons. Still, just two years into the twenty-year PPP 
contract, a high-ranking municipal officer admitted that the multi-million-dollar program would 
not be expanded, due in part to the continued presence of informal collectors.43 In this chapter, I 
ask: why did around two-thirds of households continue to patronize the informal system? 
Instead of defaulting to explanations of “state failure,” which offer limited insight into 
state-society relations, I offer an analytic framework that holds state influence in relation to 
informal institutions, I find that informal workers in Delhi were able to persist by successfully 
gaining recognition from local residents by conforming to expectations based on wider relations 
of status. This allowed a dominated group to retain their territories by meeting expectations for 
appropriate actions, relationships, and social boundaries and cultivating the legitimacy to persist. 
The result is a hybridized system of garbage collection where the state had relatively limited 
jurisdiction, in which recycling has continued. In the following sections, I detail existing 
explanations for why informal institutions may persist in the face of state-backed challenges, 
bringing together literatures from political and urban sociology, postcolonial and urban studies, 
and institutional theory. I then introduce a framework for understanding informality as a matter 
of informal jurisdiction that is solidified through practices that confer practical legitimation before 
offering evidence from the case. 
 
The Persistence of “Informality” 
Concepts of informality are wide-ranging and have been developed to account for 
economic, political, and urban institutions. The term was first introduced in the 1970s to make 
legible a vast array of actually existing economic activities for development economists (Godfrey 
2011; Hart 2006). The concept, which initially contained a problematic modernist teleology 
positing postcolonial contexts as atavisms, has been forcefully criticized (e.g. Elyachar 2003; 
Millar 2018; Roitman 2005). Meanwhile, ideas of state-society dualism have been challenged by 
 
43 Interview, 6/6/11. 
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accounts suggesting that “informal” spaces are in fact deeply entangled with, if not themselves 
produced by, state power (Roitman 2005; Roy 2005).  
And yet, despite these vital criticisms, the concept of informality remains useful for 
indicating spaces where the state—and especially its laws and regulations—do not predominate. 
To dispense with the term would, I believe, impoverish our ability to analyze the extent and 
limits of state authority, even while the need to reformulate the concept is imperative. I propose 
an approach that proceeds relationally and institutionally, maintaining that while the boundaries 
and sinews of state power are diffuse and dynamic, they are nevertheless distinguishable from 
other sources of order. Here, I offer an analysis of the literature that takes a relational perspective 
to informality, emphasizing state and social sources for persistence over time.   
 
State-Centered Explanations  
Informal institutions have been explained as the product of state action. Widely used 
conceptions in political sociology, for example, have understood economic informality to be an 
exploitative practice whereby state institutions strategically use and withhold regulation in order 
to benefit dominant actors. In their classic formulation, Castells and Portes (1989) defined 
informal economies as “unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social 
environment in which similar activities are regulated” (12). They attributed informal economic 
activity to the tendency of capitalist systems to promote reduced labor costs through diminished 
regulation—a trend that was increasingly prevalent throughout the 1970s and 80s. Some 
postcolonial scholars have similarly tended to foreground how the state promotes informality for 
the benefit of economically dominant actors. For example, Ananya Roy has productively 
theorized informality as the result of state-created exceptions, which make disadvantaged 
residents precarious and reinforce elite control. She writes, “informality must be understood not 
as the object of state regulation but rather as produced by the state itself” (Roy 2005:149; see also 
Chatterjee 2004). This perspective has provided an important framework for understanding 
decentralized forms of planning—from construction and zoning, to the provision of water and 
electricity—especially in cities of the global South (see also Roy 2009). Yet, while the 
perpetuation of state regulatory ambiguity is a key mechanism for the persistence of informality 
(e.g. Moatasim 2019a; Tucker and Devlin 2019), given the necessary conditions of benefits for 
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elites an a dominant and effective state, this is likely to be just one explanation amongst many.  
Another state-centered source for the persistence of informal institutions is the creation 
of “blurred” boundaries (Gupta 1995), where informal and state actors collaborate to benefit 
from under-the-table transactions or clientelist relations (e.g. Anjaria 2011). By taking money or 
turning a blind eye, bureaucrats and politicians effectively supplement their incomes or earn the 
votes of key constituencies through practices that are frequently illicit (even when the institutions 
they maintain are not). Examples of this include bureaucrats limiting official supplies of water in 
order to benefit mafias (Ranganathan 2014), or intentionally refraining from enforcing 
regulations in order to secure favor and votes (Holland 2016). These practices are possible when 
there are mutually beneficial prospects for collaboration and a low risk or penalty for violating 
rules or norms.  
Together, these explanations usefully attend to the influence of state authority, 
significantly improving on earlier dualistic frameworks that discounted state influence a priori. 
However, focusing primarily on the state has the inverse effect of removing substantive social 
content. Yet, these findings usefully demonstrate the relevance of state action and the tendency 
of informality to be sustained by dominant interests. 
 
Social Sources of Preservation 
Other researchers have identified non-state social sources for the persistence of informal 
institutions. Most prominently, studies of social movements have considered how informal actors 
secure claims and longevity through organized or ad hoc platforms. Such advocacy may occur 
through unions, cooperatives, NGOs, or representative political parties, as actors seek formal 
recognition (e.g. Agarwala 2013; Rosaldo 2016), pursue legal restitution (e.g. Cuvi 2016; 
Samson 2017), or engage in disaggregated forms of defiance (e.g. Bayat 2000; Moatasim 2019b; 
Scott 1985). Tactics vary and may include dispersed agitation, lobbying efforts, and sit-ins, while 
successes can include welfare benefits, formalization, continued tolerance, or the generation of 
solidarity amongst participants as they express common grievances. In his study of Mexico City 
street vendors, for example, John Cross (1998) argues that that vendors demonstrated political 
savvy in organizing to secure their work, finding that they took advantage of ties to the reigning 
party in order to gain support from local officials, for whom there were financial and political 
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benefits. These relations have proven durable, with vendors later continuing to operate despite 
recurring threats by employing practices of encroachment, organizing, and dodging authorities 
(Crossa 2009). Institutional persistence, then, can be secured either by a return to the 
nonenforcement of rules (cf. Holland 2016), as the state extends its influence (e.g. Assaad 1996; 
Loveman 2005), or as recognition is afforded through the provision of welfare benefits 
(Agarwala 2013). 
Yet platforms for coordinating action may not only include those within the informal 
institution; they can also extend to the customers or clients who patronize them. For example, 
working with informal book and magazine vendors in Greenwich Village, Duneier (2000) 
elaborates how agreed-upon rules for claiming space determined how the sidewalk is allocated, 
producing a regular market. While vendors act as “eyes on the street,” local residents offered food 
and donated materials for sale. Despite their marginal position, the vendor community was able 
to operate reliably for years. Similarly, Venkatesh (2009) argues that off-the-books work on 
Chicago’s South Side was a central part of everyday life sustaining the community’s basic needs. 
“Underground regulation” (Venkatesh 2009:382) allowed day cares, car repair shops, caterers, 
and hairstylists to remain in business, as local residents patronized them and street gangs 
regulated disputes. However, in Duneier’s case, the fact that vendors’ claims were not recognized 
far beyond their tables made them susceptible to eviction when city officials passed a new law 
and residents formed a neighborhood association that sought their removal. In both cases, 
though, outsiders labeled the informal enterprises as deviant, while service-users saw them as 
being completely normal or even necessary. From these studies, we learn that the persistence of 
informality can be secured through political and civic action, or via everyday strategies of 
legitimation.  
 
Practical Legitimation 
I offer an analytic framework that builds on these findings, arguing that the persistence of 
informal institutions can depend on support from and relations with dominant actors. Here, 
dominance should be understood not only as a matter of economic capital, but more 
comprehensively as a matter of status and legitimacy. This takes social sources of regulation into 
account and frames legitimacy as a relational process that centers power in its multiple forms. 
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Practical legitimation thus relies on practical rather than official or explicit claims (cf. Bourdieu 
1991). It explains how informal institutions can persist despite lacking the official recognition of 
legal status. I invoke Abbott’s (1988) concept of jurisdiction, extending it by including the 
territorial aspects of jurisdiction, since control over space is often crucial to ensuring persistence 
(see also Gidwani and Chaturvedi 2011; Kudva 2009). The informal jurisdiction that is secured 
entails control over a profession, service, or territory. This approach builds on existing studies 
that investigate how relationships based on status, gender, and community cohere to create 
regulatory structures (e.g. Agarwala 2009; Harriss-White 2009; Hart 1992; Meagher 2010), 
helping to account for why some informal institutions maintain the legitimacy to persist over 
time (cf. Suchman 1995:574-575).  
Prevailing conceptions of institutional legitimacy have tended to appeal to cognitive 
acceptance or conformity with wider social expectations (e.g. Suchman 1995:574), prioritizing 
legal (e.g. regulatory policies) and otherwise formal (e.g. media) sources that command or 
encourage compliance (Deephouse and Suchman 2008; Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway 2006). 
Yet, sources of legitimacy might also be generated via everyday habits and practices—the 
enforceable rules guiding action (Bourdieu 2005)—revealing institutions that obtain widespread 
social acceptance, even when they lack legal recognition or official forms of representation such 
as a name, brand, or logo. To relate these to Richard Scott’s (1995) typology of legitimacy, 
practical legitimation bridges cognitive definitions, which hold common understandings of a 
given situation, with regulative definitions that evaluate an organization’s compliance with laws 
and regulations.  
Practical legitimation generates a relational regulatory structure, as actors set out and 
meet expectations, exceeding normative definitions of legitimacy (Scott 1995) by recognizing 
norms as outcomes of—rather than explanations for—legitimation struggles. I therefore find 
Robin Stryker’s definition to be particularly helpful because it integrates power with practice, 
characterizing legitimacy as the “collective recognition of, and orientation to, institutionalized and 
binding rules of the game” (1994:858; my emphasis). Acknowledging the “rules of the game” 
usefully emphasizes the role of participants and audiences who engage with institutions and 
make assessments of them (Ruef and Scott 1998:880).  
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The extent to which institutional actors succeed in securing participants and jurisdiction 
thus depends on recognition, or the acceptance of an institution through practical action. 
Recognition describes the process through which legitimation is conferred in practice, as high-
status actors discern and define what is appropriate (Bourdieu 1991:113). The matter of 
recognition is also useful because it raises the question of whether state influence succeeds vis-à-
vis other sources of authority; to the extent that actors recognize another source of institutional 
legitimacy, processes of state formation can be subverted. While Loveman (2005) considers how 
states might seek to extend their authority by providing new services, I instead raise the inverse 
question of how limits to state authority are produced. 
I use the term practical legitimation to describe the process through which groups, and 
especially informally organized groups, obtain recognition and the acceptance to persist over 
time, as they orient themselves to the rules of the game. Practical legitimation, then, is a process 
whereby an institution or group is recognized by actors endowed with capital and status 
(Emirbayer and Johnson 2008; Johnson, Ridgeway, and Dowd 2006:69–71). These sources of 
legitimate institutional authority may then cohere to pose challenges to formal institutional rules 
(e.g. Bayat 2000; Scott 1985).  
In this case, status is cultivated through a relation of servility (Ray and Qayum 2009) – of 
primarily upper-caste, middle-class Hindu households wielding authority over, and depending 
on, the labor of Dalit (Balmiki) and Muslim migrant garbage collectors. What emerges is a 
relationship that, although different from the domestic servant relationship that Ray and Qayum 
examine, similarly exhibits traits of what they call a “new feudal contract”: a relation that draws 
on ideals of care and responsibility, which have long regulated relations with live-in (or 
“retained”), grafting some of elements onto the now more common part-time domestic worker 
(2009:103–4). What emerges, then, is a relational form that is being transformed for the 
contemporary urban context, but which draws on longer-standing ideals of upper-class 
households, which derive status from their ability to oversee and provide for large household 
staffs. If, as Ray and Qayum argue, “to be middle class is to distance oneself from work on the 
boundaries of purity and pollution” (2009:18), then Delhi’s garbage collectors—along with 
legions of other informally employed service workers—preserve their jobs, and effectively their 
jurisdiction, by performing these very tasks. 
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The Neighborhood Context 
In this chapter, I draw primarily from data collected during participant observation with 
Delhi’s informal garbage collection over a concentrated period of around six months. I worked 
alone to conduct participant observation in neighborhoods and company disposal sites. When I 
joined informal collectors on their garbage collection routes, I would wake up at five or six o’clock 
in the morning and meet them on the street (to take advantage of a ride in the soon-to-be-filled 
back of their tricycle cart) or, in the case of repeat visits, I would meet them in the neighborhood 
where they worked. Throughout the morning, and sometimes into the early afternoon 
(depending on the size of the beat), we would walk together through the neighborhood – 
pushing the cart along, collecting buckets of trash, and doing a first sort between garbage and 
recyclables in the cart. My role was determined by the collector: typically I assisted in collecting 
and sorting the garbage, but if a collector insisted that I not touch the garbage myself, I honored 
his request. 
The neighborhood where I went out on the majority of the routes was an area of Rohini 
that consisted of around 150 households that went up to five stories high and—according to the 
size and condition of the houses—included a range of the city’s middle classes. The area is mixed 
use, with businesses like small shops, beauty salons, doctor’s offices, and eateries on the ground 
floor along the roads (see Figure 13), with smaller lanes revealing courtyards for parking and 
exclusively residential use (see Figure 14). As with most middle-class Indian neighborhoods, this 
area is overwhelmingly Hindu and upper-caste, with a sizable Jain community. Caste is most 
easily ascertained from last name, and I noted down the following in the area based on plates 
outside of doors, names written on Resident Welfare Association (RWA) placards, and 
businesses: Tyagi, Dahiyal, Mann, Aggarwal, Yadav, Saluja, Sharma, Raghav, Baberwal, Verma, 
Chadha, Kalra, Oberoi, Sethi, Garg, Lal, Goel, Arora, Rathore, Das, Kumar, Gupta. While 
some of these are more ambiguous (e.g. Kumar), most are recognizably north Indian business 
and Brahmin community names. The RWA board offers an example below (Figure 15), while a 
door—this one lacking a nameplate, which many doors have—displays multiple signs of Hindu 
identity, including mango leaves above the door, swastikas and coconuts carved into the door 
itself, and (harder to see), marks for good luck in red sindur powder near the doorbell (Figure 
16).   
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Figure 13  A view of the neighborhood from the main road 
 
Figure 14  A view of the neighborhood from an inner lane  
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Figure 15  An RWA board depicts last names that reveal caste 
 
Figure 16  The front door of a local house demonstrates the religious identity of its residents 
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Maintaining Informal Jurisdiction through Practical Legitimation 
Informal collectors were taken by surprise when trucks appeared in 2009. A 31-year-old 
Bengali collector who had been working for ten years described: “They came out of nowhere, all 
of a sudden. It’s up to [because of ] the government (sarkar). The government does what it 
wants.”44 Despite the disruption and threat to their livelihoods, government plans did not take 
this into account, and there were no formal programs addressing their plight. Meanwhile, recent 
memories of slum demolitions—such as the eviction of an estimated 150,000 people living in 
Yamuna Pushta—led many advocates to fear a similar fate for the city’s informal garbage workers 
(Bhan 2009; Chintan 2007; Schindler et al. 2012). Although company officials claimed to be 
hiring existing informal collectors, I did not find any evidence of this, and a long-time advocate 
for recyclers agreed that this was pure “baqwaas” or nonsense, and companies were “inventing 
wastepickers” while actually hiring laborers through contractors.45  
With the trucks made available, I estimate that around one-third of local residents opted 
to stop paying the monthly fee to informal collectors and use the new service (based on 
conversations and observations during field work). This was geographically uneven, varying from 
a few houses in some neighborhoods to around half in others. In Meenu's area, around one-third 
of households turned their garbage over to the trucks (according to my observations and 
conversations with him, his bosses, and local residents)—leaving two-thirds to him. Most 
residents, then, have continued to pay the additional charge even though informal collectors lack 
formal credentials and the taxation powers of the state.  
Although there was some evidence of organized resistance against the new program and 
blurred boundaries that resulted from buying garbage from the PPP trucks, these accounted for 
only a small part of the overall persistence of informal recycling. Instead, it was through everyday 
practices interactions with residents that confirmed to expected practice that informal collectors 
were able to successfully preserve their jurisdiction. By demonstrating flexibility and subservience 
(Ray and Qayum 2009), collectors affirmed residents’ status as patron-like bosses and, in turn, 
 
44 Interview, 7/8/13. 
45 Interview, 5/19/11. Although some were hired as dhalao supervisors, many were not paid for their 
work and eventually left. 
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gained recognition as the legitimate providers of the service, as the following three sections 
describe. 
 
Providing Appropriate Services  
Informal collectors provided services that residents had come to see as “better,” including 
coming right to the door, arriving on time each day, cleaning parking areas and stairs, and being 
available to do odd jobs. Unlike truck attendants, who remained at the street level and received 
the bins and bags that residents brought down, informal collectors climbed flights of stairs, rang 
the doorbell, and picked up garbage at the doorstep (see Figure 17). 
 
Figure 17  A collector and his family sorting through waste collected from the houses pictured 
 
When I asked Mahmud why it was that only around ten out of the 220 households he 
collected from gave their garbage to the trucks, he responded plainly: “I walk up the stairs and 
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ring the bell of every house.”46 Delhi’s middle-class neighborhoods are comprised largely of low-
rise residential buildings, typically between two and five stories high. Residents had grown 
accustomed to pickup service, which relieves them of needing to take out the garbage themselves. 
A local resident and scrap buyer knew exactly how the broader system worked because she owned 
an informal recycling business. Unlike most residents, she was Muslim. She was also intimately 
familiar with the informal recyclers, since many of them worked for her. This interested 
positionality informed her explanation for why the informal recyclers were still working: 
Before people were saying they’d give it [their waste] to the trucks, but now 
they’re reluctant to throw it in the trucks because it’s easier for them [to have it 
picked up], you know. They [informal collectors] take the garbage right from the 
house. They sweep the stairs; they do any work that needs to be done. It’s easy 
[araam]. And the truck drivers don’t do this. When they ring the bell, you have to 
go downstairs to give them the trash. Even I’m annoyed [with this]. Even I don’t 
like it. Wake up in the morning, give the trash, and if the garbage man didn’t 
come, then it’s like why didn’t he come, for what reason? He should come.47  
Even though middle-class residents were widely sympathetic to the idea of using the trucks, their 
habits tended to weigh in the opposite direction—towards a preference for the forms of service to 
which they were habituated, described here simply as a matter of “ease,” which indicates a matter 
of convenience, but also familiarity.  
Residents and collectors also noted that informal collectors also came reliably at the same 
time each day, whereas the trucks might deviate from their designated route, speed too quickly 
down the street, or took days off. Rizaul, an informal collector who had promoted himself from a 
lower-middle-class neighborhood to a wealthier one that afforded more revenue, explained: 
“Those truck drivers don’t come on time. But we have a schedule. I get there early, work quickly, 
and then I come home.”48 Collectors often arrived during the morning or early afternoon, 
providing an opportunity for face-to-face contact with residents. Where they came before dawn, 
residents knew to leave their bins out each night, forming a routine that became a household 
 
46 Interview, 5/30/13. 
47 Interview, 7/13/14. 
48 Interview, 5/17/13. 
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daily rhythm. In both cases, if the collector was sick or traveling, they were responsible for 
sending someone in their place, ensuring that the daily collection of household waste remained 
uninterrupted. Unlike the trucks, which sometimes changed their routes, informal collectors—
perhaps counterintuitively—tended to arrive daily and on time.  
In addition to climbing up stairs to collect residents’ garbage, informal collectors were 
often  responsible for cleaning those stairs, which accumulated daily with Delhi’s copious dust. 
Collectors were also tasked with sweeping courtyard parking areas in some neighborhoods 
because the municipality only cleaned the main roads and lanes. I watched a twenty-eight-year-
old Bengali collector with amazement as he swept out five stories of stairs in nearly fifty 
buildings. When I initially interviewed him, I had not understood why Abdul worked so many 
more hours than others, who typically put in around eight hours each day. As he described it at 
the time, “I leave here at five o’clock in the morning and get back at five o’clock in the evening. I 
work for twelve hours.”49 However, it quickly became clear what took so long, when I watched 
him descend slowly down tens of staircases, hunched over below the long Indian-style grass 
broom in his hand. While many collectors swept stairs, the neighborhood he worked in expected 
this ubiquitously and daily. 
Finally, informal collectors were also expected to perform odd jobs. Their consistent 
presence, relative familiarity, and marked social inferiority as laborers (mazdoor in Hindi) made 
them available, for example, when weddings or other events were held in neighborhood streets. 
As one collector described: 
If there’s a wedding, or a birthday, if you have a function like that [in a tent on the 
street], then there will be lots of garbage and scrap (kooda-kabada). The truck 
drivers won’t come to clean it up. So, whatever time you call the informal collector 
(jamadar)—they’ll come right away and clean up. They still won’t ask for more 
money; they’ll just ask for the monthly 50 rupees [that you already pay]. It could 
be that you decide to give 50 or 100 rupees, with gratitude, you’ll say take this, 
 
49 Interview, 6/15/13. 
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have a tip (chai-paani). You can give like that. But the informal contractor takes 
care of it (kaam).50  
Residents benefitted from the collectors’ ability to work in the afternoons and evenings, which 
made them available for tasks like helping people move, or doing odd cleaning jobs. Through 
these actions, informal collectors offered services that residents tended to see as “better,” earning 
them recognition as legitimate. 
 
Forging Appropriate Relationships  
Relations between collectors and residents were embedded in local systems of status and 
longer-standing class- and caste-derived dependencies. The significance of these roles was 
especially apparent in how residents and informal collectors referred to one another. Residents I 
spoke with described a relationship of familiarity with informal collectors, referring to them as 
“ours” (apna/humara) and belonging to the neighborhood. For example, one resident referred to 
the informal system as the “normal” one, while another remarked that “we didn’t switch, MCD 
switched.”51 These residents thought that it was the informal system that had a rightful place in 
their neighborhood, while the government service had more to prove. Informal collectors, too, 
were familiar with individual households, leaving me impressed when conversations over 
payment of  the monthly fee tended to rely on personal details such as the family who has the 
new baby on the corner—identifying features that were used instead of addresses.   
Appropriate relationships were forged as collectors came to understand which houses to 
avoid because they had started giving their trash to the trucks, at which doors to wait outside for 
garbage to be handed over, and which homes might be entered after sliding bare feet out of 
sandals. Unlike the government service, informal collectors were able, and indeed expected, to 
conform to household expectations of what their labor would entail. This became especially clear 
when I joined Naseem as he served over 200 households in identical-looking concrete apartment 
buildings:  
 
50 Interview, 7/9/13. 
51 Field notes, 7/7/14. 
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As we climb up the four stories of each building, he knows exactly which houses 
to ring the bell for and which to ignore because they will give their trash to the 
truck. He also knows at which doors to wait for the garbage, which ones to walk 
into without knocking, and which to wait for someone to answer and then walk 
into. At each door, he simply rings the bell or taps the metal latch and says 
“kooda,” or garbage.52  
Naseem’s familiarity didn’t only include knowing how to collect the garbage, but also that 
someone’s son had gone to the US and another’s husband had recently passed away—details that 
he had learned from chatting with residents during his rounds.  
 Beyond these patterns of knowing and naming, the fact that several of the residents 
reference collectors possessively as “our own” or “ours”53 suggests a perceived relation between a 
plural possessor, the family, and a singular possessed, the collector, indicating ties that are both 
intimate and dependent.54 Such workers are not only employees or service-providers, but vital 
actors that help to ensure that the household’s reproductive activities are smooth and reliable. 
These practices evidence a legitimate informal institution on which residents come to rely.  
In order to provide a service widely seen as better, collectors coordinated with residents in 
order to accomplish household tasks, and in turn, residents recognized collectors as legitimate 
service providers. The result was that residents could manage their garbage through another 
person55 so that they didn’t have to touch it, or be seen touching it, in public. For example, when 
I was out with Nusrat, he coolly told me at one point that he didn’t go up the stairs, which I 
initially found puzzling because it seemed like this was his main advantage over the trucks. The 
next thing I knew, however, a woman was sending a blue plastic bucket down from her fourth-
floor balcony. All I could see from ground level were her arms guiding the string, and her face, 
lightly wrinkled, watching it. The bin dropped slowly, swinging slightly in the hot wind. Nuhu 
 
52 Field notes, 11/22/13. 
53 Field notes, 7/7/14. 
54 Despite severe power imbalances, the collectors were not indentured to residents. They did tend 
to be indebted to buyers who purchased their recyclables, but it was frequently paid off within a 
few years. 
55 The depth of this relation is well illustrated by the Hindi-Urdu verb karvaana, which denotes 
doing something via another who is made instrumental to the acting (but dependent) subject.  
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caught it, dumped the trash into the cart and looked to the sky for the next one. Relationships, I 
learned, allowed for appropriate coordination, whether or not that included a collector walking 
up the stairs. 
Residents’ status as patrons also meant that some offered collectors water, tea, and snacks. 
One day I observed:  
[The jamadar] asks an aunty in the corner to make tea, and Meenu comments to 
her when she comes down with it in a steel can, ‘I only drink tea from you. 
Sometimes they order it from the aunty down the road, but her chai is terrible.’ 
We wait for [her] to return with plastic cups from the woman who keeps those so 
that we have vessels to drink our tea, and the aunty returns with a few slices of 
wheat bread in a bag. I thank her but show her my hands: ‘They’re dirty.’ She 
offers to bring water for me to wash with, so I follow her into the courtyard, she 
sets down the tea, and pours water over my hands as I vigorously wipe them 
together.56 
The provision of such gifts further helps to explain why residents would refer to collectors as 
“ours” or “our own” possessively: it indicates subordination, but also intimately dependent ties. 
Informal collectors thus become a necessary part of the middle-class urban household’s 
reproduction. Figure 6 depicts a collector accessing water from a household, which had unusually 
provided the service in a demonstration of an older form of patronage for the neighborhood’s 
workers. 
Informal collectors are just one of many types of workers who are a familiar and integral 
part of the daily household schedule in Delhi’s middle-class neighborhoods. In a city where 
multi-generational households continue to be common, and at least one person typically stays 
home during the day to prepare food, clean, and care for children and elders, the arrival of the 
garbage collector at the front door is a routine that marks the day. When I was out on collection 
routes, the person opening the door to hand over the garbage was usually a woman—a mother, 
daughter, aunt, or grandma—often dressed in a nightgown and in the process of preparing food 
or watching young children. On the one hand, the informal service was indeed more convenient, 
 
56 Field notes, 12/14/13. 
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as it allowed them to stay inside the house. However, it is also true that norms of domesticity are 
marked by gender, class, and caste ideals that posit good household management to include 
managing tasks such as taking out the garbage, rather than doing them oneself. The informal 
service affords this by providing a daily reliable service that simultaneously relinquishes upper-
caste women from having to handle garbage themselves. The informal collector conformed to 
these existing domestic services while the municipal trucks usually tried to impose a new, ill-
fitting configuration. 
 
Figure 18  A collector taking water from a local household with a publicly facing tap 
 
Maintaining Appropriate Social Boundaries 
In addition to the formation of relationships based on service provision, collectors also 
enabled households to meet cultural ideals of ritual and material cleanliness, which derive from 
caste-based social boundaries. Meeting residents’ strict expectations for the regular, if not 
immediate, removal of waste from their homes and cleaning of surfaces meets expectations for 
particular ideas of purity, while also producing collectors’ relatively diminutive status 
(Chakrabarty 1991; Douglas 1966). Collectors’ stigmatized labor relieved residents of the 
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responsibility to have to deal with their waste either physically or psychologically—a generated 
ignorance that was particularly evident in the way that residents handed over their garbage. All 
mixed together, most of it contained vegetable peels, the remnants of tea leaves, plastics, and 
papers—but there would also be soiled sanitary pads, dirty diapers, used condoms, and pieces of 
broken glass. One day, Meenu cut his hand on some glass and was complaining about how 
residents don’t even think about this when they hand over their garbage. They should, he said, 
separate out the broken glass. When I asked him why he doesn’t ask residents to separate it, he 
shook his head while continuing to look down, telling me they wouldn’t listen. As if to 
emphasize this point, a man tossed his mixed trash into the part of the cart designated for 
recyclables while we were talking, without looking to see where it landed.57  
Meeting residents’ strict expectations for the regular, if not immediate, removal of waste 
from their homes and cleaning of surfaces meets expectations for ideas of purity while also 
reproducing collectors’ relatively diminutive status (cf. Chakrabarty 1991). Boundaries separating 
the inside of the home from the world outside, which is commonly seen as containing threats 
from both contaminating waste and lower-caste or caste-ambiguous people, were commonly 
marked to ensure that middle-class, primarily upper-caste households would not be polluted. 
Residents did not explain it in this way, but my fieldwork made the logic apparent. For example, 
tea was served to collectors in disposable cups or steel cups reserved for them that family 
members would not use themselves. Similarly, collectors knew not to cross the boundary into 
homes unless they were explicitly invited. One described how, instead of going into houses, he 
knew to stand at the door and receive the garbage from there, making sure to only take the 
bucket from the ground instead of directly from the resident. Maintaining this boundary draws 
on longstanding caste practices of purity and pollution that designate which groups can touch 
which things where, and who can hand what directly to whom—and indeed, who is compelled to 
do so in order to earn a living.  
 
57 Field notes, 11/24/13. 
26 Interview, 1/24/14. 
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Usually these practices of distinction were unvoiced, implicitly informing how actors 
related to one another across caste. But they were occasionally made explicit, such as when a 
woman emerged from her home and dropped a small clear plastic bag filled with garbage on the 
ground just beside a collector’s tricycle cart. She looked directly at the collector and instructed 
him, “Pick this up,” before quickly turning away, walking back inside, and shutting the door 
without looking back.  Another collector summed up his experience with cross-caste interactions 
as follows:  
They order you around. If there’s dog shit lying over there, they’ll tell you to pick 
it up. If you say no, they get offended. In order to do this work, we have to do all 
kinds of things. And if you don’t listen to someone they’ll cut you off. They’ll get 
rid of you; they’ll say don’t come back to work. That’s how it is.58  
Being available as workers, then, was not only about the inconvenience of walking down 
stairs; spatial separation was linked to deeper questions of appropriate roles and the 
maintenance of social boundaries.  
In summary, by providing appropriate services, forging appropriate relationships, and 
ultimately maintaining appropriate boundaries, Delhi’s informal collectors gained recognition 
from middle-class residents. Residents’ higher status enabled them to define the bases of 
legitimacy. Collectors acquiesced through practical, everyday actions, and thereby made 
themselves a necessary institution.  
 
Conclusion 
I have shown that informal institutions can persist, despite challenges from state-
authorized organizations, when informal institutional actors—in this case, Delhi’s informal 
recyclers—maintain their jurisdiction through practical legitimation. That informal actors may 
fend off dispossession in this way suggests that informal institutions can be independently 
efficacious; indeed, informal collectors have managed, for now, to continue working in Delhi 
despite significant challenges and almost no political voice. I argue that their status-based 
relations with residents help to account for this. 
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Residents opted to patronize the informal collection system because collectors provided 
the services they had come to expect: coming right to the door, performing odd jobs for 
uncertain compensation, and respecting pollution boundaries. When collectors performed these 
tasks, they affirmed residents’ higher status and allowed them to maintain the social boundaries 
they understood as appropriate. Residents patronize informal collectors not only because they 
offer additional services, but because they affirm residents’ status as patrons in a position of 
dominance over collectors. This contrasts markedly from the formal service, which requires 
residents to become ordinary citizens under the state, instead of patrons of the extended 
household (see Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19  Inversion of residents’ status under PPP program 
 
While this process of claiming and maintaining informal jurisdiction is central, it is not 
the only mechanism at work here; economic exploitation is also evident. Informal collectors do 
provide a wider array of services than truck collectors, and their availability to perform odd jobs 
benefits residents. Yet, rather than supporting collectors’ continued enterprise, which would 
ensure the persistence of a flexible and inexpensive workforce for local residents, the state instead 
attempted to displace them. This contradicts theories that assume synergies between the state 
and dominant classes, as they were here working against one another. Even while many residents 
expressed support for the idea of the government collection system, in practice only a minority 
actually used it. Moreover, had there been more robust platforms for organizing—a situation that 
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is notoriously difficult for informal workers—incorporation or formalization may have resulted, 
as it has in multiple Latin American countries (see Rosaldo 2019). And while some informal 
workers have blurred state boundaries as they began to buy garbage from the trucks, this created 
a new market rather than preserving existing jurisdiction per se.  
Instead, the primary practice that preserved informal garbage collectors’ informal 
jurisdiction was practical legitimation: collectors gaining recognition from residents as the rightful 
providers of the service. Practical legitimation is useful for studying relations between formal and 
informal institutions because the process is observable, allowing researchers to study everyday 
practices without assuming the form or function of the state a priori. Instead, what emerges is a 
context where authority easily traverses state and nonstate institutions, revealing hybridized and 
plural contexts that include multiple sources of authority (cf. Falk Moore 1978; Gluckman 1965; 
Lund 2006; Merry 1988). Identifying these institutions and tracing their contours reveals 
pluralized sources of regulation and jurisdiction, suggesting that legitimacy may not only be 
conferred through centralized state authority or overarching norms, but also through actors’ 
everyday practices. In cases where state entities mimic or coopt existing social institutions, rather 
than introducing competing entities, they are more likely incorporate them (Loveman 2005). In 
fact, this was the process through which Delhi’s first municipal garbage system was created in the 
late nineteenth century (Prashad 2000). As a result, state instititons are themselves imprinted 
with existing relational structures.  
Explanations that equate informality with exploitation usefully emphasize economic and 
class relations, but these can also obscure other relations based on a more comprehensive idea of 
status that includes caste, race, or gender. Status relations, then, are an important source of order 
and regulation in these spaces, and they can continue to shape informal institutions even after 
state incursions. In this case, status relations are based largely on caste roles and patterns of labor 
migration, with new migrants carrying out work that had been dominated by an explicitly low-
caste, or Dalit, community before their arrival. Meeting the expectations of middle-class, 
predominantly upper-caste (i.e. high-status) residents meant that lower-status collectors not only 
provided a source of pliable labor available to do odd jobs for little pay, but also upheld wider 
expectations that garbage be collected regularly and discreetly. Such expectations are not the 
path-dependent effects of an unchanging “caste system,” but rather a particular cultural practice 
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that draws on the historical caste-based labor of waste handling. In contemporary Delhi, this 
now serves as a marker of status in much the same way that access to sanitized spaces and luxury 
goods indicate relative prestige. One could imagine another context where such personalized 
services are seen differently, as a burdensome interaction that infringes on individual privacy and 
forces residents to confront stark and uncomfortable inequalities. As long as middle-class 
residents are able to maintain a relatively high status—a dominance that is broader than 
economic exploitation or even social class—and the state does not put significantly more force 
behind its efforts of dispossession, we should expect the informal recycling system in Delhi, and 
systems like it, to endure. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Compensating for Stigma59 
 
Darting between cars speeding through the outermost lane, Rizaul used his long limbs 
and tall, healthy frame to hoist the bora full of scrap (maal) onto the raised median. It was late 
morning, and as in any Delhi colony, small clusters of domestic workers—cooks, cleaners, press 
wale, chaukidars, etc.—could be seen shuffling around or between houses in this area near 
Pitampura. We too were finishing the morning’s garbage collection route when another worker 
dressed in a black-embroidered salwar kameez stepped up onto the median to talk with Rizaul. 
He went to throw the garbage in the dumpster, leaving me to watch the day’s maal, at which 
point she turned to me quickly, explaining that she was ashamed that he was collecting garbage 
for a living. She was pointed: “I always tell this guy that he is a Muslim, and Muslims don’t do 
this work.” When he eventually came back, she looked directly at him, scrunching up her face 
with disgust and disapproval: “Aap bhangi hai kya? Yeh bhangi ka kaam hai (What are you, a 
bhangi? This is bhangi’s work).”60  
Judgment, disdain, and discrimination remain sharp for those who earn a living by 
handling others’ waste in urban India. Just as upper-caste groups justify their continued 
dominance through new mechanisms such as the idea of “merit” (Subramanian 2015), so too are 
cultural caste-based practices of subjugation and untouchability promoted to secure their 
positions (Sarukkai 2009). In this chapter, I examine the phenomenon whereby Delhi’s informal 
economy for household garbage collection has been reorganized—as Balmikis have employed 
newer Muslim migrants from West Bengal for collection and sorting work, leaving them to deal 
only with monthly cash payments instead of garbage, or kooda. In turn, Bengali Muslims find 
 
59 This chapter has been adapted from: Kornberg, Dana. 2019. “From Balmikis to Bengalis: The 
‘Casteification’ of Muslims in Delhi’s Informal Garbage Economy.” Economic and Political Weekly 
54(47): 48–54. 
60 Field notes, 12/3/13. 
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themselves subjected to stigmatizing practices of untouchability, as residents respond to their 
presence by covering their noses and mouths, telling them to stay far away, and ordering them to 
move their carts. As agricultural laborers or small merchants in their villages, such experiences 
are new for them (leading to the remark above), and they must be accepted in order to continue 
working. I analyze this transformation in order to show the durability of systems of caste 
distinction, while also indicating how the processes through which caste distinctions endure—as 
well as the groups subjected to their power—may change. Why were new migrants like Rizaul 
willing to take on dirty work in the city, and how did they justify it? 
I analyze the reorganization of informal household garbage collection work in Delhi, as 
migrants from eastern states like West Bengal have begun doing manual waste work, leaving 
their Balmiki bosses to deal only with monthly cash payments. Drawing on twenty months of 
fieldwork, I first discuss this reorganization, noting especially the effect on Balmiki jamadars. I 
then focus on Bengali Muslims, who newly contend with practices of untouchability in their 
neighborhoods of work. I argue that these newer migrants come to justify the shame they 
experience by focusing on the equivalence of scrap with money, which has redemptive potential. 
I find that informal garbage workers seek to distance themselves from garbage materials and 
become closer to valuable scrap and, even more, the currency it is exchanged for, because it offers 
the alluring possibility of increased social status. This reveals a dynamic process through which 
caste differences are being re-made—what I call casteification—in relation to economic life.  
 
Stigmatization and its Justification 
Building on the recognized, and frequently violent, enforcement of untouchability 
practices perpetuated against Dalits, I argue that similar forms of domination can be extended 
through casteification,61 a term that indicates the mundane practices through which casted actors, 
groups, and structures are produced. To discuss “caste” in this way is not to delineate caste as a 
rigid system of hierarchy in the classic sense, or to invoke the language of Max Weber, but rather 
to recognize that caste is the English term most ubiquitously used to describe structures of 
 
61 Ifeka (1989) also uses this term to describe practices of caste differentiation practices by 
Christian women in Goa. 
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cultural, hereditary, and ascriptive traits, described (when it is spoken of) by the terms jati, qaum, 
and biradri in north India. This also acknowledges how social practices and positions associated 
with caste—from lineage/surname to dietary practices and access to wealth—afford some groups 
high status while others are subordinated, exploited, and even humiliated. To see caste in this 
way is to recognize how this system for producing social distinctions “continues to be significant 
as a source of cultural capital that enters into the reproduction of class differences” (Harriss 
2012:2). Here, in particular, casteification functions in an urban context, where “to be middle 
class is to distance oneself from work on the boundaries of purity and pollution” (Ray and 
Qayum 2009:18). Casteification, then, recognizes how caste practices and positions change over 
time—even if those changes are rarely radical.   
Especially relevant to this case are theories of untouchability that acknowledge and 
theorize such practices at the bottom of the hierarchy in a relational fashion. In particular, I find 
useful Sarukkai’s (2009) forceful argument that “the real site of untouchability is the person who 
refuses to touch the untouchable” (43). This formulation not only recognizes the relationality of 
caste (i.e. there is only untouchability in relation to savarna-ness), but also explicitly 
acknowledges the role of upper-caste actors in determining who deserves to be touched. 
Formulated as a social practice, the act of denying particular groups the value and care of 
experiencing touch becomes a way of confirming higher status. While some waste workers “come 
to the city to escape the inherited burden of caste,” only to find themselves again confronting its 
cruelty (Gidwani and Kumar 2019:156), the experience of new groups experiencing old forms of 
stigma and discrimination usefully extends how we conceptualize, and thus also recognize, the 
workings of caste and casteism in the urban context. Just as Punjabi laborers became Balmikis in 
Delhi during the late nineteenth century (Prashad 2000), so too do contemporary urban migrants 
take on new social positions in the city. This phenomenon is particularly evident when it comes 
to working with wet household garbage—an unambiguously stigmatizing material that has long 
been a marker of caste and status. 
To recognize the extension of stigma of untouchability to new groups, however, also 
raises the question of why such groups might accept this penalty. What is novel here is not that 
people are subjected to practices of untouchability that justify and enable their exploitation—that 
is of course a much longer-standing phenomenon—but rather that the social penalties of 
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untouchability actually come to be seen as a cost to be paid in order to realize economic benefits. 
Though narrow, Muslim garbage workers in Delhi nevertheless tend to have options ranging 
from agricultural labor in their villages, to rickshaw pulling or construction work in the city. I 
argue that Bengali garbage workers are willing to handle garbage (kooda) in pursuit of valuable 
recyclable scrap (maal or kabad), because scrap brings potential for money, capital, and even, very 
potentially, improved status. For Balmikis, this has meant reducing, or in many cases 
eliminating, their direct contact with garbage, while for Bengalis and other newer rural to urban 
migrants, contact with wet waste is seen as compulsion (majboori) but also a kind of expense—a 
sacrifice of cultural capital in the short term in order to attempt to gain the redemptive potential 
of economic capital over time (cf. Bourdieu 1977). 
This chapter thus responds to these questions: What compels Bengali62 farm laborers to 
come to the city to collect garbage and sell scrap? Even more, how do they experience and 
explain their move from farm work (khetibari) to scrap work (kabadi)? How do they make sense 
of their status vis-à-vis their Balmiki employers? And how do they contend with taking on a new 
source of stigma from dirty work that includes handling physically polluted materials?  
I argue that informal garbage workers seek to distance themselves from garbage materials 
and become closer to valuable scrap and, even more, the currency it is exchanged for, because it 
offers the alluring possibility of increased social status. For Balmikis, this has meant reducing—
or in many cases, eliminating—their direct contact with garbage, while for Bengalis and other 
newer rural to urban migrants, contact with wet garbage is seen as “compulsion” (majboori) but 
perhaps also an expense—a kind of cultural debt—that allows for the possibility of accruing 
economic capital in order to attempt to improve their social status (Bourdieu 2011). There is a 
related material circulation that facilitates this: as scrap is distinguished from garbage, it becomes 
a commodity that is exchanged for cash. It is the cash, the physicality of money, that workers 
seek. These practices of exchange, I argue, mediate status in novel ways. 
 
62 I refer to “Balmikis” and “Bengalis” as two distinct ethnic groups who are active in garbage 
collection work. They are self-identified groups, but they also denote separate groups that can be 
identified based on the settlements where they live and the language they speak. While most 
Balmikis have been in Delhi for at least a couple of generations, Bengali workers tend to be more 
recent first or second-generation migrants are were almost exclusively Muslims who were 
landless and worked as agricultural laborers in their villages of origin. 
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Balmikis: Cultivating Distance from Waste 
The last couple of decades has not only seen the persistence of informal systems of 
household waste collection and recycling in Delhi, but even their expansion. As markets for 
recycling rising amounts of plastics and papers deepened in the 1990s and 2000s, the scrap 
available in garbage for recovery and recycling swelled. Meanwhile, labour migrants arriving from 
West Bengal were eager to find work in Delhi, and many joined the city’s quickly segmenting 
waste workforce. They were facilitated by people like the scrap buyer I interviewed in northwest 
Delhi who lived in a jhuggi alongside Balmiki families in the 1990s. Spreading the word to the 
local Bengali community about the availability of work, village networks were eventually 
activated. She explained how their arrival in Delhi from West Bengal changed the existing 
system for informal household garbage collection: 
At that time, I wouldn’t have thought that people would come from West Bengal 
to do this work or that they would go through such dirty garbage (laughing). The 
Balmikis would do their own collection and just sell what they got. It was all 
clean, and there was a lot of it. Now they’ve become contractors (thekadars) and 
the Bengalis do the work, going through the garbage for things that wouldn’t 
have been sold before. It’s completely changed.63 
Two important transitions are noted here: the arrival of Bengalis from her home district and the 
expansion of scrap material recovered for recycling, which expanded beyond relatively “clean” and 
valuable things to include “dirty” less-valuable materials. Before their arrival, Balmiki workers 
reclaimed only more expensive scrap items like unsoiled plastic bottles and metals, which they 
would sell for cash. Newer Bengali collectors, in contrast, extract even small pieces of newspaper, 
handfuls of long hair, and plastic bags dripping with the milky-sweet remnants of yesterday’s 
chai. Bengali migrants have thus added both material and social complexity to the robust yet 
informal system for garbage collection and recycling.  
 
63 Field notes, 12/9/13. 
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In his detailed historical study, Vijay Prashad (2000) documents how contemporary 
Balmikis formed out of two groups, or castes, who worked primarily as agricultural laborers in 
the Punjab in the 1800s: the Chuhras and Mehtars. Finding work as street sweepers and refuse 
collectors (mainly euphemized “nightsoil” at that time), these groups coalesced—their work 
eventually becoming formalized into municipal jobs in the 1880s. As the community became 
increasingly tied to the municipality, and the municipality dependent on the Balmiki 
community’s labor, sanitation work became their primary source of livelihood. In addition to 
formal municipal jobs, then, others have relied on long-term claims to collect garbage in 
particular areas. Both Balmiki contractors and Bengali collectors understood this as a kind of 
right—or as one Balmiki man described it, their khandani kaam (hereditary work). He described 
how his parents and other members of the community claimed particular beats when new 
neighborhoods were built. Another Balmiki contractor elaborated: “Who knows how many 
thousands of people do this work. Someone does this, another does that. Some people have 50 
houses, others have 100, 150, or 200. It’s like that.” This gives them rights to collect garbage 
from all of the households within that area.  
These “jamadars,”64 have since outsourced the manual labor to Bengalis, creating two jobs 
where previously there had been only one—a response to the deepening market for recyclables. 
Their entry also meant a significant change for Balmiki workers, who had often collected garbage 
(and human waste, especially in the past) for multiple generations. A primary source of livelihood 
that had been secured entirely through informal networks, Balmikis described their rights to 
conduct sanitation work in particular areas as khandani or purkhon ka kaam (familial or hereditary 
work). While many in the community hold formal municipal jobs (often men), themselves 
passed between generations, others (often women within the same family) rely on long-term, yet 
entirely informal, claims to collect garbage from particular areas of the city. Despite not having 
formal contracts or other legal title, both Balmiki contractors and Bengali collectors understood 
 
64 According to Vijay Prashad (2000), jamadar was the title used by people in charge of the 
sweepers when the Delhi Municipal Corporation began its sanitation programs at the turn of the 
20th century. In more recent times, the title has been used to refer to those tasked with domestic 
dirty work (Ray and Qayum 2009). 
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these claims as a right, as a Bengali collector affirmed by referencing the rural context with which 
he was most familiar:  
It’s just like how we’ll get our father’s or grandfather’s fields down the road, and 
then after us our children will get them, right? That’s exactly how their jobs are. 
Before it was their father and grandfather (baap-dada), they did this work, but 
when their grandfather passed away, their dad got it, and when their father passed 
away then the son got it. I mean, they have exactly this kind of “chain system.”65  
Balmiki jamadars described how they either inherited their areas, as described here, or claimed 
them when new houses were built. These claims were widely recognized and rarely, if ever, 
contested. 
Given these longstanding claims, the fact that Balmiki collectors have been willing to 
give up a key source of income to Bengali newcomers, particularly when scrap was becoming 
more lucrative, is notable. When I asked a Balmiki jamadar whose family had collected from the 
same area for generations why they would take the reduction in pay and allow others to take the 
scrap, he explained his logic: “Unka bhi pet bhar jaye. Inke biwi bacche hain, inka bhi time pass ho 
jaye. Inka bhi time pass ho jaye, hamara bhi time pass ho jaye (They too will fill their stomachs. They 
have wives and children, they will also get by. They’ll get by, we’ll also get by).”66 In other words, 
he seemed to say, we’re all making ends meet. Framing the work as “time pass” was relatively 
common, as it was seen as a way of making ends meet—subsistence rather than gain. Such a 
logic also accords, however, with the fact that Bengalis were willing to dig out lower value 
materials for recycling—effectively contributing to an entirely new market of recyclables. The rise 
of kabadi wale (roaming scrap buyers) also had an influence, since Balmiki collectors had 
previously recovered the bottles, metal, and newspaper stacks from garbage that households now 
sell for money.    
But as I worked in the neighborhoods, I was able to see other benefits that Balmiki 
jamadars now enjoyed from giving up handling garbage and dealing primarily with money—their 
main task now being the collection of the household fee (usually between Rs 30 and 100 per 
 
65 Interview, 7/7/13. 
66 Interview, 2/8/14. 
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month). On a garbage collection round in Rohini during an unusually pleasant and cool sunny 
morning just after Diwali, the advantages of jamadars becoming contractors took on new 
meaning. I was with a slight man in his forties who had just returned from a long stay in his 
West Bengali village, when a woman arrived around 7 a.m. She looked to be in her late thirties, 
wearing a bright salwar kameez, gold hoop earrings, a shiny nose ring, and pink lipstick. Without 
any formalities, she walked straight up to him to ask about the collector who worked in the 
adjacent area. After getting an answer, she turned to me, asking if I would join her for some chai. 
I followed as she walked off in the direction of an older local woman’s house, leaving him to 
collect garbage while we were invited inside for tea and snacks.67  
While this kind of invitation could have happened when jamadars did the collection work 
themselves—and even now, jamadars are far more often served tea outside—such an interaction 
reveals two notable aspects of their new position. For one, not doing the collection work 
themselves means that jamadars have more time on their hands. While some use that time to 
take on other paid jobs, only coming to the neighborhoods once or twice a month to collect 
money, others continue to come regularly, using the time to check up on Bengali collectors and 
cultivate relationships with residents. Secondly, these relationships are also afforded by the fact 
that Balmiki jamadars no longer have direct contact with garbage. Without soiled hands or 
clothing, upper-caste households are more likely to engage with them, even while they continue 
to bear the stigma of their Dalit identities.  
Indeed, Bengali subordinates quickly learned to treat their Balmiki employers with 
respect, even if privately they asserted claims to social dominance. For example, Arif explained 
that he had to call his contractor “jamadar” to his face because he would get angry if he said 
Bhangi or even “Balmik.” Majaool concurred, “If you call him bhangi then he’ll get really mad; 
you have to call him jamadar.” While collectors were aware of their employers’ preferences, and 
usually abided by them, they would use the word bhangi often when they were around each 
other. Still, that Balmiki contractors are able to command a particular title indicates that they 
have acquired, at least, the authority to decide what they will be called. This position affords 
them the ability to avoid polluting garbage while collecting the fee from households, which 
 
67 Field notes, 11/24/13. 
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opens the possibility for forming stronger ties with residents. Moreover, some contractors may 
try to claim larger, cleaner, and more expensive items that can be sold or re-used. As Lakshmi, a 
Balmiki jamadar who comes to her neighborhood territory most days, put it: “We should get 
something. If not, then why bother coming every single day?”  
Contracting out the collection work creates distance between the Balmiki jamadar and 
the polluting substance of household waste. Where Balmiki jamadars participated in waste 
collection, they notably avoided touching the garbage itself by handing off the bags or buckets to 
their Bengali workers, ensuring that they would not be handling the wet waste with their own 
hands. When I was out on a collection route with Abdul in Rohini, I was struck by his jamadar’s 
notably stylish clothing. A thin woman in her thirties, she arrived wearing a black leather jacket 
with white furry accents at the wrists (an outfit that would have been ruined had she been sorting 
through garbage herself). In fact, so much of her outfit was white, including her sandals, that it 
seemed as if she were intentionally taking advantage of her new status. The collector I was with 
quietly handed over the small amount of money he had collected from the houses we had already 
been to, and she accepted it without comment. Her 18-year-old son was there too, and when I 
watched him in his fresh jeans, blue-striped shirt, and puffy “Poma” vest pick up garbage buckets 
from residents’ doorsteps, I eyed the kids playing in the park and felt a pang of sadness. No 
sooner had I noticed this, however, than he was hopping over the fence to join the kids playing 
cricket on the other side. Our little garbage collection crew was still large at four people, and we 
wrapped up the rest of the work quickly.  
While the social benefits afforded by these transformations are likely to be relatively small 
for Balmikis, and I am not able to fully assess the longer-term effects here, they are nevertheless 
notable. Reducing direct contact with garbage in a society where substances have long tended to 
demarcate status is itself an important change. Even more important, however, is the fact that 
such distance has been combined with a role that deals instead with money, outsourcing waste-
handling labour to a new group of actors and leaving more time to take on other paid work, 
attend to children’s schooling or job prospects, or care for family members. 
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Bengali Muslims: Contending with Stigma 
While Balmiki contractors have been able to cultivate greater distance from polluting 
materials, Bengali collectors have had to contend with their new relation to them. In their 
transition from farm labour (khetibari) to garbage collection, they have become subject to 
longstanding practices of untouchability, which they must navigate in order to continue working. 
Compounding this are two other sources of social degradation: their tendency to be labelled 
Bangladeshis and accused of illegal immigration,68 as well as being accused of theft.  
Of the more than fifty informal collectors I interviewed over the course of my research 
most had been agricultural laborers in their villages, though some had moved to the city when 
they were young or came from smaller towns or cities. Yet, when trying to assess Muslim 
migrants’ social status in their villages in comparison to Delhi was difficult, as they nearly 
universally responded that “all Muslims are equal.”69 At my field site in northwest Delhi, 
however, nearly all shared the surname: Sheikh. It took two visits to the same area of West 
Bengal to confirm what I had suspected based on earlier village studies (e.g. Ahmad 1966; 
Bhattacharya 1973): that despite claims to Muslim unity in the collector settlements, there were 
significant cleavages between land-owning and laboring groups.70 It was only after visiting a few 
villages in Birbhum district that I came to learn that Sheikhs lived in areas of the village where 
houses tended to be kaccha and constructed from mud, bamboo, and palm; had relatively small 
pieces of land; and possessed little to no agricultural land. This contrasted with the high-status 
Muslim Sayyads, or Miya, who had large plots, concrete homes, farmland, and servants. An 
older Sheikh man with a white wispy beard described the difference between the two groups 
 
68 I have frequently been asked if (or told that) the Muslim collectors I worked with were 
“actually” Bangladeshi, not Indian. The identity politics inherent in justifying their Indian West 
Bengali origins perpetuates a pernicious tendency to frame Bangladeshis writ large as 
“infiltrators” who pose economic and security threats to the Indian nation, as Shamshad (2017) 
poignantly describes. Collectors did know who was Bangladeshi by their accent or through 
personal ties, but very few had remained after several rounds of deportation from the city. 
69 See Trivedi et al. 2016 for a recent discussion of pollution-based discrimination towards low-
status Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. The evidence for this remains mixed and is likely to vary by 
context. 
70 Kaveri Gill (2007:f.n.9) describes a similar situation when she conducted her study of plastics 
recycling in West Delhi in the early 2000s. 
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plainly: “Miyas are rich, Sheikhs are poor.”71 Yet this economic distinction did not translate into 
social distinctions based on purity and pollution, with members of the Sheikh community joining 
the Miyas for weddings and other ritual events. And certainly, dirty work was not a part of their 
lives before moving to the city. 
In their new positions as part of Delhi’s vast informal garbage collection workforce, 
Bengalis were socialized to regard their Balmiki jamadars with the respect of bosses, even while 
some privately expressed seeing their Balmiki employers as socially inferior based on their 
association with dirty work. For example, one collector explained that he had to refer to his 
contractor as “jamadar” because he would get angry if he said “Bhangi” or “Balmik,” while 
another elaborated that it was a matter of their “prestige.” Becoming socialized into their new 
roles within the caste hierarchy meant that Bengali Muslims had to learn to demonstrate respect 
and appropriately position themselves as diminutive in relation to their Dalit employers.  
As the ones touching wet (gila) household garbage on Delhi streets, they quickly 
encountered new forms of stigma and discrimination. Most commonly, collectors described that 
residents would tell them to move their carts away, or more to the point, stay away completely. 
Mohammad, who had been working in Delhi for ten years when I spoke with him, described 
this frankly:  
It’s like this, I mean, not a single person regards this work as being good (accha). 
They say it’s bad work (bura kaam), it’s dirty. Some people say things, like if I’m 
going to a muhalla, then no one will even touch72 me. They’ll say bhai, stay away 
from here (isse dur raho). 
Accha, so they’ll say that, or that’s how you feel? 
They even say it. “Bhaiyya, stay away, stay over there, don’t come over here.” I 
mean, we shouldn’t touch their clothing. The garbage will be over there, so it’s 
like don’t touch their clothing; just take the bucket and go.73  
 
71 Interview, 6/27/14. 
72 He uses the English word “touch” here.  
73 Interview, 6/21/13. 
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Of course, collectors were also quick to point out that if they didn’t collect the garbage, residents 
would be upset about that too. The point here, of course, is not for Delhi’s middle classes to get 
rid of this servile workforce, but rather to assert their dominance via familiar caste practices of 
untouchability that keep lower-status workers in their place. A moral distinction between ideas 
of “good” and “bad” work expressed in quote above serves to justify why mohalla residents defend 
themselves against the perceived threat of Mohammad’s touch. Being instructed to stay away and 
“take the bucket and go” are disciplinary measures that ensure that he is socialized, like other 
Bengali Muslims, into their new roles as garbage workers. Subjecting them to the idea that their 
bodies are dangerous, workers thus re-orient themselves to abide by upper-caste desires to avoid 
touch in order to perform pliable and subservient labor. 
 Apart from touch, smell (badboo) was also central to calls for Bengali workers to maintain 
physical (and thus also social) distance, with residents holding their noses while handing over 
their garbage or telling them to move their carts. Such visceral practices—which not only refer to 
the cart, but also the worker attached to it—come to define the role of the worker according to 
caste-derived ideas of pollution. Naseem described in an especially poignant way how these 
ascriptions can attach to the body itself:   
So, when I’m standing next to an accha admi, I myself feel ashamed…. 
Why? 
Because our work is so very dirty that our sweat turns into poison (zehar). Our body’s 
sweat becomes poison. If I were to give anyone the sweat to drink at that time, then they 
would die.  
But how could poison come from a person? 
It’s dirty work. We live in filth (gandigi). When we go off to work, we sit inside the 
garbage sheds and eat our food.74   
After this powerful admission, Irshad continued to describe how he had become inured to the 
facts of his life, which too frequently include dirt and poverty. He described, like others, how he 
now cleaned off his hands and just ate as a matter of preservation. Nevertheless, the 
internalization of pollution as dirt, and the sweat that becomes poisonous, powerfully captures 
 
74 Interview, 7/13/13. 
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how externally ascribed stigma—here personified by the “accha admi”—can be so deeply 
integrated into one’s own sense of being. The direct effect of these experiences with social status 
was made unambiguously evident when I was occasionally admonished by local residents not to 
handle the garbage. Although I tried to ensure that my whiteness was not visible to passers-by 
(who anyway tended to divert their gaze) by covering my hair and skin, on two occasions local 
residents came up to tell me that I should not be sorting the garbage because my “status will 
drop.”  
 In order to continue working, Bengali Muslims have had to become habituated to both 
their status and treatment, rationalizing and integrating their new status—as well as negotiating 
its effect on their lives. A twenty-three-year-old collector from Assam described his process of 
coming to acceptance as follows: “Look, at the very beginning even I, at first when I entered the 
scrap trade, I also felt ashamed for picking up garbage. So then I thought about it and if I’m 
going to be ashamed, then there’s no point.” He went on to explain that he decided he had to get 
used to it in order to earn a living, reasoning that “there’s even dirt in our stomachs (apne bhi pet 
mein gand hai).”75 Still, he said, some residents hold their nose while handing over their garbage, 
and others will tell him to move his cart because of the smell (badboo). Accepting dirt as a regular 
part of life was a central part of the process. Salma compared herself to nurses, explaining that 
they too have to deal with blood and other “dirty” things, implying that they are not stigmatized 
like garbage workers despite this contact.76  
As Muslims, Bengali collectors have also negotiated these sources of physical and social 
pollution with their religious practices. For some, this has meant drawing on Islam to assert that 
no matter what one touches, everyone is pure in the eyes of God. Others, however, expressed 
finding it difficult to sustain prayer practices, explaining: “How can you pray when there is so 
much filth (gandigi) in this work?” Another added: “It takes so much time because first you have 
to come back and bathe, and only then are you fit to pray. I had to stop it.” There are tensions 
that thus remain when it comes to navigating physical and social pollution, especially when it 
comes to eating and praying (particularly during Ramadan).  
 
75 Interview, 12/2/13 
76 Interview, 5/26/13. 
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Back in the village, meanwhile, the nexus between khetibari and kooda strengthened. At 
the beginning of the migrant flow, many collectors avoided telling people in the village what they 
did in Delhi, instead saying they worked in construction. Many relatives seemed content to not 
ask too many questions. However, after a while, there were so many people working in Delhi 
that it was no longer a secret. An elder Sheikh man described: “There were people who, I mean, 
who wanted to go [into waste work], but they said no, it’s dirty work, I’m not going to do 
that….But the ones who said it’s dirty, now they’re all in this line [of work] in Delhi.”77 Yet, even 
if Bengali waste workers internally rationalize the stigma they face, and their communities come 
to accept it, they nevertheless contend with and seek to compensate for the discrimination they 
are subjected to while working in Delhi.  
 
Compensating for Stigma 
While Balmiki contractors have been able to cultivate greater distance from polluting 
materials and enjoyed some markers of higher social status, Bengali collectors have had to 
contend with their new relation to them. In their transition from farm work (khetibari) to scrap 
work (kabadi), they have had to take on a significant source of lower status. Compounding this 
were two other sources of social degradation: their tendency to be labeled Bangladeshis and 
therefore accused of illegal immigration, and frequent accusations of stealing when something 
goes missing.  
However, there were practices that they relied on to mitigate feelings of shame. 
Collectors tended to see garbage as polluting material that must be handled in order to access 
scrap; it was the dirt to be tilled in pursuit of value. This was aptly described as follows: “in the 
search for scrap, they also have to collect the garbage (maal ke chakkar mein inka kooda uthana 
padta hai).”78 In order to compensate for the stigma of handling wet waste (kooda)—vegetable 
peels, yes, but also menstrual pads—collectors tend to focus on the scrap (kabad or maal) that 
they will pull out and eventually exchange for payment. 
 
77 Interview, 6/26/14. 
78 Interview, 11/16/15. 
 112 
Kooda is wet, organic, laden with personal marks of use such as bodily fluids (saliva, shit, 
blood, semen), and prone to instability via decomposition. Its contents range from fresh 
cucumber peels, which are neither marked by saliva nor rotting, to highly polluting items like 
used condoms and baby diapers that bear the waste produced by human bodies. Somewhere in 
the middle fall things like rotting mango peels or leftover cooked food, which is marked with 
saliva. In contrast to garbage, maal (or kabaad) is relatively dry and stable. During the process of 
segregation, collectors shake papers and bags to loosen as much of the organic garbage as 
possible from the dry scrap (see Figure 1). The fact that scrap is regarded as a relatively uniform 
and unpolluting set of materials is further evidenced by the fact that the Hindi word used to 
describe the scrap, maal, does not exactly translate into the English word scrap; the word kabaad 
does. Maal denotes a uniform, commercial material. In this case, maal is scrap, but in another 
industry it could be plywood or clothing. Maal, in this context, is a commodity—anything that 
can be bought or sold in bulk.  
 
Figure 20  Kooda (garbage) and maal (scrap) inside a collector’s cart 
 
Bengali collectors thus create physical distance from polluting garbage while producing 
standardized maal to be sold for payment. Indeed, it was the procurement of money that 
mattered to my collector respondents, and the scrap was just a conduit for its acquisition. In 
contrast to the status of waste material, which was a more ontologically varied category, money 
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was more standardized—thus relatively stable and dependable, if always inadequate. And, despite 
being physically quite tainted—smudged, worn, and manipulated (written on, folded)—by the 
many hands and substances it comes into contact with, currency endured as a relatively pure 
symbolic material. In its physical form it was, for example, kept close to the body. Like many 
women, one of the scrap buyers I worked with regularly kept hers tucked into her bra, held 
directly against her skin.  
Money thus offered an important—if uncertain—opportunity to gain material resources 
in their home villages that might help to redeem their social status in the city. A Bengali woman 
sorting the scrap that her husband had collected one day in Delhi responded with an amused 
look when I asked her about why they would come from the village to do work that many 
considered to be dirty. Looking at me, she smiled and replied easily: “There’s more money in it.” 
In the village, too, another woman similarly explained that she thought she would have to go 
back to Delhi again soon. When I asked her why, she said that in the village you can earn just 
enough to eat, but in Delhi they were able to save 20,000 rupees a year. The other women sitting 
with us nodded in agreement.79 
 The consequences of saving money became apparent during one of my visits to Birbhum. 
There, I saw how kabadi work was allowing many previously landless villagers to replace clay-
constructed homes with concrete structures and to buy small plots of land for housing and 
farming. Apart from this, some of the less-educated but landed Miyas who started scrap-buying 
businesses were building larger homes. In response to my surprise, someone commented (riffing 
on the BJP’s 2014 election slogan): “Gaon ki tarakki bhi hai”—the village is also improving. A 
young woman revealed another side to these small capital accumulations as a crowd in the village 
looked on and laughed: “When people doing kabadi work in Delhi come back to the village, they 
strut around in their nice clothes and gold watches and talk constantly on their mobiles as if they 
have nothing else to do.” She went on to say that when you look at them, you would think that 
they were all doing regular office jobs (using the words “service” and “naukri”). They’ll do this for 
a few weeks, she explained, but then they have to go back and earn more because they run out of 
money. She shook her head, “Why spend that money on this stuff when you could be saving it 
 
79 Field notes, 6/22/14. 
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for a house or some land?”80 The image of young men strolling around, showing off their hard-
won accessories, provides a striking contrast to their roles as garbage collectors in Delhi. Doing 
so offers both material and symbolic benefits, as status cultivated in the village can result in a 
repaired or improved sense of self (through the eyes of others) to compensate for stigma, as well 
as potential material benefits as houses are built and land purchased.   
In the city, too, many families were eager to show off the interior of their homes as places 
of cleanliness and rest. If each home is maintained as uncontaminated, collectively settlements 
(jhuggi) actively cultivate and reinforce the habits that maintain those boundaries. For example, 
collectors typically wash before coming into their houses to eat and take a nap, and everyday 
group events such as playing cards, braiding hair, and drinking tea unite collectors’ families 
through activities that are distinct from their garbage collection activities. Life-course events like 
musalmaanis, engagements, and weddings serve to reinforce community solidarity and offer 
opportunities to clear out scrap material in place of decorations and change into clean clothes 
that separate them from their roles as garbage collectors.  
I stepped into Salma’s house in the jhuggi one day, her workers’ hands clasping my arm 
hard (as she usually did) and leading me to the back room, only letting go once we were finally 
there. Motioning to a brand-new, shoulder-height, raspberry-colored refrigerator, she fed me 
some ice while pointing to a mixi, a TV they’d now had for more than ten years, and a cooler—
making sure that I noticed these important objects. Cultivating a home space with the comforts 
and symbols of modern life provided an important contrast to life outside, which was frequently 
chaotic, hard, and disappointing. By taking on the taint of garbage work in the city, new 
migrants are able to gain access to modern conveniences in the city and also potentially save 
money to accrue the capital needed to purchase land in their villages, construct new homes, and 
pay for weddings. It is these experiences, things, and promises that keep them in the “line” of 
garbage work in spite of the related stigma. 
 
 
 
 
80 Field notes, 6/26/14. 
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Conclusion: Garbage, Money, and Status 
Bengali migrants taking on the dirty work historically done by Dalit Balmikis in Delhi 
reveals a process through which new groups are subjugated through practices of casteification—
in this case, as they experience practices of untouchability. While on the one hand this indicates 
how caste formations are changing in contemporary urban India, on the other hand, it also 
reveals how the informal economy of waste work in Delhi is being reorganized. Historically 
shaped and regulated by caste relations, Bengali Muslim laborers now contend with stigma and 
discrimination, while Balmiki jamadars are relieved of contact with stigmatizing wet garbage. 
The residents who hold their noses or shout about badboo, then, perpetuate forms of 
untouchability that mark the workers as being out of place, and worse, will them out of sensory 
perception. 
And so a system for household garbage collection is re-made, at once based on 
longstanding divisions between upper-caste households and a servile class of garbage workers. 
Yet, we see how those workers are actually produced through ascriptive subjectification, as 
disciplinary, discriminatory, and disparaging caste practices put them in their place (in the 
neighborhoods), as well as in the wider social hierarchy (as dominated actors). This isn’t a matter 
of caste as identity then, or as caste as a relatively stable hierarchical system, but rather the way 
that an economy of practices together structure social relations in a way that is relatively durable but 
also shifts over time. Collectors are subjected to them, and become habituated to them—learning 
not to cross into residents’ homes, to show their Balmiki jamadars respect, and to move their 
carts when asked— without too much protest. In turn, some Balmiki workers have been able to 
relinquish doing garbage work themselves, instead focusing on the collection of payments. While 
giving up garbage work certainly does not eradicate centuries of caste-based discrimination, it is 
nevertheless a notable shift, particularly when it affords a position of dominance over a new 
group of actors. 
Like their Balmiki bosses, Bengalis are willing to do waste work and negotiate the stigma 
it entails in the pursuit of money, an object that denotes both economic and cultural capital (as a 
symbol of modernity) to counter the polluting attributions of kooda. Transactions of waste and 
money, then, entail one group—Bengali Muslims—receiving polluting waste from the city’s 
middle classes, while another—Dalit Balmikis—cultivate distance from garbage and instead 
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collect money. Money here is seen as a source of purification, and of promise, which stands in 
stark contrast to much social theory, which tends to associate money with dirt and filth because 
of its tendency to corrode social relations (see Peebles 2012).  Seen as a kind of cultural debt, the 
source of pollution that is taken on by newer migrant collectors is at first distanced and then 
exchanged for economic capital, as cash, which offers the possibility for improving social status in 
the village. The stigma taken on by newer migrant collectors, both as a sense of personal 
impurity and more direct forms of discrimination, offers the possibility of a better daily living, 
and potentially also the ability to accrue capital in order to improve their social status in the 
village. This process, I contend, is not only likely to have analogues in other contexts, but also 
offers a fruitful approach for subsequent analyses of how caste and status relations are 
transforming in contemporary India, accounting for both stability and change over time.   
  
 117 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
Getting Paid 
 
Dusk was descending on an early winter day in Delhi when I joined Almaas, an informal 
scrap buyer, climbing up the seat of a cycle rickshaw and winding our way out of her middle-class 
neighborhood, arriving five minutes later at the unpaved road leading to the large settlements 
where hundreds of people who work informally as garbage collectors live with their families. We 
walked past homes constructed from bamboo scaffolding and plastic sheeting, turning into 
Almaas’s site and then into her office—the only brick structure. Carefully inserting two bare red 
and black wires into an electric socket, the structure illuminated, making visible its bare mud 
floors, a plush easy chair, two plastic lawn chairs, and a wooden coir cot. Sitting down in the lone 
upholstered chair, she called for her niece to bring her a calculator, opening a large ledger across 
her lap. Without announcement or warning, a small group began to gather near the doorway. 
Clutching small planners or “diaries”—books gleaned from waste—they formed a loose queue, 
chatting with one another and yelling intermittently at children rushing past. A few people took 
seats in the couple of available chairs, while others squatted on the ground or looked in from the 
door. Almaas glanced at the first person: a good-humored man in his thirties who often assumed 
a leadership role because of his tenure in the area. Taking a small paper handwritten receipt from 
him, she began to write down the total weight of each scrap item in the ledger—mixed plastic 
(guddi), cardboard (gatta), glass bottles (kaanch), etc.—along with the current rate, multiplying 
the numbers on her calculator and adding up the products. She announced the total, 1640 
rupees, and asked him hurriedly: “How much? (Kitna?)” “One thousand,” he replied. Almaas 
peeled off two 500-rupee notes and handed them over, noting the remaining 640 rupees as 
“savings” in his small diary. The next person took a seat, and the process continued.  
One of the first things that I, a person used to the digital standardized payment systems 
typical of middle-class America, was struck by when I began spending time at my main field site 
in northwest Delhi was the amount of cash being regularly, and seemingly haphazardly, 
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distributed. Reaching beneath her dupatta scarf into her bra, Almaas would retrieve a wad of cash 
and peel off 100 and 500 rupee notes in response to a flow of requests. The transfer would 
usually happen so quickly and without commentary that I would find myself needing to ask, 
“What was that for?” Sometimes it would be a 500 rupee note for a collector, while other times 
she’d send a kid off with 20 rupees and a wave of her hand to fetch a snack. I commented that 
she was like a human ATM.  
Eventually, I would learn that many of these tended to be small payments to the 
collectors—money for daily living expenses that would later be deducted when the accounts were 
done. It took me months to realize that while there were times when collectors would directly 
ask for money, often non-verbal signals were used to try to induce the ritual of doing the 
accounting books and getting paid. Although this was readily understood by the collectors and 
Almaas because of their intimate knowledge of each other and the system, it took me a long time 
to piece the process together. These transactions, like all economic exchanges, rely on 
contextually specific institutions and meanings—moral economies that amalgamate not only 
feelings and discourses (Fourcade 2017), but indicate relations of power between actors and with 
other institutions, and especially the state (Bourdieu 2005; Palomera and Vetta 2016).  
Despite there being no formal labor or purchase agreements between collectors and scrap 
buyers, the routine of “doing the books” (hisaab karna) was remarkably regular and predictable, 
constituting a primary relationship on which the larger recycling economy was based. 
Throughout my fieldwork, I had focused primarily on waste processes: collecting, sorting, and 
selling scrap; the visibility of storing plastic bottles on top of bamboo-framed homes in mosquito 
nets; and the care with which metal parts were stripped from sunglasses and votive candles. But I 
soon came to learn that if waste was the more ubiquitous material, it was money—the physical 
currency and records documenting it—that people tended to care about, as I began to discuss in 
Chapter 4. And, I learned, these transactions constituted relationships: while collectors became 
obligated to sell their scrap to a particular buyer, the buyer became obligated to provide for the 
collectors’ basic needs, taking into account significant rites of passages and life stages (cf. Wherry 
2017:61–62). 
In this chapter, I analyze how processes of getting paid reveal moral economies of 
responsibility and obligation, drawing on existing social ties, but also creating limited possibilities 
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for status transformation. I describe how the process of getting paid reveals longer-term 
contractual relations that are solidified between buyers and collectors as credit is extended, 
accounts are done, and basic needs are appealed and attended to. This process of long-term 
account keeping relies on existing social ties, but it also solidifies new economic relationships 
through processes of establishing ties, extending advances, account keeping, and dissolving ties. 
Such processes of loan making and account keeping, I find, were central to a broader moral 
economy that involved earmarking money for tangible goods like food or gifts and defining 
differentiated roles of responsibility and obligation, which engendered trust (see also Hart 1992). 
Collectors were made dependent on buyers through a relationship of dependence based on 
subsistence (cf. Scott 1976), or substantive need rather than the accumulation of capital (Sanyal 
2007). Ray and Qayum (2009) similarly find that bonds of obligation (amongst other ties) 
solidify what they call a “new feudal contract”: an amalgam of more contemporary ideas of 
contractual labor and feudal relations that assign particular groups of people to particular duties 
or obligations. This relationship is revealed through the ritual of getting paid, an event that is 
made possible by forging initial collector-buyer relationships, giving loans or “advances,” and 
doing the accounts.  
 
Buyers and Collectors 
Delhi’s informal garbage collectors are most often first- or second-generation migrants 
from India’s eastern states, primarily from villages but sometimes from towns and cities, who 
come to Delhi through contact with someone from their hometown who is already there.81 
Relying on this network of family and community—clustered according to jati, caste and 
religion, this rural to urban migration has been especially prevalent in the last couple of decades. 
Rizaul, an informal collector from West Bengal explained how he took up garbage collection 
work in Delhi: “We didn’t have enough money in the village. One guy from our village went to 
Delhi and said that in Delhi he earns a lot. So then I came, thinking that we’ll see if I can get 
 
81 Although waste collection was historically done by the “untouchable” Balmikis who came from 
Delhi’s neighboring villages (Prashad 2000), recent decades have seen a flood of migrants – many 
of them Muslim – from the states of West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and neighboring 
Bangladesh, who have begun to informally subcontract from the Balmikis. 
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more money too” (Rizaul Sheikh, Rithala, 6/17/13). Collectors find out about work 
opportunities and places to live by word of mouth. These contacts are also what typically allows 
newly arrived workers to be deemed trustworthy by potential buyers. Through this network of 
relatives and fellow villagers, collectors are initially connected with scrap buyers like Almaas who 
acts as their boss, facilitates their entry to work and life in the city, and become a source of 
potential credit.  
Buyers, on the other hand, were either from similar backgrounds as collectors and had 
worked their way up, or they were people from historically land-owning or business-caste 
families who faced particular, difficult circumstances. For example, while Almaas was from the 
same area as the collectors, she was the daughter of the land-owning Miya (a Sayyad, or upper-
caste Muslim) family back in Bengal. Yet her position was unusual. Unlike others in her 
community who had moved to Kolkata and become urban professionals, she was married at age 
eleven because her mother had died when she was young and her father was more interested in 
alcohol than his job or his two remaining wives. When she moved to Delhi around age thirteen 
to join her husband’s family, Almaas began buying scrap from Balmikis who lived in the same 
basti (settlement) as her, hiding the money from her own husband who was also an alcoholic 
without steady employment. Eventually, she would find herself with a steady business, and she 
filed for divorce, moved, and struck out on her own. 
Almaas’s story is unusual—borne out by her extraordinary position as a woman working 
independently (i.e. without a husband or other family member) in this business. Regardless of 
their origins, buyers tended to inhabit roles that marked their status as higher within the context 
of the workplace, mimicking practices of distinction relied on in village contexts. Yet while they 
enjoyed a status as boss (malik or malkin) vis-à-vis collectors (known as grahak, or 
customers/clients) buyers themselves were also associated—albeit to a lesser degree—with the 
scrap sourced-from-garbage that they purchased. While they may aspire to become free from 
these obligations and stigmas (see Chapter 6- to be included in the book), they see themselves as 
belonging to the communities who sell them scrap, and from whom they ultimately profit. 
Indeed, many buyers (including Almaas) have relatives who are themselves collectors.  
While the relationship between collectors and buyers is certainly exploitative in the sense 
that buyers earn their living—and when business is good, may even profit enough to buy small 
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plots of land or flats in the city—there are also tensions in how buyers relate to collector 
communities, with different buyers navigating those tensions differently. While some buyers 
were from different regions than the collectors who sold to them and lived in different 
neighborhoods, others were from similar communities and lived on or near collector’s 
settlements. Physical and social distance could allow for greater exploitation, but proximity could 
also lead to monopoly and dependence. Some buyers took advantage of their positions, not only 
requiring collectors to sell exclusively to them, but also denying them payment records that could 
be used to form mutual agreements on the exchange of money. I found that in places with the 
highest levels of trust between collectors and buyers, no written records were used because the 
collectors did not find them necessary; in places with medium levels of trust, written records were 
used by both parties; and in places with the lowest levels of trust, few or no records were used 
because buyers refused them.  
Collector-buyer relations frequently involve much more than transactions of scrap and 
cash. Buyers are frequently new migrants’ primary source for housing in the city. In exchange for 
a place to live, buyers may collect rent and/or reduce the rate paid out to collectors for their scrap. 
Buyers can also be an important connection to urban institutions like schools, hospitals, religious 
community (mosques), police, and other local bureaucrats—especially for newer migrants. While 
collectors are disenfranchised by their lack of multiple forms of capital in the city, buyers are a 
crucial point of contact. On the other hand, while buyers would pay collectors to do additional 
labor like loading up trucks with scrap to be sent to the factory, they would also call on them to 
do odd tasks for like help to weigh a bag of scrap, fetch a chair, or fix an electric wire come loose. 
However, in better-established second-generation communities, collectors may be responsible for 
their own housing. Some buyers were once collectors themselves and saved up the capital to 
move up the chain, while others had capital available to begin in the sector as a buyer. With work 
and home spaces—“public” and “private”—so tightly bound and constricted (see Figure 21), 
celebrations like weddings (Figure 22) offer a chance for the community to come together for 
joy, lightening an environment that is often riddled with arguments and stress.    
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Figure 21  The entrance to a single jhuggi (hut), with scrap stored in front 
 
Figure 22  Cleaning and decorating for a wedding 
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Buyers like Almaas can thus be crucial links not only to work, but also to housing, 
protection from police harassment, and entry to school for children. Throughout the months 
that I spent with Almaas, I looked on as she took on a number of roles far exceeding the strictly 
economic: intervening in family arguments, bailing people out of jail, filing rape cases on behalf 
of teenage girls, and even arranging marriages. She intervened when there was a dispute over 
who should clean the standing water from around the pump, and she was responsible for 
providing a feast for Eid. Buyers may also help collectors obtain ID proof in Delhi, which allows 
them to access government benefits such as a cash transfer scheme for women that was being 
piloted in 2013-14. Obtaining ID cards became easier with the advent of the universal 
identification program Aadhaar, which was launched in 2009. I asked collectors at a south Delhi 
godawm where they were denied significant agency why they did not have their families with 
them. One man responded that it was because they did not have identity cards in the city, and 
when I asked why they had not had them made, he responded, “Hey, when the boss has them 
made, then…” (3/9/14). As socially marginalized (in this case Dalit) migrants to Delhi, many of 
whom are illiterate, the collectors sole connection to this major government institution was their 
buyer.  
Buyers may also enact their role as patrons by mediating interpersonal issues, navigating 
institutions of both family and the law. For example, I joined Almaas for three separate 
incidents: one where a motorcycle had been impounded by the police, another where a young girl 
was raped by a neighbor, and a third where a collector’s son had been put in jail for an unknown 
reason. In each case, Almaas was their most powerful contact, and she would intervene in various 
ways, including talking to family members, holding ad hoc “panchayats” (meetings where women 
would explain what exactly happened), bringing in the police, making sure the police did not get 
involved, calling in Maulanas (Muslim religious leaders), and occasionally using physical violence 
like slapping or beating (not uncommon in Indian cities). A couple who had been living and 
working at Almaas’s godawm for 16 years, after initially coming there to fix a fan, expressed a 
distinct mix of disdain and affection for her. For example, she pointed to their jhuggi hut and 
complained that she had been asking to have the roof fixed for months now, but whenever she 
asked Almaas responded that they should do it themselves even though they are renting from 
her. At the same time, she explained, Almaas is everything to them. She is who they go to for 
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their housing or when they need money. During the conversation, she pointed to a taller jhuggi 
on the corner nearby, explaining that the family inside was renting (without the obligation of 
selling their scrap to her). They pay more (Rs 4,000/month instead of 3,000), making me 
initially think that she was complaining about the expense. But she was impressed with the fact 
that they had achieved independence and were able to afford more in rent and live in nicer 
jhuggis. She was looking at them wishing she could have that too (field notes, 10/23/15). 
On the other hand, Almaas regularly complained about the “tension” or stress she felt 
because of the obligation to provide for collectors and their families. “Tension hi tension,” she said 
to me one day—nothing but stress—complaining that she needed Rs 2 lakh (200,000) to build 
toilets for the jhuggi (field notes 7/4/13). She didn’t have anything saved at the time and was in a 
marriage that was sucking her dry, financially and otherwise. While she frequently expressed 
frustration from the “tension” her role required, she also expressed a strong sense of moral, and 
also personal, obligation to provide for people whose circumstances were regularly precarious—
many of whom she had often known for years. Unlike corporations with workers at different sites 
than their bosses, often in different countries, Almaas’s business requires her to actually know the 
people whose labor she exploited for profit, much like any small business. But this went one step 
further: collectors were not only people that Almaas knew; they lived at her workplace. They 
were not only people with names and faces, personalities and illnesses and families, but their 
material circumstances—the food they ate, appliances they owned, births and weddings they 
celebrated—were all, for better or worse, apprehendable. 
In contrast to Almaas’s godawm, which ran on the power of newer migrants, at the site in 
East Delhi where scrap-buying families have lived for two to three generations, collectors were 
not as dependent on their buyers for negotiating with the world beyond their settlement. Yet 
they still tended to maintain ties with particular buyers because they afforded the ability to 
request advances, reducing uncertainty and defining roles and expectations. 
 
Advances 
Once collectors begin working they can request a monetary loan, or an advance, which 
obligates them to sell to a particular buyer. As buyer Rajesh explained, no one will work without 
an advance. Advances indicate long-term commitment: buyers take responsibility (albeit to 
 125 
varying degrees) for collectors’ basic needs, while collectors become obligated to sell to particular 
buyers until they pay off their debt. Collectors who take advances become known as clients, or 
grahak. Such arrangements are common in contexts where other sources of credit are hard to 
come by and resemble feudal relations whereby laboring “serfs” were similarly forced to petition 
landowning zamindars for the resources to support major life events.   
Collector Khawadeb described that advances created bonds of trust, or vishwaas, which 
grew from an initial recommendation from another collector. From the buyer’s perspective, trust 
in a collector similarly tends to originate in reputational information gleaned through mutual 
contacts, and it is confirmed through the identification of a person, or “guarantor,” for an 
advance. Advances can be requested and taken for several reasons, but they are always justified 
with a substantive need, which the amount is based on. One collector explained while others 
looked on in agreement that loans aren’t just given, but “if we suddenly need money that’s when 
we take it. … Whether it’s for a wedding, whatever it is, if you need it then you can take some 
extra and get things done. Then you just keep on working” (Interview, 4/19/14). These events 
were often framed as emergencies, as a group in South Delhi explained: “It’s…when you have to 
get someone married, that’s the only time you take it, or if you find yourself in an emergency. If 
not, then who gives an advance these days?” They continued, “Everyone has an advance and 
everyone gets the same rate [for scrap]. Everyone’s taken one. One might have taken 10 
[thousand], another 20, someone else 50. Everyone’s taken” (Interview, 3/9/14). This all means 
that buyers must know the content of “needs” and “emergencies,” assessed not only by collectors 
telling them about them directly, but also through longer-term knowledge of their life 
circumstances or news circulating in the community. For example, of ten collectors who had 
significant outstanding debt from Almaas, the majority of them were for trips to and from the 
village, though some money was also taken for household goods like televisions and weddings. 
The average debt amount was 45,000 rupees, or $750, each (see Figure 23). Because most 
collectors earn between 150 and 250 rupees ($2.50 to $4.15) per day,82 these are relatively large 
sums. However, collectors were frequently able to pay off their loans, evidenced by the large 
 
82 Wages, including the minimum wage, are calculated on a daily basis in India, making a daily – 
as opposed to a weekly or hourly – amount the most intuitive and relevant measure. 
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number of people who had severed ties with a single buyer, instead forming independent groups 
of collectors who sell directly to wholesalers, which I will talk about in more detail at the end of 
the chapter. All of these requests had occurred before I entered the field, so I wasn’t able to 
observe them directly. What these records and other narratives reveal, however, is a list of life 
events that are deemed worthy of support. In a community as poor as Delhi’s garbage collectors, 
their requests did not frequently test the boundaries of what constituted need, but in one case, a 
collector was borrowing for “household needs” and then gambling the money away. While he 
was denied future loans, it is possible that he would not have been if he had been able to pay the 
money back.  
 
 Collector’s name Amount 
(rupees) Purpose 
1 Meenu 45,000 Household expenses, village visit 
2 Abdul 45,000 Musalmaani, village visit 
3 Laltu 35,000 Building house in village, village visit 
4 Hasibul 80,000 Buying land in village 
5 Salim 65,000 Daughter's wedding and new baby, village visit 
6 Sagir 23,000 Village visit, buying a cycle-cart and a TV 
7 Yusuf 55,000 Building house in village, village visit 
8 Nuhu 15,000 Initial travel to city 
9 Kabir 10,000 Village visit 
10 Mahmud 10,000 Daughter's wedding 
 
Figure 23  Sample of outstanding loans from Almaas 
 
Once a collector takes an advance from a buyer, they are required to sell their scrap 
exclusively to them, apart from a few items like the roti or bread that is sold to farmers. The 
advantage of this system for the buyer is that they have a guaranteed scrap supply, and they can 
buy scrap at lower rates from indebted collectors than they can from outsiders. Although the 
collectors are made dependent on buyers, they receive money up front and have a guaranteed 
buyer when, for example, their scrap gets wet, and they also get access to housing and other 
potential resources in the city. However, this can of course lock collectors into an exploitative, 
bonded relationship. Nuhu, who works for Almaas, often complained about the power 
imbalance. When I asked about whether he went behind her back to sell to another buyer for a 
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higher rate, he explained: “We have to hide it from madam [i.e. Almaas] to sell it. If madam finds 
out, she wouldn’t let us sell it. We get ten rupees extra (chai-paani) if we sell to an outsider, but 
we have to do it secretly. If word gets into the godawm, then she won’t let us do it.” Still, I 
learned that getting caught did not mean immediate or even severe consequences. When I was 
walking with Almaas to the godawm one afternoon, we passed by two collectors selling glass 
bottles to another nearby buyer. When Almaas didn’t say anything about it to them, I asked her 
why, and she replied that she would bring it up when the accounts were being done. In other 
words, this breach would become a tool that she could leverage in case the rate came into dispute 
while doing the accounts—another source of credit in their ongoing transactional relation. 
Under the system of collector-buyer dependence, advances were given on a regular basis, 
becoming the most easily accessible source of credit for collectors who otherwise earn just above 
subsistence and tend not to have bank accounts (see also Gill 2007:1454). Along with the 
exploitation this facilitates sits another kind of relation—one that Almaas described as growing 
out of a sense of “humanity” (insaniyat): an ethic of mutual obligation, where buyers ensured that 
collectors and their families were provided for, while collectors became obligated to sell to their 
buyers. After initial loans, collectors could continue to request further advances whenever they 
needed a lump sum to make ends meet, so long as they continuing selling their scrap to that 
buyer. Another collector in East Delhi who had been working for more than a decade explained:  
The shopkeeper [buyer] gives an advance. For example, if you need money then we 
take one or two thousand from the shopkeeper. We’ll give them scrap, they’ll take the 
money out of the scrap.  
So how much advance do they give? 
According to need. For example, if I suddenly need 500, then they give 500. But if I 
take it then I also have to give it back. I’ll give scrap and they’ll subtract is slowly. I 
have to give back as much as I take. If I take five [thousand], I won’t be able to give it 
back at once, so I’ll give you a thousand of five hundred at a time. (Interview, 
5/14/13) 
As these ties engender trust, advances might be given more readily. As Almaas exclaimed with a 
laugh, “Some people take them just because they feel like it!” She explained that Kabir had 
borrowed 10,000 rupees when he needed to make an emergency trip to his village, even though 
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she believed that he had enough money. Because Kabir had worked for Almaas for nearly twenty 
years, he was able to ask for the money casually, and Almaas trusted that he would pay it back. I 
once saw Almaas take a small cash loan from Nasima, Kabir’s sister-in-law, when she was 
running low, showing that the arrow of hierarchical dependence can be temporarily inverted. In 
addition to fulfilling needs, these kinds of practices also seem to test each person’s responsibility 
and obligation.   
The necessary, if uneasy, intimacies of this relationship were made clearer when I visited 
a scrap-buying site in South Delhi—a place to which I had no previous connection apart from 
one other brief visit. There, Sanatan was one of around 25 collectors working for buyer Ajit. I sat 
next to him on the long rickety wooden bench in the small open shelter where scrap was 
weighed, paperwork kept, and daily prayers to Ganesh conducted. Sanatan told me that he had 
three daughters (and, I later learned, one son, mentioned as an afterthought because arranging 
his marriage wasn’t a source of financial stress). So far, he told me, two were married, and he had 
taken out large advances to pay for the weddings. His diary, an old planner, had only has about a 
week’s worth of records in it, and written clearly on the opposite page was an amount: Rs 11,549, 
the amount he currently owed (see Figure 3). I asked Sanatan how long he thought it would take 
to pay off this amount, and he responded: “Two to three years.” “What will you do after that? 
Will you keep working here?” I asked. He was hesitant to respond—perhaps a mixture of the 
strangeness of talking to a foreign woman, being new to Delhi, the embarrassment of talking 
about debt, and sitting right next to his buyer. Buyer Ajit jumped in and explained, “Look, it’s 
like this: he will need to get his third daughter married off, plus he’s trying to make his mud 
(kaccha) house a bit more finished by putting up a sheet metal roof.” I didn’t see the connection 
at first, but after looking at the accounts and asking why he takes so little each day and saves so 
much, I understood that he was trying to improve his house in order to secure a good marriage 
for his daughter. Ajit could narrate Sanatan’s family history and future plans—a result of his 
being the provider of loans that had to be justified with exactly this kind of information.  
Taking advances, then, depends on a personalized negotiation based on substantively 
earmarked requests (cf. Zelizer 1989). During these meetings, actors define expectations and 
negotiate responsibilities. As people chat about their lives and the lives of relations in the context 
of economic transactions, an institution is created that provides for substantive needs. Although 
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debts are given and paid back, the timing and sum of the exchanges are regulated by accepted 
forms of need and well-being: daily expenses, hospital bills, marriages, and visits back to see 
family, but also longer-term aspirations like buying farmland and building new concrete houses 
in their villages.  
 
 
Figure 24  Collector Sanatan’s diary 
 
Doing the Accounts 
With collectors working on an advance basis, figuring out what is owed involves a regular 
need to do the accounts, when buyers tally up the scrap that a collector has sold, deduct what has 
been paid out, and apply the rest as payment against their outstanding debt.  The process of 
doing the accounts thus becomes a focal point – a ritual that binds together buyers and collectors 
while also promoting economic relationships that comprise the informal scrap market chain.  
On a warm sunny evening in June 2013, I was sitting with Almaas and some of the 
collectors having the standard sweet, milky tea served in small pink plastic cups, when I wrote in 
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my field notes: “Abdul comes in and out, always looking on the border of rage—or a fit of 
laughter, it’s really hard to tell. His shirt is raised most of the time, exposing his torso” (6/22/13). 
This would become a familiar dance – with me realizing only later that Abdul was appearing to 
have his accounts done and get paid. I would see him standing around outside of where Almaas 
was sitting in her office, and when I asked him what he was doing, he said simply “I have to do 
my accounts” (hisaab karna hai). I began to recognize the look of impatient waiting that painted 
his face as he tapped his feet, smoked bidis, and eyed the door, waiting for any visitors to exit so 
that they could enter and make their appeal. This kind of signaling reinforces buyer’s 
responsibility to provide for the collectors so that they can meet their daily household expenses, 
while indicating collectors’ limited agency in forcing the transaction of getting paid. 
Getting paid actually meant getting money daily living expenses, relatively small amounts 
that cover collectors’ subsistence based on their need. Figure 3 shows how these amounts are 
variable depending on how much the collector needs for the day—in Sanatan’s case, ranging 
from Rs 100 to Rs 200 per day. These are amounts that are deducted from the total owed for the 
sale of scrap. While many places did the books daily, others like Almaas’s had space for 
individual collectors to store their scrap and weigh it periodically. In this case, weights would be 
noted on small receipts (parchi) made from scrap paper, which would be handed over when the 
accounts were done (see Figure 25). At Almaas’s, these were written in Bengali script with a 
signature in Latin characters, as Bengali was the language that the community was literate in, if 
they were literate at all. Doing the accounts books involves totaling each item (e.g. newspaper, 
mixed plastic, PET bottles, aluminum) and multiplying by its going rate (see Figure 26).83 The 
buyer then adds up the total, takes a portion of it to apply to their outstanding loan, and hands 
over the rest in cash. To show that they had been paid out, the receipts are torn down the middle 
and/or marked with two diagonal lines.  
 
 
83 Rates are determined by the buyer, generally by taking the rate given to them by a buyer above 
them on the commodity chain and adding a small margin for their profit.  
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Figure 25  Receipts for scrap that had been weighed 
 
Item Rate (INR)  Quantity (kg) Pay (INR) 
Glass bottles .5-2 N/A 100 
Plastic bottles 20 13 260 
Cardboard 3 76 228 
Paperboard 3 84 252 
Plastic bags 2 76 152 
Glass shards 1 24 24 
Tin 4 9 36 
Iron/Steel 15 3 45 
Mixed plastic 9 81 729 
Paper 1 45 45 
Total - 411 187184 
 
Figure 26  A Collector’s Accounts (8 days’ worth of scrap) 
 
84 Equivalent to around US$31. 
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The process of doing the accounts at Almaas’s was so significant because it was the only 
time that a crowd formed inside the office hut. During waking hours, the settlement would be 
buzzing with families working together to sort through the day’s pile of scrap, men drinking tea 
and playing cards, women cooking meals just outside their homes, and children running around. 
At the end of a line of collectors’ huts, the office space was reserved for the buyer and her 
business dealings: meeting with buyers, loan-givers, and other visitors. However, when accounts 
were done, many collectors would come in, and even stay on after their accounts had been done 
(see Figure 27). To return to the opening scene, this involves a one-on-one conversation in 
which each individual’s accounts are calculated to tally scrap sold and payouts made. Once that is 
done, an amount is given to cover everyday living expenses, with the remainder “deposited” 
against the outstanding loan. While this process is relatively standardized, it is noteworthy that 
the amounts are relatively flexible—allowing for life circumstances to be taken into account (for 
example, a collector might need extra cash at the beginning of the school year).  
When collectors and buyers meet to do the account books, their roles are evident by their 
clothing, where they sit, and the books they hold (either a diary or a ledger). At another 
settlement in South Delhi, the older male boss and his younger helper sat in white plastic chairs, 
sipping on tea and looking at the large ledger spread across the former’s lap as laborers heaved 
enormous and imperfectly-packaged bails of scrap onto the large non-mechanized weighing 
machine. They sat easily, marking themselves as the bosses by not only their posture, but their 
relatively higher body weight and ease with which they gave orders. Bodies and spaces thus help 
to mark out this hierarchy between laborer and boss. Respecting these boundaries are easy even 
for newly arrived laborers because they draw on hierarchical distinctions in the village, derived 
from caste identity and land ownership, even if the person sitting in the chair is not of the same 
caste/ethnic background. 
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Figure 27  Doing the accounts inside Almaas’s office hut 
 
Like advances, daily payments were justified with substantive needs. Responses given 
when I asked about these elaborated that the money is for rice, bread, vegetables, or meat—in 
other words, for everyday basic needs. Alternatively, some collectors explained these daily 
payments by contrasting their subsistence positions with the owning classes with the rationale, 
explaining: “we need to eat somehow.” Thirty-six-year-old collector Nuhu described, “We don’t 
get a salary. It’s, you know, whatever scrap there is – 100, 150, 200 rupees worth – from that we 
manage to take care of the roti, daal-roti [lentils and bread] for our wife and kids.” He 
elaborated, “I’m a poor man. I need to earn and eat something, you know? If I sit at home, stay 
at home, then we wouldn’t get anything to eat” (Interview, 7/9/13). Nuhu directly links his work, 
and the pay that he receives for it, to his most basic needs of getting lentils and bread, which 
signify staples in this community of rice eaters. These earmarked cash payments thus retain a 
kind of use-value based on ideas of subsistence, despite money’s universalizing and homogenous 
tendencies. The physical distribution of bills becomes a ritualized practice that allows each family 
to survive. 
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Surprising to me was that I found, in most cases, the process of selling scrap to be 
relatively uncontested. For example, Tabir told me that he doesn’t ask his boss for any kind of 
documentation like the one described above because he has worked with them for years and 
trusts them. At Almaas’s place, it was the same: corrections were occasionally made to fix a 
mistake in the actual weight of a particular item (e.g. “I had 16 kilos of plastic, not 14”), the 
overall amount owed was nearly always taken for granted. Collectors treaded carefully, 
recognizing their obligation and raising meeker challenges—for example, asking for clarification 
on the number of bottles or the rate itself, but then nodding intently when it was repeated with a 
direct stare. With the terms known and consented to through the initial extension of an advance, 
there was little to negotiate during the transaction itself.  
In other cases, however, the lack of negotiation may instead indicate collectors’ lack of 
influence. When I was talking with collector Yusuf about his accounts, he produced a shard of 
greyish brown paperboard like the ones in Figure 4, which had various names for scrap materials 
in Bengali, along with their weights and rates. The parchi had a couple of diagonal lines across it 
indicating that it had been paid out, along with a signature. Next to the prices on the parchi, 
however, were another set of numbers in a different color ink. Yusuf explains that he calculated it 
himself and figured that he should have been paid 200 rupees more (see Figure 6). He explained 
that he had showed this to Almaas, but when he did she responded that the accounts were 
already done and the amount had been reduced because some of the scrap could not be sold. I 
asked Yusuf whether some of it was wet or not recyclable (putting stones or bricks into the scrap, 
or wetting paper, are well-worn tools of insurgent resistance), but Yusuf and his wife 
emphatically said no. Yusuf says there isn’t anything he can do. He wasn’t there when she went 
through the scrap, so he has no idea what was taken out, and even if he were, he would still be 
obligated to sell to her. He showed me a second parchi that had not yet been paid out, on which 
he again calculated the total amount he expected (around Rs1400). I later watched as he accepted 
less while doing the accounts without more than a single protest. 
Despite other similarities across worksites, buyers did the accounts with differing 
regularity. While some like Raja and Rajesh tally them daily, others like Almaas did them every 
week to ten days, or even only once in six months when a collector left for his village. Raja 
explained how this worked in his family’s business where the fifteen or so collectors who work 
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for them weigh the scrap on a daily basis: “they sort and bring it every day … once they deposit 
their stuff, they need money for the market and whatnot, for food. So once they’ve deposited the 
scrap, they take the money. When their scrap is sorted, then we deduct the total amount [that 
they took].” Because Raja lives in the same neighborhood as the collectors, he was frequently 
around. At Almaas’s, accounts were done every week or two. If a collector sold scrap while she 
wasn’t there (she lived in an adjacent middle-class neighborhood), a relative who lived on site or 
another person working for her would weigh each item and offer a receipt. Some buyers did the 
accounts even less frequently, however. “He’ll do them once in 6 months when they need to leave 
for the village or something,” a collector speaking for the group of collectors I was speaking with 
in South Delhi told me. I clarified, “But you weigh the scrap every day, right?” “Yes,” he replied, 
confirming that earnings were regularly tallied, if not disclosed. None of them had their own 
diaries for tracking the accounts, so they have to rely on their boss’s word. When I asked why 
they didn’t maintain their own diaries, or record books, a few of them just shrugged as they 
looked down, while another collector said that if they did that the boss would cut their earnings 
in half. Since nearly all of them had taken advances, so they were bound to sell to him, as one of 
them explained, “even if he is buying for 5 rupees [per kilo] instead of 10” (field notes, 3/9/14). 
Although the process varies, account keeping tends to be a community event that defines the 
boundaries of the workplace and specifies the roles that comprise it. 
 
Cutting Ties 
Despite the relatively high amount of loans, collectors have frequently been able to pay 
them off. For example, a large number of people who have severed ties with single buyers like 
Almaas, instead forming independent groups who sell directly up the chain. When I was 
wrapping up fieldwork in 2015, an increasing number of collectors at Almaas’s site recently 
began to sever ties, paying off their debts in order to become free to sell to the person with the 
highest price. Nuhu complained: “We don’t get the entire rate, just half, and she gets half as 
profit…At least half goes to madam’s profit. … That’s not right, which is why I’ve thought that 
if I get some money then I’ll strike out on my own” (Interview, 1/24/14). Nuhu understood that 
Almaas made a profit from his labor, but he describes her taking  at least half of the price that 
she sells it for as being excessive. This logic leads an increasing number of collectors to sever their 
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ties with a particular buyer, paying off their debts so that they are free to sell to the person with 
the highest price. A collector who had successfully paid off his loan and achieved independence 
explained that he had found happiness after an early life of intense struggle:  
Before we ate, look ma’am, I’ve never told a lie to anyone in my life, before we ate rice 
and curry (sabzi) – only one rice and one curry each day. If once in a while we got 
some fish, then we’d eat that. If one of us was sick, then we’d have to take a loan, but 
we didn’t have faith that I could make the payments. And now over here, you see, I 
earn enough so that I even have faith that I can give someone else a loan. Before, 
when I was a kid in the village, if we took a loan then I was scared about paying it off 
when I took it. [I’d think], how would I give back the 500 rupees I took, I mean, how 
would I get it back to them? (Interview, 13 July 2013). 
What is interesting in this narration is how the collector moves from a logic of subsistence to 
a logic of exchange-value, with his ability to become the giver of money instead of the 
provider of food becoming an important marker of status and mobility. A 28-year-old 
Bengali collector from a village near Almaas’s explained that as an independent collector, he 
could save three to five thousand rupees each month, rather than being in debt. 
Other collectors breach obligations by running away. When this happens, buyers 
may try to recoup the money, but as Rajesh, a buyer who has been in the business for over 
20 years in south Delhi, explained, it’s rarely worth their efforts: 
Now, I wasn’t able to catch the people who ran away … I didn’t get them. Like 
the ones from Bangladesh, they ran off to Bangladesh. The ones from Gorakhpur 
ran off to Gorakhpur. How would I even figure out which village they’re living in? 
So if I go after them for 50,000 [rupees] there’ll be conflict and fighting, so 
[there’s no] point, I mean, there’s also the fact that, you know, they stayed with 
me for ten years, and in ten years I must have earned 20 or 30 thousand rupees 
from them. If there’s a 10 or 20 thousand rupee loss, then it’s no big deal. When I 
think like that, I let it go. (Interview, 3/12/14) 
When I went with Almaas to homes near my primary field site on a couple of occasions, we 
visited collectors who had taken loans were not selling their scrap to her, going into homes where 
she would tell them that they needed to start selling to her, and if they didn’t, she would take 
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their television. I went with her when she did this in the village as well. There, we sat and waited 
for a skinny man in his early 20s to come back while his wife waved a palm-leaf fan in our 
direction. However, I never saw her confiscate anything on our visits, which made me ask me 
whether she ever had. “No,” she responded; she just tries to pressure them into selling to her or 
paying back what they owe.  
 Although Almaas would complain about the cost of people running away without paying 
off their loans, she also admitted that there was little she could do to get the money back, even 
though she was from the same state, and in some cases even the same village, as collectors. More 
effective, it seems, was the reputational damage that would follow a collector from the city to 
their village: “If they run off with 50,000, people will exaggerate and it’s its 400,000 just to give 
them a bad name,” Almaas explained with a chuckle. Still, while collectors may not pay back 
their loans, they continue to receive them. The system does not collapse even though there is 
malfeasance because the majority of people find playing by the rules to be worthwhile. 
 Remaining in debt means to form lasting ties. Knowing to whom you are indebted, or 
from whom you are owed, is a reason and a responsibility to be in touch with that person—either 
to repay them or to call in what’s owed. These negotiations may involve ongoing phone calls, 
visits, and cups of tea or “cold drinks” (sodas or juices).The gesture of offering these tokens — 
answering someone’s phone call, meeting them on their schedule, and offering them 
refreshments — serves to demonstrate good faith that the person will be repaid. It is the 
termination of such a relationship, by running off or refusing to answer calls, which violates the 
agreement. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the giving and taking of advances, and the regular practice 
of doing the accounts, creates a contractual bond between based in a particular moral economy. 
In the process of getting paid, people form relationships—bonds that entail obligation and 
responsibility partially rooted in other kinds of social belongings, especially from rural life, but 
which are re-purposed in order to sustain a life of recycling in the city. The first stage in the 
process, forming ties, offers the opportunity for both parties to assess one another before moving 
into the long-term contractual bond that commences with the second stage of extending 
 138 
advances. When the accounts are done, transactions are relatively uncontested, with payment 
amounts being generally agreed to. Finally, ties are severed when collectors pay off their debt and 
decide to become independent, or when they breach the contract by running off without paying 
back their debt. And, of course, there are the various material forms that these accounting 
processes entail. There is the structure of the room, which affords only some of the people to sit 
on chairs. Much like more bureaucratic institutional forms, these must include the right 
signature and format to be processed during the process of accounts. And since the accounting 
books themselves are small physical objects often left in places that collectors have access to, they 
are stolen on occasion by people hoping to clear their debt. 
To say that these practices and relations are central to informal scrap economies, 
however, is not to say that they are uniform or unchanging. On the contrary, as I have shown 
here, there are variations across sites, and more recently, collectors in many areas have begun 
paying off their debts and making themselves independent sellers. Yet, even while collectors 
become increasingly independent, many continue to remain tied to a single buyer—perhaps out 
of a sense of loyalty—but more likely because the contract provides security: a guarantee of future 
credit and mutual accountability that offers life-sustaining potential. The process of doing the 
accounts, then, lies somewhere between gift and market. It is obviously a system of monetary 
accounting, so the transactions are explicit. Totals are calculated, standardized amounts are 
multiplied in order to arrive at them (using a physical calculator and a “calculator mind”), and 
payments are made in cash. But, then, there is also that which is not immediately apparent (cf. 
Bourdieu 1996): payments are always partial—either requested by the seller or given without 
discussion by the buyer—and there are “payments” in kind that aren’t visible such as housing and 
unpaid labor. The temporal relation between loans and ties, then, is not simple or unidirectional. 
Services are received in exchange for these other kinds of work, or maybe it’s the other way 
around. All of these are of course also mediated processes—a mixture of exchange and 
redistribution that draws on village patronage roles (Polanyi 1957).   
Key to such relations, however, are money and debts, which form relations that bind 
people together over the long term by occupying the liminal state (Gregory 2012) of “an 
exchange that has not been brought to completion” (Graeber 2011:121). Materials help to 
ground these otherwise abstract transactions, recording obligations on hand-written 
 139 
books and receipts and providing a focal point for repeated interactions (cf. Çalışkan and Callon 
2009; Suchman 2003; Yudin and Pavlyutkin 2015). Money and scrap are the focus of the 
transactions—with the pursuit of rupee bills motivating the entire process, even while indicating 
more substantive necessities. Adding to the existing set of mechanisms through which contracts 
may be formed and enforced relationally, debt relations may thus function as contractual bonds 
through which other forms of obligation and provision are expected and enforced. In the course 
of negotiating accounts, ethical obligations are made as people chat about their lives and the lives 
of relations, creating a moral economy that offers flexible responsiveness to substantive needs. 
The ethical affordances (Keane 2015) of these transactions come to define what kinds of 
circumstances and events are seen as important or necessary in order to live a decent life, as 
certain kinds of justifications are deemed acceptable for the purposes of receiving or delaying 
payments. Indeed, the timing and sum of the exchanges are regulated by accepted forms of need 
and well-being, with economic and familial intimacy becoming integral to the system of 
earmarking through which these transactions occur.  
Surprisingly, when I asked Yusuf and his wife—who had so carefully tracked the amount 
they had been shorted while getting paid—whether they trusted Almaas to accurately keep the 
books, they both responded “yes” without hesitation. “Why?” I asked. They explained that they 
can see the ledger as she writes, plus they’ve now known her for a really long time. It can be easy 
to criticize buyers like Almaas—to focus on their exploitation of marginalized workers. But this 
perspective is itself impoverished of a broader perspective that brings into view their own 
marginalization. While other business owners are able to access capital and choose other 
occupations, buyers like Almaas have far fewer options. The next chapter (to be included in the 
book) looks at buyers up the chain, offering a view of what aspiration in this context looks like. 
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Conclusion: Remaking Status in Delhi’s Informal Recycling Economy 
 
Over five substantive chapters, I have shown how status relations are reproduced between 
actors and institutions as collectors, recyclable buyers, and policymakers at various points of the 
chain engage in transactions—primarily, but not exclusively, of money and waste—that engender 
particular forms of obligation, responsibility, and stigmatization. Together, these bonds create 
status relations that structure and reproduce systems for garbage collection and recycling, 
forming a substantive challenge to government-supported programs through robust, if informal, 
institutions. The hybridized institutional forms that are produced notably mix the “modern” and 
“traditional,” revealing processes that comprise what has been referred to as postcolonial or racial 
capitalism.  
Each of the status relations discussed in these chapters, including patron-client relations, 
stigma navigation, and the ideal of monetary independence, illuminates a pathway through 
which status based on class, caste, ethnicity, and religious community structures economic life 
and provides durability through repeated transactions. What do these portend for capitalist 
trajectories and their environmental consequences? The transactional forms exemplified by 
informal garbage collection in Delhi are constituent of economies that are hybrid not only in 
their institutional composition and modes of economic transformation (cf. Nee and Opper 
2014), but rather in their relationship to capitalist processes themselves. Visible from these 
spaces, I suggest, are processes through which multiple forms of capitalist relations—along with 
their attendant environmental consequences—are adopted, transformed, and undermined.  
To have someone in your debt, for example, is to be in a position of power; and whether 
that power is explicitly exercised or retained as a latent potentiality, it comes with specific 
possibilities and responsibilities that exceed more limited legally defined contractual forms of 
obligation. Meanwhile, the stigmatization and de-stigmatization that occurs as both a source and 
consequence of social status transformations demarcates the boundaries of institutional and 
group formation. In this conclusion, I connect the concepts of transactions, status-based 
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regulation, and moral economies to wider ideas of caste capitalism and environmental 
transformation, elaborating the processes that comprise them. 
 
The Moral Economies of Status-Based Regulation 
The remarkable social complexity of the informal economy for garbage and scrap, which I 
have only begun to describe here, involves millions of hands adeptly sorting recyclable stuff into 
sequences of piles that are moved along a manual conveyor belt. This happens again and again, 
from the doorstep where it is collected to the mouth of a machine that spits it back anew. I have 
demonstrated here, however, the aim of sensing these physical and sensory—smelly, slimy, 
heavy, sharp—aspects of the waste products, however, is to convert it into cash. In other words, 
while the laborers who work with, and in, the garbage-laden scrap are hardly alienated from its 
reproduction, their primary objective is not to reuse the recyclable material themselves, but rather 
to sell them like any other product or commodity. Materials like plastics, papers, and metals are 
given local names that have their own monetary rates. Yet those possibilities are limited by the 
other transactions they participate in: handling garbage engenders stigma, and a lack of capital 
leaves them open to financial exploitation, as buyers maintain control over the books and 
substitute non-monetary payments for more fungible cash. 
The negotiations and transactions that underpin their buying and selling, then, are deeply 
embedded in existing relations of status, power, and being—generating moral economies that are 
tightly bound up in the production and enactment of status-based regulation. What are the 
norms, duties, solidarities, responsibilities, and obligations (i.e. the moral economy) that are 
produced through, and in turn structure, this economy? What kinds of social distinctions do 
these depend on, reinforce, and transform? Through what processes does the economy change 
over time, and what does this portend for possible futures? 
We have seen how the transactional pathways (Guyer 2004:30), through which materials 
are exchanged and value conferred, coalesce at multiple scales. The mechanized corporate 
garbage programs discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, for example, have become the recipients of 
multi-million-dollar investments at a time when India was seeking to “clean up” its cities—a 
project that was, unfortunately for ordinary Indians who desperately need more sanitation 
resources, primarily aesthetic. These macro-institutional priorities channel resources into 
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corporate programs, leaving the existing informal recycling system to fend for itself. This 
aesthetic focus was tied to the pursuit of enhanced global status, which was particularly evident 
during the 2010 Commonwealth Games held in Delhi, in hopes of attaining wider recognition 
for being a “developed” and desirable place fixed onto the sensory map of the global elite. 
Through the lens of these modernist developmentalists priorities, the Indian government at 
multiple levels (i.e. local, state, and national) prioritized and funded mechanized systems for 
garbage collection, effectively valorizing expensive garbage collection trucks and incinerators 
while dismissing the country’s vast, highly institutionalized manual collection and recycling 
system as atavistic and ill-suited for the nation’s urban future. Prioritizing these aesthetic 
concerns, which align with upper-caste interests over low-caste and Muslim laborers, reinforces 
an existing moral economy that devalues their labor more generally. 
Meanwhile, at the neighborhood scale discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, we saw how moral 
economies are evident in the relations between collectors, local residents, and jamadar 
contractors as collectors retain access to neighborhood territories and individual households. For 
residents, having a collector come right to the door means that they do not have to walk out onto 
the street with their garbage—an act that is stigmatizing in a casteist division of labor frequently 
marked by ideas of purity and pollution. Even though trucks collect garbage from the street just 
in front of their homes, most residents opt to continue paying the small additional monthly fee 
for a collector to take their trash right from the doorstep. This arrangement is at once a matter of 
“convenience” because residents do not have to walk down stairs or out the door at the exact time 
of collection. But I also argue that this arrangement upholds status distinctions by maintaining 
middle-class householders as bosses of their domains while positioning Muslim and Dalit 
collectors as servile laborers who ensure the proper maintenance and cleanliness of the 
household. In return for their labor, residents take on collective responsibility for ensuring that 
collectors have access to tea and snacks while working, and they sometimes also offer leftover 
food or clothing. These transactions reinforce who can give what to whom, affirming the lower 
status of garbage workers by tasking them with handling garbage (while ensuring that middle-
class residents do not) and ensuring that things given are of inferior—and thus socially 
appropriate—quality. Drinks are typically served in disposable cups that are then discarded, 
demonstrating that the giving of food occurs in only one direction, from a higher status group to 
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a lower status one, which cannot be reciprocated except through garbage labor. An inability to 
reciprocate marks unequal status, much as Marriott described in India’s villages mid-century. 
Similarly, the relationship of informal collectors to their jamadar bosses reflects the status 
hierarchy evidenced by who touches garbage. While the collectors who tend to be newer 
migrants from eastern states like West Bengal touch the trash and all that it contains (wet paper, 
mango peels, baby diapers) with their bare hands while collecting and sorting through it, 
jamadars—who are nearly all part of the Delhi Balmiki community—do not. Instead, jamadars 
earn a living from collecting the monthly fee from households—something they have the right to 
because of hereditary claims to particular neighborhoods to collect their waste. Yet, we also see 
how this casted labor is not simply reproduced over time, but rather the roles and groups who 
occupy them can change. In particular, migrants to the city have to contend with newly ascribed 
forms of stigmatization that originate in the collecting of other people’s trash. Becoming 
socialized to these new relational selves requires that collectors endure forms of discrimination 
that range from being served tea in plastic cups to being told to move (themselves or their cart – 
with the object often left ambiguous) because of the dirtiness or smell. Through these practices, 
moral economies come to define particular status relations through ideas of cleanliness and 
servility that are distributed more widely. 
In Chapter 5, meanwhile, we saw how economic exchanges were not only secondary to 
other relational ties (i.e. trust à lend / don’t trust à don’t lend), but are themselves productive 
of moral commitments. The transactional relationships between collectors and buyers, for 
example, involves a range of obligations that include the sale of scrap but do not end there. 
Instead, buyers become responsible for ensuring collectors’ basic needs, with payments 
themselves tied to a temporal range of reproductive necessities ranging from daily food staples to 
health crises and ensuring children’s marriages. Rather than receiving one-time payouts with no 
further obligation, collectors have tended to remain indebted to particular buyers, taking cash 
only for what they need on a daily basis and “saving” the rest to pay off larger advances: sums that 
are taken for major life events.  
The power of this long-term relationship, of course, is that money holds out the promise 
of financial and also social commensuration, and “[e]xchange allows us to cancel out our debs. It 
gives us a way to call it even: hence to end the relationship” (Graeber 2011:104). To repay 
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someone exactly, then, suggests a closure or a termination of obligation; while the ongoing 
account-keeping process described here requires an ongoing relationship. Still, how that act is 
understood depends upon the context within which it takes place. Discussing a passage by Laura 
Bohannan, Graeber (2011) describes how locals had described that, yes, she was obligated to 
return food staples (peanuts, corn, chicken, tomatoes) that were given upon her arrival in the 
village. But, importantly, the countergift was not to be exactly equivalent, so as to avoid the 
crude—thus immoral—suggestion that there was no reason to continue relying on one another. 
Echoing earlier findings by Malinowski, he writes: 
To bring back nothing at all would be to cast oneself as an exploiter or a parasite. 
To bring back an exact equivalent would be to suggest that one no longer wishes 
to have anything to do with the neighbor. Tiv women, she learned, might spend a 
good part of the day walking for miles to distant homesteads to return a handful 
of okra or a tiny bit of change, “in an endless circle of gifts to which no one ever 
handed over the precise value of the object last received” – and in doing so, they 
were continually creating their society (Graeber 2011:105)  
Such long-term exchanges of near, but not exact, equivalency persist even in contemporary 
capitalist societies. A friend buys dinner, and I offer to get the next one. Instead of sending an 
electronic transfer of $4.78, I send five dollars. These indicate my intention of continuing our 
relationship (along with signaling that it could be dissolved). In the case of Delhi garbage 
collectors, their unequal status vis-à-vis buyers is borne out in who determines how much is 
owed, how much will be paid, and when the books will be done. The longevity of the relation, 
too, is defined by the ambiguity of payments and the provision of other kinds of provisions, such 
as housing, work, and healthcare. Evident here, then, are other kinds of social relations that are 
not only the basis for  properly “economic” exchange relations. Rather, the two are connected in 
an iterative fashion, generating moral expectations and status positions in the process. 
 
Caste Capitalism 
What becomes apparent is the centrality of other kinds of social relations and forms of 
difference in configuring economic ones, and vice versa. Much as racial capitalism has been 
increasingly used as a lens for understanding how other forms of social difference affect 
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accumulative regimes, so too might we think of the role of caste and community in the Indian 
context—shaping economic regimes, but not in the rigid (or really ossified) way indicated by 
orientalist ideas of caste that posit it as an “unchanging system.” As discussed in the introduction 
and Chapter 4, caste instead describes multiple communities or jatis, which are hierarchically 
related, but in ways that can shift over time and geography. Moreover, the mechanisms through 
which status is re-inscribed shifts according to new institutional landscapes, much like race in the 
United States or elsewhere. What we find here is that these sources of social difference are not 
only strategies of accumulation; they also create morally positive ties between people and groups 
that creates a platform for ongoing transactions.  
To see this space through the lens of caste capitalism is to go beyond ideas of  
“postcolonial capitalism,” which graft the center/periphery divide onto ideas of “need” versus 
“accumulation” economies (Sanyal 2007). Certainly a distinction is evident here between 
corporate and “non-corporate” forms of capital (cf. Chatterjee 2011), with informal collectors’ 
earnings being so tightly bound to basic reproductive needs and the government program being 
twinned with a corporation. Yet, the distinction between need/subsistence and 
accumulation/profit does not capture the moral complexity and social transformation evident in 
this deeply hybridized space. The line between need/subsistence and accumulation/profit can be 
blurred from both ends of the status hierarchy. On the one hand, while corporations seem to fit 
neatly into the latter category, we have to wonder whether accumulation is the right lens for 
companies that only profit by siphoning money away from the state. (Infrastructure companies 
are extreme but certainly not unique in this regard). And, on the other hand, while Delhi’s 
informal collectors and low-level buyers might be seen as part of a need economy (their activities 
certainly do focus on subsistence), to label this space as only concerned with need does not 
adequately capture the fact that many of the actors within it aspire to accumulate and emulate 
business owners. The irony, of course, is that the so-called “need economy” in this case is the one 
operating according to economic principles of supply and demand, dependent on the availability 
of not only scrap but also global oil markets, while the “accumulation economy” operates 
according to rates fixed by negotiations and government contracts. Perhaps the terms market and 
monopoly would do more to describe these distinctions. 
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Rather than being exceptional as “informal” or postcolonial, then, spaces like the one 
described here are better understood extreme cases of how economic institutions are embedded 
in particular social contexts, much as Polanyi maintained. Beyond any idea of “postcolonial 
capitalism,” which grafts a West/Rest dichotomy onto national territories, distinctions are 
shaped by local systems of social status: gender, class, and especially race/ethnicity/caste. Rather 
than a rupture leaving to cleavage, what emerges is hybridized: not only do informal garbage 
collectors rely on caste-based and casteist (including anti-Muslim) practices, but so too do large 
corporations and other major state institutions rely on caste categories and social divisions. In 
this case, for example, the formal garbage collection trucks—much like the informal collection 
system—depends on members of the regional Balmiki Dalit community to populate its 
workforce. 
This approach to theorizing links between multiple forms of social difference and systems 
of capital accumulation extends work on racial capitalism, which centers the practical ways that 
actors experience economic systems and change, extending amore unidimensional critical 
political economy tradition focused on class. Cedric Robinson, who coined the term racial 
capitalism, puts this dynamic into historical context, maintaining that “capitalism was less a 
catastrophic revolution (negation) of feudalist social orders than the extension of these social 
relations into the larger tapestry of the modern world's political and economic relations” 
(Robinson 2000:10). In other words, transformation is an ongoing and fluid process whereby 
new forms of social relations and distinctions do not emerge ex nihilo, but rather develop from 
those that were already there.  
What I demonstrate here, however, is that conditions of structural difference (whether 
labeled “race” or “caste”) not only create limitations and exclusions, but also engender platforms 
for ongoing connection. Stigma here functions as a central factor that reinforces caste and 
community differences at multiple levels, producing key limitations that are often bitter and even 
morally repugnant, but so too do community ties form a basis for economic provisioning and 
exchange. A key tension emerges, as the creation of a liberal utopia based on equality in the 
economic realm would also flatten sources of meaning and identity that create socially productive 
ethical relations. This is what caste capitalism refers to: both the forms of difference that 
facilitate exploitation especially through devalued labor and the connective bonds that tie actors 
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together as they struggle to succeed. Caste capitalism, then, includes both the transactional 
economic limits and possibilities that are produced through caste-based differences, while also 
accounting for how categories themselves are shaped through economic relations.  
To introduce the idea of caste capitalism here is to connect the study of transactions the 
macro institutional forms that produced in the process. What emerges is a similar reproduction 
of capitalism and caste/community structures to what Cedric Robinson details in his classic 
work. Yet, rather than showing signs of protest and resistance, more liberatory futures are 
imagined through market transactions, as actors seek greater independence, rather than only 
against them (see also Ghertner 2015).  
 
The Social Organization of Environmental Systems  
If there is a well-theorized between capitalism (alternatively conceptualized as 
imperialism, neoliberalism, or the “capitalocene”) and environmental exploitation, so too must 
connections be made between processes of environmental racism and racial capitalism (cf. Pulido 
2017), in order to understand how economic systems lead to environmental and public health 
crises and recognize the limits of statist interventions intended to resolve them. 
This project makes a few key contributions to the field of environmental sociology, with a 
focus on how environmental institutions take shape (cf. Pellow 2000; Pellow and Nyseth Brehm 
2013; Taylor 2000). For one, it demonstrates that social inequalities may not only structure the 
distribution of environmental harms like air and water pollution, which has been at the center of 
environmental justice research and some of my own work (Kornberg 2016, 2019b; Krings, 
Kornberg, and Lane 2018), but also the provision of environmental goods. This case foregrounds 
a number of more widespread, and often problematic ironies—one of which is the fact that an 
environmental system is only extant because of socially discriminatory practices and inequalities 
that endow some groups with the ability to use more things while others can only survive on 
their offal.  
Second, this project contributes the project of understanding how environmental 
institutions take shape differently depending on global and local systems of power, particularly as 
they become embodied by particular actors (Doshi 2017; Peet, Robbins, and Watts 2011). 
Chapter 2, for example, shows the importance of the world stage in affecting how solid waste 
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programs were formed; technologies designed for wealthy Western contexts were adopted 
without considering locally available resources and workforces. What would be considered a 
standard service in the context of the global North instead came to indicate, to a postcolonial (i.e. 
colonized) state, an enviable amenity with the power to improve a city’s reputation. Meanwhile, 
local politicians and company managers also stood to benefit from the construction of capital-
intensive technologies, further resourcing their more personalized elite aspirations.  
Yet, the main contribution I want to emphasize here is that environmental institutions 
are crucially shaped not only by technology and power, but also meaning and culture. It is the 
meanings and values that actors have access to, based on their status positions, which 
consequently value environmental goods and forms of environmental practice. In India’s 
postcolonial context, modernity—and specifically ideas of ecological modernization—retain a 
kind of allure that has been arguably replaced in wealthier nations by a return to the “artisan” and 
handmade. If locally grown vegetables and composting are seen as hip and progressive in high-
status western contexts, in India they tend to be seen as inferior (the word “local” tends to be 
pejorative in the sense of it being low quality). 
As environmental actors, Delhi’s garbage collectors and recyclers are of course largely 
unaware of their environmental subjectivities. Their actions and are widely depicted as “dirty” in 
a system predicated on caste and casteism, which only internationally connected NGOs tend to 
uplift as environmentally beneficial forms of recycling per se. More generally, claims to 
environmentalism—via discourses of “clean,” “green,” and “scientific”—have primarily been 
made by more powerful, high-caste actors touting developmentalist agendas; to be “green” is to 
be clean and modern—yet another amenity that adds aesthetic value to urban space and 
residences, rather than providing a check on the exploitation of resources. Apart from the 
framing of environmental goods themselves, then, the social structure of environmental systems 
is based not only on divisions such as class, caste, and race, but also the culturally specific forms 
that those inequalities take.  
At the heart of these problems, then, are how categories of worth of generated through 
transactional pathways to frame certain forms of environmental discourse as valid while 
devaluing others. Who is empowered to define these, of course, depends on their social position, 
making environmental claims deeply tied up with status. Similar dynamics are evident in wealthy 
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countries, where the cultivation of parks, provision of recycling and composting services, and 
access to safe and ethical food tend to be for white middle-class and elite communities. With 
claims to green or environmental consumption, these tendencies become even more pronounced; 
environmental stewardship becomes something one can buy, if only the products are available 
and a person can afford them. All things are commodified, as whiteness justifies capitalist 
orientations towards the planet as a neutral project.  
But environmentalism is not only something one does or does not do; it is a system that 
is socially defined. The question, then, is who gets to claim environmental practice: is it the 
working poor, women, and indigenous communities, or is it a white, elite, and masculine 
conception that prevails? In order to get at these wider cultural politics, there is an urgent need to 
expand the kinds of cases and questions that environmental sociology examines, going beyond 
already existing movements, organizations, and identified problems to grappling with stickier 
questions of how environmental problems are defined, who gets access to environmental goods, 
and what systems of meaning and inequality shape them.  
At stake is not only contests over local environmental claims and conceptions, but the 
very ability to articulate them in the first place. Here, for example, we have seen how recycling 
has persisted despite dominant actors in Delhi attempting to replace it with less environmentally 
beneficial approaches like incineration. This has important consequences for the environment in 
terms of material use, air pollution (from the incinerators being built), and groundwater pollution 
(from landfilling). Despite this, however, environmentally beneficial systems are at a high risk of 
being dismissed as backwards or dirty in postcolonial contexts like India’s. Where that line is 
drawn depends on the cultural context, and its effects have serious environmental consequences.  
Social distinctions are what uphold this economy and its division of labor, tasking 
particular groups with doing the dirty work so that others don’t have to. On the other hand, 
making distinctions between materials is also necessary in order to facilitate material re-use and 
recycling. When everything is massed together (with standardization/homogenization being 
central to ideas of modernity), possibilities for re-use or recycling are significantly reduced (think 
not only of landfills here, but also single-stream recycling, which has proven to be so 
problematic). Making distinctions, then, is not the problem. The problem is the basis on which 
they are made, who makes them, and what the effects are.   
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*   *   * 
There is no shortage of contemporary support for modernist ideas—from mechanization, 
to sterile architecture and strong nation-states—not in the global North and especially not in the 
Global South. In India, for example, Modi’s fantastic rise to power hinged on ideas of forward 
motion, captured by calls for progress and waves sweeping the nation. Differences, especially of 
caste, have been exacerbated even as they’ve been swept (nearly literally, through programs like 
Swacch Bharat) under the rug. As “Bharat,” the theory still goes, nationality triumphs over 
longstanding systems of discrimination, rendering claims to caste and religion (or casteism and 
Islamophobia) as themselves backward, while upper-caste Hindus claim a neutral status for 
themselves that theoretically and practically resembles Whiteness elsewhere. 
The rise of modern forms of development were intended to render existing systems 
“traditional” and meaningless. Shorn of their relevance, these systems—practices, organizations, 
civilizations even—themselves become a kind of waste from the perspective of those bringing 
“Development.” Indigenous mounds in North America, for example, are all that remain where 
towns once stood, their markers (or lack thereof) indicating a civilization that has been deemed 
no longer relevant by the now-white European descendants who conquered their territories. Yet 
those heaps of mud contain souls and their things, which we might imagine calling out during 
this time of climate crisis: “What if everything had gone differently?” What if “Development” 
had come to mean something else, in a different language, that brought us to commune with 
nonhuman species in ways that left smaller mounds, that left so much less of our trace, our scars, 
on this planet? 
To envision a future is beyond the scope of this project. Yet I aim to contribute to this 
urgent need by tracing the alternatives that exist in the now. These aren’t utopias. They aren’t 
non-capitalist (in fact they’re perhaps more capitalist than the so-called “capitalist” economy that 
is more monopolistic than competitive). And they aren’t socially equitable. But they do offer 
insight into other ways of relating—to each other and to the things we waste—that reach  
beyond stale, modernist ideas of “market,” “state,” and “civil society.”   
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